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Preface
This chronology provides a background briefing on the 32-year history of orbital debris and near-
Earth environmental management. It concisely charts the development, growing awareness, and
management of the orbital debris problem from 1961 to July 1, 1993. This chronology is, of course,
not exhaustive. However, every effort has been made to include entries which at least touch upon
all the important aspects of the history of orbital debris and management of the near-Earth environ-
ment.
The expository sections (e.g., Introduction - A Primer on the Problem) cover specific aspects of orbital
debris and near-Earth environmental management which cannot be treated adequately in the
chronology entries. They also provide overviews of complex event sequences which are difficult to
track through the entries.
Included are entries describing important events in space history and space technology develop-
ment which may not be directly related to orbital debris. One purpose for including these is to
provide context for the orbital debris and near-Earth environmental management events. Another
is to depict how human space activities have become Increasingly complex, costly, and interna-
tional in the past 3 decades. At the same time, they have become increasingly vital to human
civilization and increasingly vulnerable to the growing population of orbital debris.
Every effort has been made to make this chronology international in scope. However, difficulty
with acquiring source materials from other countries in English may mean some important events
have been omitted. We encourage orbital debris researchers in other countries to produce their
own histories In order to make the record more complete.
This document was compiled through research using the History Office and the STI Center at
Johnson Space Center (JSC). In addition, David S. F. Portree conducted approximately 35 hrs of
interviews with key players in the history of orbital debris. Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., is co-author, yet he
was interviewed in the same manner as the other key players. For this reason, and in order to
adequately attribute his information and interpretations, his interviews are listed in the citations.
This chronology makes no attempt to list all of the more than 120 known satellite breakups occur-
ring in the period it covers. Only significant breakup events are included. The counts of objects
produced in these breakups and remaining in orbit on December 31, 1992, are drawn from the
Satellite Situation Report, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), Vol. 32, No. 12.
The number of artificial objects in Earth orbit is given with the heading for each year in order to
suggest the growing magnitude of humanity's impact on the near-Earth environment. It is drawn
from the NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command)/USSPACECOM catalog, and
was provided by Special Projects, AFSPACECOM (letter, Capt. Robert B. Teets, Chief, Special
Projects, to Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., September 29, 1993). This end-of-year "box score" is not appropri-
ate for use in technical analysis, as Darren McKnight and Nicholas Johnson have pointed out
(Aerospace America, April 1989, pp. 13-14). It is, however, appropriate for use in this historical
document.
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numerous contributions to space exploration. In July-August 1985, he fulfilled his long-held ambi-
tion of making astronomical observations from orbit on the STS 51-F Space Shuttle mission (Chal-
lenger/Spacelab 2). After retiring from the astronaut corps, Dr. Henize conducted orbital debris
observations for the JSC Space Science Branch. He made many significant contributions to the
orbital debris field, including improving our understanding of the orbital debris detection sensitiv-
ity of ground-based telescopes. He will be sorely missed by his many friends and colleagues. This
chronology, to which he made important contributions, is dedicated to his memory.
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The Chronology
Introduction - A Primer on the Problem
Human space activities are almost entirely restricted to two Earth orbit altitude regions - low Earth
orbit (LEO) and geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). The former, 200-2000 km high, is the only
region where spacecraft carrying crews venture today (the U.S. Shuttle and Russian Soyuz and Mir
operate 200-615 km high). The latter, 36,000 km high, is dominated by the economically important
space industry of satellite telecommunications. In GEO and LEO, human activities have become an
important feature of the environment - at least in their effect on other human activities (this is best
known for LEO - see fig. 1).
As a general rule, the higher above Earth's atmosphere a satellite orbits, the longer it will persist in
orbit. At GEO altitude, atmospheric drag is unimportant. A GEO satellite is likely to orbit for
millions of years. LEO is continually cleansed by atmospheric drag. Nevertheless, many LEO
objects orbit for years, and most will orbit for centuries. The oldest artificial space object is the U.S.
Vanguard 1 satellite. The 3968-by-650-km orbit it reached on March 17, 1958, ensured its longevity.
The first satellite, the Soviet Union's Sputnik 1, decayed from its low orbit on January 1, 1958, less
than 3 months after launch.
Of the approximately 23,000 orbiting artificial objects catalogued in the past 3 decades, about 7200
remain aloft. The Earth-orbital regions humans most use are so large that 7200 orbiting objects
would constitute only the beginning of a crowding problem, if the numbers stopped there. But
objects put into space seldom remain as they were on the ground. They shed shrouds, lens caps,
booster upper stages, nuts, bolts, paint chips, and bits of foil. In addition, solid rocket motors spray
out billions of tiny aluminum particles; Space Shuttle orbiters dump waste water, which forms
clouds of snowflakes; and spent upper stages and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons explode. Most
artificial space objects are too small to be detected from the ground using conventional satellite
tracking techniques. The smallest of the more than 7200 objects in the USSPACECOM (formerly
NORAD) catalog are about 10 cm across. There are estimated to be about 20 untrackable 1-cm
objects and nearly 10,000 untrackable 1-mm objects for every trackable object. Artificial objects as
small as I micron could number 100 trillion (fig. 2).
All of these objects have the potential to collide with other objects. The average speed of collision in
LEO is about 10 km/sec. At that speed, a 1-cm object massing a few grams packs the kinetic energy
of a 250-kg object moving at 100 km/hr. In GEO speeds are slower and the volume of space is
larger, but objects stay in orbit and pose a hazard longer.
When collisions occur more pieces are produced. When a paint chip the size of a grain of salt blasts
a 3-mm pit in a Space Shuttle orbiter - not an uncommon occurrence - tiny fragments spray free
and add to the orbital debris population. When a 1000-kg satellite is broken up by collision with a
10-cm object, millions of pieces will be produced. Many will be capable of causing new breakups.
Secondary collisions could produce enough secondary debris that the most heavily trafficked
orbital regions will become unusable. This is called runaway debris generation, the Kessler Syn-
drome, or collisional cascading. It may already be too late to prevent this from happening at certain
altitudes.
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Figure 1.
In 1993 there were more than 7200 catalogued objects in Earth orbit. Finite probabilities exist that
catalogued objects will pass near to or collide with a spacecraft. This chart shows how probabilities
vary according to the altitude at which the spacecraft orbits. In certain orbital altitude regions -
700-1100 km and 1400-1600 km - there is already substantial risk of collision between a spacecraft
and a catalogued object. However, the real risk comes not from catalogued objects, but from
uncatalogued objects, which are vastly more numerous (see fig. 2).
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as Estimated from Various Measurements
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Figure 2.
The precise number of human-made objects in space is unknown. The present (1993) NORAD/
USSPACECOM catalog lists about 7200 objects. Use of detection methods more sensitive than those
employed to create the catalog has produced dramatically higher estimates of the number of objects
in Earth orbit. The smallest objects (paint chips, splinters of glass, and aluminum particles sprayed
out by solid rocket motors) likely number 100 trillion. This chart is based on measurements which
sample the environment and shows estimates of the number of objects in orbit of a given size and
larger.
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April 12
June 28
June 29
July
October 21
The Soviet Union launches Vostok 1. Its occupant, Yuri Gagarin, is the first
human in space. His flight lasts about 90 min. Vostok I is a small target for
artificial space objects, which, of course, are few at this time. It is approxi-
mately 4 m long and masses 4725 kg.
Three-and-a-half years after the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, reaches
orbit, the First Aerospace Control Squadron of the U.S. Air Force uses diverse
radar and optical instruments to catalog 115 Earth-orbiting satellites. The
instruments include NORAD's Baker-Nunn Schmidt cameras and the
NAVSPASUR (Naval Space Surveillance System) radars headquartered at
Dahlgren, Virginia.
Two hours after separating from the U.S. Transit 4-A satellite, its Able Star
upper stage becomes the first known artificial object to break up unintention-
ally in space. The cause of the explosion is unknown. The event produces at
least 294 trackable pieces, more than tripling the number of known satellites
of Earth. Writing in 1966, satellite watcher Desmond King-Hele called this
the first of the "real population explosions" in space. He said, "these bits and
pieces.., are a real curse.., especially since most of the fragments will re-
main in orbit for a hundred years or more. By then the scrap metal may have
cost more to track than the rocket cost to construct." Of the pieces produced,
about 200 were still being tracked in orbit on December 31, 1992, more than
30 years after the breakup that created them.
Desmond King-Hele, Observing Earth Satellites,
St. Martin's Press, New York, 1966.
Project Moonwatch observers in Sacramento, California, observe 54 frag-
ments of the Transit 4-A upper stage. Project Moonwatch was organized in
1957 by Fred Whipple of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO).
During its 18 years of operation (1957-1975), teams of amateur astronomers
around the world track satellites optically and report their observations to the
SAO. Some observers log thousands of satellite sightings.
Thornton L. Page, Andrew E. Potter, and Donald J. Kessler, "The History of
Orbital Debris," 1990 (unpublished draft paper).
The U.S. Air Force launches the Midas 4 satellite on what is primarily a
military surveillance mission. The satellite also deploys a spinning 35-kg
canister into orbit at 3220 km in support of Project West Ford. The canister
holds 350 million hair-like copper dipole antennas, the West Ford Needles.
They are meant to scatter along Midas 4's orbit, forming an 8 km wide, 40-km
deep belt around the Earth. The dipole belt will serve as a passive radio
reflector for military communications. Information about the experiment
released before launch raised protests from optical and radio astronomers.
The Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences countered by
describing how, in June 1960, it concluded that releasing the dipoles would
"not harm any branch of science." A statement of U.S. government policy on
1961-1963
Project West Ford by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Science and Technology, reinforced the Board view. The Board
invites optical and radio astronomers to help study the effects of the dipole
release. It maintains that the belt will be nearly undetectable, even to as-
tronomers seeking it, and short-lived. These assertions are not tested, how-
ever, because the dipoles do not leave their canister.
"Project West Ford," Spaceflight, January 1962, pp. 24-25; Patrick Moore,
"Communications on the Moon," Spaceflight, July 1963, p. 122; lnteravia
Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, p. 205.
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February 20
October 24
John Glenn becomes the first American in LEO. His Mercury capsule, Friend-
ship 7, orbits Earth three times. Like Vostok, its Soviet counterpart, it pre-
sents a small target to space objects. Friendship 7 is about 3 m long and 2 m in
diameter. Three more orbital flights follow in the Mercury program. The last
and longest is Gordon Cooper's 22-orbit flight of May 15-16, 1963. It lasts 34
hr, 20 min.
The Soviet Union launches Sputnik 29. On October 29 its
SL-6 booster upper stage explodes, producing 24 trackable debris pieces.
None remain in orbit.
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February 11
February 14
Ernest W. Peterkin, Operational Research Branch, U.S. Naval Research
Laboratory, publishes the first of two memoranda on satellite collisions.
Titled "Some Characteristics of the Artificial Earth Satellite Population," it
predicts that the catalogued population will grow by 318 objects per year.
This approximates the actual annual growth rate for catalogued objects up to
the mid-1980s, uncorrected for the effects of solar activity.
Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 3, July 1. 1991.
Peterkin's second memorandum is called "Implications of Artificial Satellite
Population Growth for Long Range Naval Planning." He describes several
ways in which a large satellite population could interfere with future naval
operations. It might clutter space, making surveillance of surface targets
difficult; interfere with future ASAT operations by creating a confusingly
large number of targets; create decoy cover for fleet-launched ballistic mis-
siles; and overload missile early warning systems.
Ibid.
1963-1965
May 9 The U.S. Air Force launches Midas 6. In spite of protests from astronomers,
part of its mission is to support a repeat of the Project West Ford experiment.
This time the plan is to release about 400 million dipoles into orbit. The
experiment is only a partial success, because the dipoles do not scatter prop-
erly. It produces more than 150 trackable debris pieces, presumably clumps
of dipoles. Of the trackable clumps, about 100 remained aloft on December
31, 1992. Project West Ford is not repeated, in part because of the success of
the active communications relay satellite Telstar 1, launched on July 10, 1962.
Patrick Moore, "Communications on the Moon," Spaceflight, July 1963, p.
122; Interavia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, p. 205.
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April 21
August 19
October 28
The U.S. launches the Transit 5BN3 navigation satellite. The spacecraft is
powered by the SNAP (Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power) 9 nuclear
generator. It scatters radioactive materials over the Indian Ocean after its
Scout launch vehicle fails. This is the worst space accident involving release
of radioactive material until the uncontrolled reentry of the Cosmos 954
spacecraft in 1978.
lnteravia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, pp. 191-192.
Syncom 3 is the first successful satellite in GEO. It orbits Earth in approxi-
mately 24 hours, so from the ground it appears to remain almost stationary
above the equatorial Pacific Ocean. The satellite acts as an antenna atop a
tower reaching a tenth of the way to the Moon, relaying television from the
Tokyo Olympics to half the Earth. The USSPACECOM catalog contains no
current elements for this satellite. It probably remains in GEO, adrift. In the
3 decades since Syncom 3, hundreds of satellites have taken up residence in
the economically valuable GEO region.
Arthur C. Clarke, The Promise of Space, Pyramid Books, 1968, p. 126.
Cosmos 50 is a reconnaissance satellite designed to return exposed film to the
Soviet Union. After its recovery system fails, the Soviets command it to self-
destruct so it will not land outside their national territory. None of the
approximately 100 debris pieces produced remain in orbit.
Cumulative launches (since 1957) 404 )1965 Catalogued objects in orbit 919
March 18 The Soviet Union launches Voskhod 2, a modified version of the Vostok
spacecraft. Voskhod 2 carries a deployable airlock. Alexei Leonov exits the
spacecraft through this airlock to become the first person to conduct an
extravehicular activity (EVA). Pavel Belyayev observes the 23-min
spacewalk from inside Voskhod 2.
March23
June28
October15
November26
1965-1966
Virgil Grissom and John Young enter space aboard the Gemini 3 spacecraft.
Their flight, a test of basic Gemini systems, lasts nearly 5 hrs. Gemini is the
first manned spacecraft capable of extensive maneuvers, rendezvous and
docking, and extended duration flights (up to 2 wks). Each Gemini capsule is
approximately 6 m long and 3 m in diameter.
Early Bird (Intelsat 1) triples trans-Atlantic telephone capacity by providing
240 telephone circuits. Early Bird is a drum 70 cm in diameter which weighs
68 kg at launch. The satellite is launched into a GEO slot at 325 deg east, over
the Atlantic Ocean. The first commercial communications satellite, Early Bird
is operated by the Intelsat Organization, a not-for-profit international corpo-
ration formed by 124 countries and signatories on August 20, 1964. The
satellite operates for more than 3 years.
A U.S. Titan 3C transtage breaks up at an altitude of 739 km shortly after
attaining orbit. This remains the worst known orbital debris event until 1986,
with nearly 475 trackable debris pieces added to the near-Earth environment.
About 100 trackable pieces remained in orbit on December 31, 1992. This is
the only time a Titan transtage was left in LEO where its breakup could be
confirmed by ground radars. About 30 have been left in GEO. At least one
of those is believed to have broken up. However, USSPACECOM tracking
limitations prevent confirmation.
Note, Donald J. Kessler to David S. F. Portree, August 2, 1993.
France becomes the third country (after the Soviet Union and the U.S.) to
launch a satellite. Its A-1 (Asterix) satellite is launched into a 1758-km-by-
528-km orbit at a 34-deg inclination by a Diamant launch vehicle.
966 Cumulative launches (since 1957)Catalogued objects in orbit
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March
March 16
R. E. Dalton and J. N. Thilges of TRW Systems, Florida Operations, publish
Gemini GT-8 Orbital Collision Hazard Evaluation, in which they state that "the
logical admissibility of a collision between the spacecraft of the
GT-8 mission and other orbiting objects is recognized to exist." They assume
data supplied by NORAD for February 1-6, 1966, includes all Earth-orbiting
satelhtes. Approach within 15 m is considered a collision. They determine
that the probability is very small that the Gemini 8 capsule will be struck by
orbital debris during the planned mission. A 313-km-by-145-km elhptical
orbit yields a collision probabihty of 1.7 x 10-9; a 242-km circular orbit yields
a collision probability of 2.1 x 10-9; and a 268-km circular orbit yields a colli-
sion probability of 2.3 xl0 -9.
R. E. Dalton and J. N. Thilges, Gemini GT-8 Orbital Collision Hazard
Evaluation, TRW Systems, Florida Operations, March 1966.
Gemini 8 becomes the first spacecraft to dock with another vehicle in LEO.
Shortly after they dock their spacecraft with the Augmented Target Docking
Adapter (ATDA), Gemini 8 mission commander Neil Armstrong and pilot
1966-1967
May 7
May 9
July 20
David Scott experience the first on-orbit emergency. A jammed maneuvering
thruster forces them to undock from the ATDA and make an emergency
reentry.
U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson calls for an international treaty to regulate
space exploration. He calls for the treaty to cover astronaut rescue and return
to country of origin in the event of emergency landing, and liability for
damage caused by space objects.
David S. F. Portree, Thirty Years Together: A Chronology of U.S.-Soviet Space
Cooperation (NASA CR 185707), February 1993, p. 7.
The U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. presents the U.N. Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) with a draft of the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the Outer Space Treaty).
The draft version contains the stipulation that countries which cause damage
through their space activities should be liable to make compensation for that
damage.
Ibid.
A camera wielded by astronaut Michael Collins becomes orbital debris. He
loses it while performing a spacewalk during the Gemini 10 mission. Before
reentry, Collins and mission commander John Young open the hatches and
discard unneeded equipment into orbit. None of this debris remains in orbit
today.
Michael Collins, Carrying the Fire: An Astronaut's Journeys, Giroux, Farrar,
and S_aus, 1974, pp. 235-236; James Grimwood, Barton Hacker, and Peter
Vorzimmer, Project Gemini: A Chronology (NASA SP 4002), Washington,
NASA Scientific and Technical Information Division, 1969, p. 251.
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January 27
April 10
The U.N. opens the Outer Space Treaty to signature. The U.S., the Soviet
Union, and more than 60 other nations sign. The final version of the treaty
largely avoids the divisive issue of liability for damage caused by space
activities.
David S. F. Portree, Thirty Years Together." A Chronology of U.S.-Soviet Space
Cooperation (NASA CR 185707), February 1993, p. 8.
A NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) Flight Analysis Branch Internal
Note espouses the prevailing view of the amount of orbital debris circling
Earth, when it states that "the number of untrackable fragments which result
from explosions of satellites in orbit and whose radar cross section areas are
too small to be tracked by NORAD, constitutes an insignificant increase in
the total number of objects in earth orbit and hence can be neglected in the
calculation of collision probability." They calculate the probability of coUi-
April 23-24
October10
December27
1967-1968
sion for an Apollo spacecraft to be only 3.68 x 10 -5 for a 12-day mission and
11.16 x 10-4 for a 1-year stay in Earth orbit.
"Collision Probability of Apollo Spacecraft with Objects in Earth Orbit" (MSC
IN 67-FM-44), April 10, 1967.
The Soviet Union launches Soyuz I with cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov
aboard. Its mission is to dock with Soyuz 2. A cosmonaut from Soyuz 2 will
then transfer by EVA to Soyuz I and return to the Soviet Union with
Komarov. The mission is a rehearsal for several parts of the Soviet manned
lunar landing mission plan. Soyuz I has power and guidance problems
immediately after orbital insertion. The Soyuz 2 launch is postponed. Dur-
ing reentry the parachute system malfunctions and Komarov is killed.
The Outer Space Treaty comes into force.
The Soviet Union launches Cosmos 198, its first Radar-equipped Ocean
Reconnaissance Satellite (RORSAT). The satellite carries a nuclear reactor,
which separates and boosts to a 948-km-by-889-km storage orbit on Decem-
ber 29. Cosmos 198 is the first of 33 RORSATs launched up to March 1988.
Thirty-one RORSAT reactors were in storage orbit in July 1993.
Jos Heyman, Spacecraft Tables, Univelt, Inc., San Diego, 1992, p. 115.
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October 11-22
October 20
November 1
Apollo 7 is the first flight of the U.S. Apollo Command and Service Module
(CSM) spacecraft. Walter Cunningham, Donn Eisele, and Walter Schirra
simulate docking and test the Apollo spacecraft systems in anticipation of
lunar missions. The Apollo spacecraft is about 4 m in diameter and 10 m
long.
Cosmos 249 is the first ASAT weapon. It is designed to maneuver close to a
target in orbit and explode, pelting it with fragments. Cosmos 248 is the
target. After reaching a 2135-km-by-538-km orbit at a 62.3 deg inclination,
Cosmos 249 explodes, creating more than 110 trackable pieces of debris. Of
these, about half remained in orbit on December 31, 1992.
Nicholas L. Johnson, "Artificial Satellite Breakups (Part 2): Soviet Anti-
Satellite Programme," Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 36,
1983, pp. 357-362; Interavia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor,
p. 188.
The Cosmos 252 ASAT achieves a 2134-km-by-538-km orbit at a 62.3-deg
inclination. It explodes when it passes near the Cosmos 248 target satellite.
The intentional fragmentation produces 139 trackable debris pieces, of which
about 50 remained in orbit on December 31, 1992.
Ibid.
1968-1970
December 21-27 The Apollo 8 spacecraft carries astronauts Frank Borman, William Anders,
and James Lovell out of LEO. They complete 10 orbits of the Moon. This the
first of nine times humans leave LEO.
1969
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1783
July 16-24
September 18
On Apollo 11 Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin land their Lunar Module
(LM) Eagle on the Sea of Tranquility. Michael Collins remains in lunar orbit
aboard CSM Columbia.
Intelsat 3-F1, launched this date, is the first satellite of the Intelsat 3 series.
The eight satellites in the series each have 1200 telephone circuits and four TV
channels. Whenever possible, at end-of-life they are boosted above GEO.
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February 11
April 24
August
October 20
The Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science (ISAS) launches Osumi, the
first satellite launched by Japan, atop a Lambda 4S-5 rocket. The test satellite
transmits for 17 hrs from a 5150-km-by-340-km orbit at a 31-deg inclination.
The Peoples' Republic of China launches its first satellite. A Long March 1
rocket places China I into a 2386-km-by-441-km orbit at a 68.4-deg inclina-
tion.
Skynet 1B, a British military communications satellite, is launched on a U.S.
Delta rocket. It is targeted for GEO, but its apogee kick motor fails. The
failure may have created a long-lived debris cloud. It may periodically pass
through GEO (no sensors exist to permit certainty). No orbital elements are
maintained for Skynet lB.
NicholasL. Johnson,"The Crowded Sky: The Danger of Collisions in
Geostationary Orbit," Spaceflight, Vol. 24, No. 12, December 1982, pp. 446-
449.
In an MSC Internal Note titled "Collision Probabilities of Future Manned
Missions with Objects in Earth Orbit," Michael E. Donahoo of the Flight
Analysis Branch updates the April 10, 1967 calculations and applies them to
Skylab, a space station, and a large space base. Donahoo's calculations
assume that the uncatalogued debris population is insignificant. He calcu-
lates the probability that a Skylab will be hit by orbital debris during an 8-
month mission to be 2.27 x 10 -4. The probability for a space station is 1.083 x
10-2. It is 1.179 x 10 -2 for the large space base. He states that the large colli-
l0
October20-30
1970-1971
sion probabilities are "not surprising when the increased mission durations
and larger vehicle sizes are considered."
Michael E. Donahoo, "Collision Probability of Future Manned Missions with
Objects in Earth Orbit" (MSC IN 70-FM-168), October 20, 1970.
The Soviet Union's Cosmos 373 is launched on October 20 to serve as an
ASAT target. The Cosmos 374 ASAT is launched on October 23. It explodes
into more than 100 trackable pieces after two-and-a-half orbits, 4 hours after
launch. Cosmos 375 intercepts Cosmos 373 on October 30 and explodes into
more than 40 trackable pieces. Of the pieces produced in the two explosions,
more than half remained in orbit on December 31, 1992.
Report on Orbital Debris, IG (Space), February, 1989; Nicholas L. Johnson,
"Artificial Satellite Breakups (Part 2): Soviet Anti-Satellite Programme,"
Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 36, 1983; lnteravia Space
Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, p. 188.
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Space Stations and Liability Issues, 1970-1973
By 1970, NASA had well-advanced plans for large space stations. The Agency forecast the 1970s
and 1980s to be decades of rapidly developing space activity. Large spacecraft for the Moon and
Mars would be built and serviced in LEO. Some researchers became concerned that stray satellites
might threaten planned large spacecraft and orbital facilities.
At the same time, concern increased over the possibility that objects falling from space could cause
harm on Earth. After 5 years of stalemate, U.S. and Soviet negotiators made progress on the U.N.-
sponsored Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. The Liabil-
ity Convention, as it was called, was both a vehicle for and a product of detente between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union, just as was the more famous Apollo-Soyuz linkup of July 1975. Before enter-
ing into an agreement, however, U.S. negotiators wanted an estimate of the probability that their
space activity would actually cause damage on Earth for which they would be held responsible.
For this reason NASA launched studies of uncontrolled reentries. Some of these studies would
have implications for later research into orbital debris collision hazards.
February 25 The Cosmos 397 ASAT assumes a 2203-km-by-572-km orbit at a 65.3-deg
inclination and explodes near its Cosmos 394 target, producing about 120
trackable debris fragments. More than 50 remained in orbit on December 31,
1992.
Ibid.
March 31 NORAD civilian analyst John R. Gabbard publishes NORAD Analysis
Memorandum 71-8, "Systematic Discontinuities in the Location of Satellite
Explosion Fragments." The document is the first to describe techniques for
analyzing artificial and natural satellite breakups. It lays the groundwork for
11
1971
April 19
May 25
June 29-July 3
July 23
October
December I
the Gabbard diagram, a widely-used graphical tool for orbital debris research
(fig. 3).
Nicholas L. Johnson and Darren McKnight, Artificial Space Debris, revised
edition, Orbit Books, 1991.
The Soviet Union launches Salyut 1, the first space station, into a 210-km-by-
200-km orbit at a 51.6-deg inclination. Salyut I is nearly 16 m long and
weighs 19,000 kg. The Soyuz 11 crew of Georgi Dobrovolski, Vladislav
Volkov, and Victor Patseyev spend three weeks aboard the station (June 6-30,
1971), the longest period humans have spent in space up to this time. During
reentry the crew perishes. No further crews are sent to Salyut 1. It is com-
manded to reenter in October 1971.
James McCarter, Aero-Astrodynamics Laboratory, NASA Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC), writes a memorandum on "Space Station Satellite
Collision Avoidance." He assumes a space station in a 450-500-km, 55 deg
orbit. He also assumes that the NORAD catalog of space objects is a com-
plete inventory of Earth-orbiting satellites. He determines that the space
station could avoid collisions by using small rockets to change altitude by 3-4
km. This would be practical because it would expend only 9-40 kg of fuel
each time. NORAD monitoring combined with a dedicated debris avoidance
radar and computer on the station would provide collision warnings.
McCarter calculates the collision probability to be only about 2-3% over 10
years.
Memorandum, S&E-AERO-MMD/Mission Design Section, NASA MSFC,
May 25, 1971.
Negotiations on the Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (the Liability Convention) are held in Geneva,
Switzerland under auspices of the U.N. COPUOS.
David S. F. Portree, Thirty Years Together." A Chronology of U.S.-Soviet Space
Cooperation (NASA CR 185707), February 1993, p. 14.
Morton Shaw, NASA Headquarters Safety Office, asserts in a memorandum
that there must be debris in orbit too small for NORAD to detect. He states
that the probability of a space station collision with orbital debris could be up
to 8% for a 10-year period. Shaw outlines a plan to form a working group to
create a NASA orbital debris program. MSFC receives primary responsibility
for research. MSFC researchers continue to develop computer programs for
calculating collision probabilities, but fail to include an uncatalogued debris
population in their calculations.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, May I l, 1993; Thornton
L. Page, Andrew E. Potter, and Donald J. Kessler, '_I'he History of Orbital
Debris," 1990 (unpublished draft paper).
The U.K. becomes the sixth nation to launch a satellite on its own launch
vehicle. The Prospero test satellite rides a Black Arrow rocket to LEO.
D. E. Besette, NASA Headquarters, writes a memorandum that says collision
avoidance is impractical for Skylab. He maintains that this is not necessary in
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Figure 3.
The Gabbard diagram plots perigee and apogee altitudes for pieces produced in on-orbit breakups
as a function of orbital period. The orbits of pieces thrown in the direction of motion of the satellite
increase in apogee and period. They are plotted by the two arms on the right side of the "X'-
shaped Gabbard plot. The top arm on the right side plots apogees (in this case above the satellite's
original altitude), while the bottom arm shows perigees (at or near the sateUite's original altitude).
Pieces thrown against the orbital motion decrease in altitude and orbital period. They are plotted
on the left side of the "X." Again, the top arm displays apogees (this time at or near the satellite's
original orbital altitude) and the bottom arm perigees. Pieces thrown at right angles to the
satellite's orbital path cluster at the center of the "X" because their orbital periods and altitudes are
not changed substantially by the breakup. If no other force acted on the pieces, they would all
continue to pass through the altitude at which the breakup occurred. However, atmospheric drag
causes apogees to decrease over time. This effect is most noticeable on the left side of the "X,"
among the pieces with the lowest perigees. The left side of the Gabbard plot appears to sag over
time as pieces succumb to atmospheric drag and decay from orbit.
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1971-1972
December 3
any case, as the probability of a debris collision with the Orbital Workshop is
only 0.01%.
Ibid.
Cosmos 462 enters an 1800-km-by-229-km orbit at a 65-deg inclination, then
explodes near Cosmos 459. Improvements in superpower relations mean this
is the last Soviet ASAT test until 1976. The test produces 29 trackable debris
fragments, none of which remained in orbit by 1982.
Report on Orbital Debris, IG (Space), February 1989; Nicholas L. Johnson,
"Artificial Satellite Breakups (Part 2): Soviet Anti-Satellite Programme,"
Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 36, 1983, pp. 357-362;
lnteravia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, pp. 188.
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January 12
June 8
June 15
J. E. McGolrick, NASA Headquarters Space Sciences Office, circulates a
memorandum summarizing the January 4 meeting of a task group on orbital
debris criteria for future NASA missions. The meeting concerned uncon-
trolled reentry of space objects rather than collisions with orbital debris.
McGolrick states that early in the meeting a NASA policy of creating no
uncontrolled orbital debris was proposed; however, after discussion, the
group decided that such a policy would "seriously impact science and appli-
cations spacecraft weights and costs."
Memorandum for the Record from SV/Advanced Programs and Technology
Program Manager, January 12, 1972.
James McCarter publishes calculations which state that a space station with a
radius of 50 m has an 8% probability of colliding with orbital debris if operat-
ing at 700-1000-km altitude, and a 1.5% probability at 440-500 km. He as-
sumes the NORAD catalog is complete.
James McCarter, Probability of Satellite Collision (NASA TMX-64671 ), June
8, 1972.
Dr. Homer Newell, NASA Associate Administrator, and other NASA officials
are briefed on orbital debris reentry hazards by members of a headquarters
group assigned to study the problem. According to the transparencies used
in the briefing, existing space tracking systems and early warning radars are
unable to track objects throughout every orbit and are limited to northern
hemisphere coverage. Available tracking systems can detect objects down to
the size of a tennis ball, which includes 75-95% of all artificial objects in space.
At the 6-cm wavelength the systems can detect objects down to the size of a
walnut, but "the inventory of such objects is very limited." The officials hear
that most U.S. space objects pose little uncontrolled reentry hazard, though
"the Skylab hazard will be somewhat higher."
Memorandum with enclosure, PA/Senior Technical Officer William A.
Fleming to FM3/Robert McAdams, July 5, 1972.
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Laws for Orbital Debris: The U.N. Space Treaties of 1967 and 1972
1972
The framers of the U.N.-sponsored space treaties of 1967 and 1972 were not aware of the hazards to
space operations of orbital debris. Nevertheless, space law experts generally agree that, in the
absence of international treaties dedicated to regulating orbital debris, these international agree-
ments remain the most pertinent to the orbital debris problem.
On July 13, 1988, S. Neil Hosenball, former NASA General Counsel and U.N. Delegate, told the U.S.
House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications that Articles VI, VII, and IX of the 1967
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space
(the Outer Space Treaty) can be applied to the orbital debris problem. Article VI says that state
parties to the treaty bear international responsibility for their national space activities, whether
sponsored by government or by private organizations. Article VII establishes the principle that a
state party to the treaty which launches or procures the launch of an object into space is internation-
ally liable for damage caused by that object to another state party of the treaty. Article IX states that
state parties to the treaty should be guided by the principles of cooperation and mutual assistance.
Hosenball maintained that the phrase "potentially harmful interference" can be applied to orbital
debris. If a state party has cause to believe that the activities of another state party will interfere
with the peaceful use and exploration of space, it may request consultation. At the same time,
states planning activities which could cause interference should provide opportunity for consulta-
tion before proceeding.
According to Hosenball, the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (the Liability Convention) elaborates on Article VII of the 1967 treaty. Space objects
are formally defined as including component parts of spacecraft, their launch vehicles, and compo-
nent parts of their launch vehicles. Hosenball testified that this is important for the orbital debris
issue because most orbital debris consists of pieces of launch vehicles.
Orbital Space Debris, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Space Science and
Applications, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of
Representatives, July 13, 1988.
August 13 NASA launches the Explorer 46 satellite into a 815-km-by-490-km orbit. It
carries experimental Whipple Bumper meteoroid shields (fig. 4) with con-
denser-type impact detectors. The satellite operates between 1972-75, but
data analysis is postponed until 1980-81 by funding cuts.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 1, 1993; Donald H.
Humes, David R. Brooks, Jose M. Alvarez, and T. Dale Bess, "Manmade
Orbital Debris Studies at NASA Langley," in Orbital Debris (NASA CP 2360),
Donald J. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su, editors, 1985.
September I The Liability Convention, first proposed in 1966, goes into effect.
December 7-19 Apollo 17 is humankind's last flight out of LEO. Eugene Cernan and
Harrison Schmitt land the LM Challenger at Taurus-Littrow while Ronald
Evans conducts research aboard the CSM America in lunar orbit.
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Figure 4.
The Whipple Bumper is a surprisingly effective, simple means of protecting a spacecraft from
meteoroid or orbital debris impact. A particle penetrating the aluminum bumper is broken up and
partially vaporized before striking the aluminum backplate (the spacecraft hull). The design is
named for astronomer Fred Whipple, who first proposed it in 1947.
16
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Meteoroids
Early space scientists overestimated the threat from meteoroids. In 1946, Fred Whipple, an astrono-
mer at the Harvard Observatory, predicted that one moonship in 25 would be destroyed by them.
In 1947 he proposed a meteoroid shield design comprising an aluminum plate suspended in front
of a backplate. It became known as the Whipple Bumper. In the late 1950s, meteoroid detectors on
the Sputnik 3 and Explorer 3 satellites returned signals which were interpreted as indicating a
meteoroid flux much higher than expected. Some space scientists invoked an Earth-orbiting dust
cloud to explain this.
The Earth-orbiting dust cloud theory was countered by researchers at NASA centers and elsewhere.
William Kinard, Donald Humes, and Joe Alvarez were members of a Langley Research Center
(LaRC) team which studied data from the Explorer 16 and Explorer 23 meteoroid detector satellites.
MSFC researchers studied data from the Pegasus satellites. Both teams found a low meteoroid flux.
Researchers at the MSC in Houston also studied meteoroids. Burton G. Cour-Palais, Subsystem
Manager for Apollo spacecraft meteoroid protection, studied returned surfaces from the Mercury
and Gemini spacecraft. He sponsored Herbert Zook's examination of all the Gemini windows in
1965-66. Zook found only one crater which might have been caused by a meteoroid impact.
Donald J. Kessler recalculated the average meteoroid velocity, arriving at a value about half the 30
km/sec previously used. By 1970, as an adjunct to his meteoroid studies, Kessler began to consider
whether colliding satellites might be a source of debris pieces, just as colliding asteroids were a
source of meteoroids. But cuts in meteoroid research funding stopped Kessler's work before it
could begin.
The meteoroid flux and velocity models developed by 1969 became the NASA standards for space-
craft design and are little changed today. It became clear that spacecraft for short Earth-orbital
sorties or 2-week lunar voyages required little shielding beyond their basic structures. The Skylab
Orbital Workshop and Salyut space stations would be in space for months, however, so it was
judged prudent to equip them with Whipple Bumper shields. Skylab's shield deployed prema-
turely during ascent and was torn away by atmospheric drag. Nevertheless, the three Skylab crews
recorded no pressure hull penetrations before the station was abandoned in 1974. Remaining
meteoroid fears quickly evaporated, and with them money within NASA for meteoroid research.
During the year LaRC conducts research into the meteoroid environment in near-Earth and
interplanetary space. The study team comprises David Brooks, T. Dale Bess,
Gary Gibson, Joe Alvarez, and Don Humes, and is supervised by William
Kinard. The team becomes aware of the hazard posed by orbital debris after a
year of work. They spend the next 2 years assessing the problem.
Ibid.
April3 The Soviet Union launches the Salyut space station into a 248-km-by-207-km
orbit. Salyut 2 is a military research station. No crews are launched to Salyut
2 because on April 14 it loses stability and tumbles, then breaks up. None of
the 25 trackable pieces produced remain in orbit.
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1973-1974
May 14
November 16-
February 8, 1974
December 29
The U.S. launches the Skylab Orbital Workshop (the unmanned launch of the
Orbital Workshop is officially designated Skylab 1). Skylab measures about
30 m long and 7 m wide. It carries the $149 Particle Collection experiment,
which is brought back to Earth by Skylab astronauts after exposure to space.
Its Principal Investigator is C. L. Hemenway of the Dudley Observatory in
Albany, New York. Hemenway theorizes that the solar exosphere produces
titanium particles after he finds one embedded in the experiment. Although
not realized at the time, the particle was probably a paint chip.
Roland W. Newkirk, Ivan D. Ertel, and Courtney G. Brooks, Skylab: A
Chronology, NASA Scientific and Technical Information Office, 1977, p. 386;
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 23, 1993.
The Skylab 4 crew of Gerald Carr, Edward Gibson, and William Pogue, the
third manned Skylab launch, sets a new world spaceflight endurance record
by living for 84 days aboard the Skylab Orbital Workshop. This remains a
U.S. record today. They are the last crew to live aboard Skylab.
The NOAA 3 satellite was launched on November 6, 1973 into a 1525-km-by-
1522-km orbit at a 102-deg inclination. NOAA 3, also known as ITOS-F, is
one in a series of more than 30 NOAA/GOES weather satellites launched
since 1960. The NOAA satellites replaced the earlier TIROS series. GOES
satellites operate in GEO. The NOAA satellites operate in near-polar Sun-
synchronous orbits. More than 120 nations receive their images. On March
28, 1983, NASA launched NOAA 8 with the first U.S. COSPAS/SARSAT
international rescue system transponder. It joined two similar transponders
launched on Soviet spacecraft in June 1982 and March 1983. The most recent
successful NOAA satellite, NOAA 12, weighed 1416 kg when launched on
May 14, 1991 (NOAA 13, launched in August 1993, failed after 12 days in
orbit). NOAA I weighed only 306 kg when launched on December 11, 1970.
About $420 million was budgeted for NOAA satellites in FY 1989-FY 1991
alone. On this date the second stage of NOAA 3's Delta launch vehicle
explodes, producing 198 trackable debris pieces. Of these, 182 trackable
pieces remained in orbit on December 31, 1992.
Report on Orbital Debris, IG (Space), February 1989; lnteravia Space
Directory 1992-1993, Andrew Wilson, editor, pp. 487-491.
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During the year Burton Cour-Palais, of the Environmental Effects Office at NASA Johnson
Space Center (JSC - formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center) examines the
windows from the Skylab 3 and 4 Apollo CSMs. The spacecraft spent 60 and
84 days, respectively, docked to the Skylab Orbital Workshop. Cour-Palais
finds numerous hypervelocity (speeds greater than 6 km/sec) impact pits,
presumably caused by meteoroids. He is not permitted to use Scanning
Electron Microscope (SEM) analysis to identify the impactors because this
18
July 30
September30
1974-1975
would require cutting up the windows. The pits later prove to be partly the
products of orbital debris strikes.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Herbert Zook, June 16, 1993; interview,
David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 23, 1993.
The Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) project is approved. LDEF is
envisioned as a reusable, bus-sized passive satellite fitted with static experi-
ment trays. Its purpose is to let researchers learn more about the long-term
effects of the space environment on a wide range of materials. LaRC is to
build LDEF.
Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 3, July 1, 1991 ; Eric Lerner, "Bringing
Back a Long Look at Space," Aerospace America, August 1991, pp. 28-31.
Brooks, Gibson, and Bess present a paper called "Predicting the Probability
that Earth-Orbiting Spacecraft will Collide with Man-Made Objects in Space,"
at the 25th International Astronautical Congress in Amsterdam. The paper
analyzes collision probability, with special attention given to extrapolating
the size of the population of small, untrackable pieces created in explosions.
Brooks estimates the population of mm-size debris at only 2.5 times the
catalogued population (less than the meteoroid population). A computer
program error gives collision probabilities lower than those calculated by
other researchers for the catalogued population. The team determines that
16.8% of orbiting objects are payloads; 10.1% are rocket bodies; 17.3% are
payload debris; and 55.8% are pieces produced by explosions.
Donald J. Kessler, "A Partial History of Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part
1)," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1, 1993; Donald H. Humes,
David R. Brooks, Jose M. Alvarez, and T. Dale Bess, "Manmade Orbital
Debris Studies at NASA Langley," in Orbital Debris (NASA CP 2360),
Donald J. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su, editors, 1985.
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During the year
May 22
The Institute for Astronomy (INASAN) of the Soviet Academy of Science
begins positional observations of GEO satellites.
Lydia Rykhlova, "Optical Observations in the Geosynchronous Orbits: Data
Reduction" (not dated), Loftus Orbital Debris Files.
Landsat I was launched atop a Delta rocket on July 23, 1972. By March 30,
1973, when the satellite's tape recorder failed, the satellite had photographed
North America 10 times and all of Earth's major landmasses at least once.
The satellite returned more than 300,000 images and proved the potential of
Earth observation using remote sensing. It was commanded off on January 6,
1978. To 1993 approximately $1 billion was invested in the Landsat series of
satellites. Landsat l's spent Delta second stage was left in a 910-km-by-635-
km orbit at a 98.3-deg inclination after satellite separation. On this date the
upper stage explodes, producing more than 200 trackable pieces. Of these,
about 50 remained in orbit on December 31, 1992.
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1975
July 12
July 15-26
August 20
December
PAGEOS (Passive Geodetic Earth-Orbiting Satellite), a
30.48-m aluminized balloon, was launched on June 23, 1966. Initially it
served as a target for geodesy, and was used for optical tracking experiments
as late as 1972. On this date it breaks up into 11 pieces. A second breakup
event was detected by Desmond King-Hele in 1976. NAVSPASUR confirmed
44 additional pieces. In addition, 19 unofficial pieces (one of which is be-
lieved to have broken into about 250 pieces) are associated with PAGEOS.
The initial breakup may have been caused by a collision with a clump of
dipoles produced in 1963 by the second Project West Ford experiment - they
orbit at about the same altitude as PAGEOS. Later breakups could have been
caused by the effects of space conditions on the materials making up the
pieces. PAGEOS pieces are notoriously hard to track. According to the
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Satellite Situation Report, seven
trackable pieces of PAGEOS remained in orbit on December 31, 1992.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 23, 1993; Linda
Neuman Ezell, The NASA Historical Data Book, Volume H (SP-4012), NASA,
Washington, D.C., 1988, p. 298; Orbital Space Debris, Hearing before the
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, Committee on Science,
Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, July 13, 1988, p. 51; David
J. Nauer, History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations, 7th edition, July 1993,
pp. 42-43; Satellite Situation Report, Project Operations Branch, GSFC,
December 31, 1992.
The U.S. and the Soviet Union conduct the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP)
rendezvous and docking mission in LEO.
The NOAA 4 satellite was launched on November 15, 1974. On this date the
second stage of its Delta launch vehicle explodes after ten months in a 1461-
km-by-1440-km, 101.5-deg orbit. Most of the 150 trackable debris pieces
produced remained in orbit on December 31, 1992.
Bess publishes a NASA Technical Note in which he details his contribution to
the September 1974 LaRC orbital debris team paper. Bess used a light-gas
gun to fire 1-gin steel and aluminum pellets at simulated spacecraft struc-
tures. This was the first attempt to calculate the mass distribution of orbital
debris pieces produced in explosions and hypervelocity collisions. His data
and analysis led the LaRC team to conclude that high-intensity explosions
produce many small pieces. Low-intensity explosions produce fewer pieces
overall. They tend to be larger than those produced in high-intensity explo-
sions. Bess found that collisions produce a continuous distribution of large
and small fragments. The results closely follow the curve of the sizes of
fragments produced in asteroid collisions. Bess's work shows that these
calculations apply to spacecraft structures as well. They follow a power law,
which states that for every order of magnitude decrease in the diameter of
the fragments, the number of fragments produced increases by 2.5 orders of
magnitude.
T. Dale Bess, Mass Distribution of Orbiting Man-Made Space Debris (NASA
TN D-8108), December 1975; Donald H. Humes, David E. Brooks, Jose M.
Alvarez, and T. Dale Bess, "Manmade Orbital Debris Studies at NASA
Langley," Orbital Debris (NASA CP 2360), Donald J. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su,
editors, 1985.
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Space Solar Power Energizes Orbital Debris Research at JSC
JSC Director Christopher Kraft believed that developing space solar power would be NASA's next
big project after the Apollo lunar program. He wanted to build dozens of giant satellites in space to
collect solar energy and beam it to Earth. This, he felt, would be a way NASA could contribute to
solving the energy problem. At the same time, it would permit NASA to develop the skills needed
for lunar base and Mars exploration projects of the future.
Launching the millions of tons of construction materials required for each Solar Power Satellite
(SPS) and beaming energy through the atmosphere would, however, have unknown environmental
consequences. The Environmental Effects Office (EEO) at JSC had been established to study the
effects of frequent Space Shuttle flights on the environment. In early 1976 Andrew Potter, EEO
Chief, asked Donald Kessler, an aerospace technologist in EEO, to investigate the environmental
effects of building large SPSs in orbit.
Kessler reasoned that an SPS breakup caused by a collision would harm the space environment by
creating a huge number of new space objects, each capable of precipitating another collisional
breakup. He calculated the probabilities that collisions would occur and found that catalogued
space objects were already numerous enough to pose a threat to large space platforms and stations.
If the debris population continued to grow, it would soon threaten all space vehicles.
Donald J. Kessler, "A Partial History of Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part
1)," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 3, July l, 1993; interview, David S. F.
Portree with Donald J. Kessler, May 11, 1993; Donald J. Kessler, "Space
Debris - Environmental Assessment Needed" (JSC 11539),July 1976.
February 9 On January 22, 1975, Landsat 2 was launched atop a Delta rocket. On this
date the Delta's spent second stage undergoes the first of two explosions.
The second explosion occurs on June 19, 1976. A total of 208 trackable pieces
are created, a quarter of which remained in orbit on December 31, 1992. The
spent Delta second stage described a 918-km-by-745-km orbit at a 97.8-deg
inclination before the first explosion.
July Donald Kessler warns that fragmentation by impact between debris pieces
will exponentially increase the debris population. Runaway debris genera-
tion could begin as early as the year 2000. The starting condition for his
estimate is the orbital population in the NORAD catalog. Based on data from
meteoroid impact experiments conducted in the late 1960s by McDonnell
Aircraft Company to support Mars expedition planning, he assumes that
each collision will produce 100 pieces. Kessler concludes that the probability
of debris collision for a space station with a radius of 50 m over 10 years
could be 100% by the year 2010.
Donald J. Kessler, "Space Debris - Environmental Assessment Needed" (JSC
11539), July 1976; Thornton L. Page, Andrew E. Potter, and Donald J. Kessler,
"The History of Orbital Debris," 1990 (unpublished draft paper).
21
1976
July 31-
August I
October 26
November
December 24
December 27
Preston Landry, a civilian analyst at NORAD, conducts the Unknown Satel-
hte Track Experiment at the request of the LaRC orbital debris team. It lasts
about 12 hours. The experiment uses the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Char-
acterization System (PARCS) radar in North Dakota. PARCS is a phased
array of 6144 north-facing sensors which can track many objects simulta-
neously in a 65-deg wide sector to 4000 km north of the radar site. During
the experiment, the radar detects 8445 objects, 17.7% of which are not listed
in the NORAD catalogue. Of the objects detected below 400 km, 90% are
previously undetected. The explanation reached for the larger number of
small, previously unknown objects in lower orbits is that unknown objects
too small to be detected at higher altitudes rain down to lower altitudes,
where they can be detected. This is one of the most important findings of the
1976 PARCS test. However, the breakup of the Soviet Cosmos 844 satellite
only a few days before the test may have inflated the number of objects at
low altitudes beyond its usual level.
DonaldJ. Kessler, "NORAD's PARCS Small SatelliteTests (1976 and 1978)."
Orbital Debris (NASA CP 2360). DonaldJ. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su, editors.
1985. p. 3944.
The Soviet Union launches the Ekran I television relay satellite into GEO at
99 deg east. It is the first Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS). Ekran satellites
weigh 1970 kg and keep station to within about 0.5 deg of their GEO slot.
David Brooks publishes NASA TMX-73978, A Comparison of Spacecraft Pen-
etration Hazards Due to Meteoroids and Manmade Earth-Orbiting Objects. He
applies the findings of the September 1974 Brooks, Bess, and Gibson paper to
calculate the probability of penetrations by orbital debris and natural meteor-
oids for double-walled spacecraft, such as the Skylab Orbital Workshop. He
shows that the Whipple Bumper is adequate for meteoroid protection, but
not for orbital debris protection. Brooks also determines that while orbital
debris pieces are generally larger and slower than meteoroids, spacecraft in
high-inclination orbits risk collisions with orbital debris at speeds up to 15
km/sec. He asserts that debris cleanup and avoidance are too expensive, so
spacecraft wails must be strengthened to contend with the hazard.
Donald H. Humes, David E. Brooks, JoseM. Alvarez, and T. Dale Bess,
"Manmade OrbitalDebrisStudies at NASA Langley," Orbital Debris (NASA
CP 2360), Donald J. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su, editors, 1985;Thornton L. Page,
Andrew E. Potter,and Donald J. Kessler, "The History of Orbital Debris,"
1990 (unpublisheddraftpaper).
The Delta upper stage which placed the NOAA 5 satellite into orbit on July
29, 1976 explodes, producing 159 trackable debris pieces. Of these, 155
remain in orbit on December 31, 1992.
The Cosmos 886 ASAT explodes, producing 72 trackable pieces of debris. Of
these, 55 remain in orbit on December 31, 1992.
NicholasL. Johnson, "Artificial Satellite Breakups (Part 2): Soviet Anti-
Satellite Programme," Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 36,
1983, pp. 257-262.; lnteravia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson,
editor, p. 188.
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February 17
June
June 30
July
At the request of Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., Chief, Technical Planning Office at JSC,
Donald Kessler submits a memorandum proposing that optical sensors
(telescopes) be used to detect LEO orbital debris. Kessler's proposal is modi-
fied to become the second PARCS radar test.
Donald J. Kessler, "A Partial History of Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part
1)," OrbitalDebris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1, 1993.
Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais predict that the hazard posed by
orbital debris will soon exceed the hazard from meteoroids. They state that
the collision rate between objects in 1504000-km orbits was 0.013 per year in
1976. They note that the number of objects NORAD tracks has increased by
320-510 objects per year since 1966, and predict that the collision rate will
increase rapidly.
Burton Cour-Palais and Donald J. Kessler, "Space Debris - Environmental
Update l" (JSC 12949), June 1977; Thornton L. Page, Andrew E. Potter, and
Donald J. Kessler, "The History of Orbital Debris," 1990 (unpublished draft
paper).
In a formal briefing on SPS environmental impact, Donald Kessler describes
to Christopher Kraft the hazard posed by orbital debris. According to Joseph
Loftus, "in general [Kraft] had a 'show-me' kind of attitude" because of his
mission operations background. Kraft is skeptical of Kessler's orbital debris
conclusions because they are largely theoretical.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 7, 1993; interview,
David S. F. Portree with Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., August 25, 1993.
The JSC SPS Systems Definition effort publishes a report titled Solar Power
Satellite: Concept Evaluation. Section VII, entitled "Environmental Factors,"
reports that predictions of collision frequency contain a large measure of
uncertainty. This is because the number of orbiting objects below the level of
NORAD radar detectability down to about I mm and the number of "ejected
'daughter' products" are not known. It gives the uncertainty in collision
frequency for the year 2000 as about four orders of magnitude. According to
the report, "this uncertainty implies the need to be very careful to minimize
the rate at which new objects are added to orbit (especially small, numerous
objects) and a possible need for removing debris ('space cleanup') at some
later date." To reduce uncertainty, the report calls for improvement of space
debris models and the small object database. It also calls for structural
designs which minimize the effects of damage, identification of crew safety
design requirements, and consideration of "trade-offs among constraints on
the generation of additional space debris and requirements for debris re-
moval."
Solar Power Satellite: Concept Evaluation, Vol. 1, July 1977, pp. VII-4;
interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 1, 1993.
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July 14
September 25-
October I
September 29
December 21
A Delta rocket lifts off from Cape Canaveral, launching the first Japanese
GMS (Himawari 1) weather satellite toward a slot in GEO at 140 deg east
longitude. Soon after payload separation the second stage explodes in a
2025-km-by-53-km orbit at a 29-deg inclination. The low-inclination orbit is
unusual for an exploding Delta second stage - previous Delta explosions
took place in high-inclination, Sun-synchronous orbits. The explosion pro-
duces 172 trackable pieces, of which 81 remained in orbit on December 31,
1992.
lnteravia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, p. 480; Report on
Orbital Debris, IG (Space), February 1989.
Lubos Perek, a Czech astronomer and Chief, Outer Space Affairs Division,
General Secretariat of the U.N., presents "Physics, Uses and Regulation of the
Geostationary Orbit, or, ex facto sequitur lex," at the 28th International
Astronautical Federation congress in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Perek de-
scribes aspects of the GEO environment arising from solar radiation pressure,
the ellipticity of the equator, and Earth's oblateness, then lays out how they
create problems for satellites in GEO. The paper is among the first to address
GEO orbital debris.
Lubos Perek, "Physics, Uses, and Regulation of the G-eostationary Orbit, or, ex
facto sequitur lex" OAF Paper SL-77-44), presented at the 28th International
Astronautical Federation Congress, Prague, Czechoslovakia, September 25-
October 1, 1977.
The Soviet Union launches Salyut 6, the fifth Soviet space station to host a
crew, into a 51.6-deg, 256-km-by-214-km orbit. Salyut 6 is generally similar
to Salyut 1. However, it has a rear docking port. Automated Progress supply
ships call at the rear port, delivering supplies for the crew and fuel to main-
rain the station's orbit. Salyut 6 can thus remain operational much longer
than the earlier Salyuts. Cosmonauts live aboard Salyut 6 for a total of 676
days up to 1982. Salyut 6 is visited in April 1981 by the Cosmos 1267 expan-
sion module, which nearly doubles its 13.5-m length. It receives the first
international spaceship crew (Alexei Gubarev and Vladimir Remek, a Czech,
the first non-Soviet/non-American in space). The Soyuz 35 crew of Leonid
Popov and Valeri Ryurnin spends a record 185 days on the station.
ASAT weapon Cosmos 970 explodes in a 1139-km-by-946-km orbit at a 65.8-
deg inclination. Of the 70 trackable pieces produced, all but four remained in
orbit on December 31, 1992.
Nicholas L. Johnson, "Artificial Satellite Breakups, (Part 2): Soviet Anti-
Satellite Program," Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 36, 1983,
pp. 356-363; Interavia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, p.
188.
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During the year
January 24
John Gabbard tells Donald Kessler how to identify breakup fragments in the
NORAD catalog. Using a limited list, Kessler draws a "4% random sample"
of about 100 objects, then tracks the origin of each object. He notices that a
large fraction originate with Delta second stages launched since 1972. Kessler
informs Loftus, who in turn informs the Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV)
Office at NASA Headquarters. A series of informal discussions commence
between the ELV Office, JSC, and the Delta Program Office at GSFC. The
ELV Office contracts with Battelle Institute, Columbus, Ohio, to study the
orbital debris issue. Donald Edgecombe, who has experience with the related
issue of uncontrolled reentry of space objects, organizes the Battelle effort.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, May 11, 1993.
Cosmos 954, a Soviet nuclear-powered RORSAT ocean surveillance satellite,
undergoes uncontrolled reentry over northern Canada.
Heightened Awareness: The Skylab and Cosmos 954 Reentries
The Soviet Union launched Cosmos 954 on September 18, 1977. The satellite carried a nuclear
reactor to provide adequate electricity for its powerful ground-pointing radar. Cosmos 954, like
other RORSATs, operated in a low orbit, with a limited lifetime before decay. It had to be periodi-
cally reboosted to maintain orbit. Normally, when its reboost fuel supply was nearly depleted,
such a satellite launched its reactor into a high storage orbit with a lifetime of 300-1000 yrs (the
nuclear fuel in the reactor has a half-life of 70,000 yrs, however, meaning that the storage orbit foists
contending with the radioactives on a future generation). The main body then reentered harm-
lessly. Cosmos 954 malfunctioned, however, and reentered with its reactor still attached on January
24, 1978. The Soviets announced that the reactor contained about 30 kg of enriched uranium.
Cosmos 954 broke apart over the Great Slave Lake, in northwestern Canada, and peppered a region
800 km long with radioactive debris. Cleanup cost $14 million. The 1972 Liability Convention
came into play. Canada claimed $6 million and the Soviets eventually paid $3 million. The Soviets
redesigned the reactor boost system and resumed launching RORSATs in April 1980.
The uncontrolled reentry increased awareness at the U.S. Cabinet level of potentially dangerous
space objects. The U.S. Secretary of State, Zbigniew Brzezinski, raised the issue in a public speech.
He declared that "'no one [in any U.S. government agency] shall increase the hazard in space with-
out consulting me."
By this time the 80,000-kg Skylab Orbital Workshop had been in orbit for almost 6 years. As early
as 1976, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) predicted that Skylab
would decay from orbit earlier than the March 1983 date forecast by NASA. By 1977, the 11-year
sunspot cycle was already climbing toward the most intense solar maximum period before 1989-91.
As is normal during active Sun periods, increased solar heating expanded Earth's upper atmo-
sphere. But the 1978-80 solar maximum expanded the upper atmosphere to an unusual degree,
hastening Skylab's decay.
Less than a month after the Cosmos 954 reentry, NASA announced that Skylab would decay below
278 km by October 1979. As Skylab fell, worldwide concern grew. The space agency took pains to
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regain partial control over Skylab. However, the chances that pieces of Skylab would hit a person
or cause property damage were extremely small. On July 11, 1979, Skylab reentered over the
Atlantic Ocean. The crew of an aircraft flying at 8500 m over the Indian Ocean saw Skylab appear
as a blue fireball in the starry predawn sky. After 45 secs, the fireball turned red-orange and broke
into five large pieces. Early-risers throughout southwestern Australia saw flaming pieces in the
sky. Sonic booms awoke sleepers in Perth and Kalgoorlie, the largest cities in Skylab's path. Skylab
rained debris in a footprint more than 1000 km long and nearly 200 km wide. Some 500 major
debris pieces, with a total weight of about 20,000 kg, were found in the Outback.
Together, the Cosmos 954 and Skylab reentries increased awareness that orbiting objects could pose
hazards, that the products of human space activities did not vanish into infinite blackness when
their usefulness ended. The reentries helped create a climate in which orbital debris research and
awareness-building efforts could continue to develop.
W. David Compton and Charles D. Benson, Living and Working in Space: A
History of Skylab, NASA Scientific and Technical Information Branch,
Washington, D. C., 1983; Donald J. Kessler, "A Partial History of Orbital
Debris: A Personal View (Part 1)," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 3, July
l, 1993; interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, May 11, 1993;
Craig Covault, "Skylab Tumble Timing Linked to Control," Aviation Week &
Space Technology, July 16, 1979, pp. 22-23; "Cosmos Reentry Spurs Nuclear
Waste Debate," Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 30, 1978, p. 33.
February 7 The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space takes
testimony from Dr. William M. Brown of the Hudson Institute, NASA Ad-
ministrator Dr. Robert A. Frosch, and others on the future in space. Brown
describes as "chilling" some of the conclusions on orbital debris reached by
Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais in their paper for the Journal of
Geophysical Research. He requested an advance copy in late 1977. In a letter to
Kessler acknowledging use of the paper in his testimony, Brown reflects the
contemporary international political climate by stating that "Russian killer
satellites [Cosmos ASATs] are killing the future of space." At this time few
people suspected that the major source of orbital debris was exploding U.S.
Delta second stages.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 1, 1993; letter,
William M. Brown, Hudson Institute, to Donald J. Kessler, April 3, 1978.
March 14 The Delta second stage which placed Geodynamics Experimental Ocean
Satellite (GEOS) 3 in orbit on April 9, 1975 breaks up in an 847-km-by-807-km
orbit at an inclination of 115 deg, producing only five trackable pieces. Four
remained in orbit on December 31, 1992.
June I Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-Palais publish "Collision Frequency of
Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt" in the Journal of Geophysical
Research (JGR). The article is based on their June 1977 JSC document. It
proves to be a seminal work on the orbital debris problem. They predict that
collisional breakup will become a new source of orbital debris, "possibly
before the year 2000," and that the debris flux will continue to increase over
time once collisional breakup begins, even if no new payloads are placed in
Earth orbit.
Donald J. Kessler and Burton G. Cour-Palais, "Collision Frequency of
Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt," Journal of Geophysical
Research, Vol. 83, No. A6, pp. 2637-2646.
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The Soviet Ekran 2 DBS undergoes a nickel-hydrogen battery explosion in
GEO. The Soviets photograph the breakup. No other space power detects
the explosion.
"Russia Seeks Joint Space Test to Build Joint Military Cooperation," Aviation
Week & Space Technology, March 9, 1992, pp. 18-19; interview, David S. F.
Portree with Donald J. Kessler, August 3, 1993.
In six 84-min sessions, the PARCS detects 5586 known objects, 437 unknown
objects, and 379 uncorrelated (not tracked well enough to determine their
status) objects. Including the uncorrelateds is the only major departure from
the 1976 PARCS experiment. The percentage of unknowns nearly doubles
directly over the radar site, where sensitivity is highest. 80% of the objects
detected below 300 km are unknown. Only 32% above 2000 km are un-
known. Many unknowns are found at inclinations of 62 deg-64 deg, 84 deg-
88 deg, and 103 deg-106 deg. The second group may be associated with the
second Project West Ford experiment in 1963. No recent debris-producing
events compromise the results, as may have happened in 1976. This adds
credibility to the idea that previously unknown small debris found in low
orbits originates at higher altitudes.
Donald J. Kessler, "NORAD's PARCS Small Satellite Tests (1976 and 1978),"
Orbital Debris (NASA CP 2360), Donald J. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su, editors,
1985, pp. 39-44.
Donald Kessler again briefs Kraft on orbital debris. The PARCS experiments
provided concrete data on the uncatalogued orbital debris population, so
Kraft is willing to accept that a problem exists. He sanctions further research.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 1, 1993.
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February 6-8
*The decline since 1978 was caused by
record-high levels of solar activity during the 1978-1980 solar
maximum period.
Christopher Kraft presents a paper at the 15th American Institute of Astro-
nautics and Aeronautics (AIAA) Annual Meeting and Technical Display in
Washington, D.C. Titled "The Solar Power Satellite Concept - The Past
Decade and the Next Decade," it touches on the hazards of meteoroids and
orbital debris. He asserts that experience gained from past space activities
shows that protection can be provided at reasonable cost. Kraft adds that a
"'space cleanup' of past man-made orbital debris may become desirable
during the SPS construction phase, and meticulous housekeeping during
construction will become imperative."
Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., "The Solar Power Satellite Concept - The Past
Decade and the Next Decade," AIAA 79-0534, February 1979.
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March 9
March 26
July 11
September 16-22
Burton Cour-Palais telephones Donald Kessler to tell him "our work has hit
pay dirt" at NASA Headquarters. Cour-Palais tells Kessler that Philip
Culbertson, Deputy Associate Administrator (Technology) in the NASA
Headquarters Office of Space Transportation Systems, raised the orbital
debris issue during negotiations with the Soviets on the second Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 2).
Kessler Phone Logs, 1978-1982
Joseph Loftus again arranges for Donald Kessler to brief Christopher Kraft
and his senior managers. When asked if orbital debris research should
continue at JSC, Kraft says, "we would be crazy not to continue.., go do it...
forthwith." According to Kessler, this was "the directive that allowed the
orbital debris program to be developed."
Donald J. Kessler, "A Partial History of Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part
1)," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1, 1993.
The U.S. Skylab Orbital Workshop reenters, raining debris on Australia.
Lubos Perek presents "Outer Space Activities versus Outer Space" at the 22nd
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space in Munich, West Germany. Perek's
paper presents an overview of the orbital debris issue as understood at this
time. Perek depicts an optimistic future in which the U.S. Space Shuttle,
Soviet Progress automated space station supply ships, and the European
Ariane rocket provide easy access to space. He maintains that easy access to
space will cater to large space structures, such as solar power satellites and
space habitats. Perek states, however, that "there is... one aspect which is
rarely mentioned in this connection.., how will the individual projects and
missions relate to each other?" He notes that at present the only acknowl-
edged relationship between satellites is their common use of the radio fre-
quency spectrum for communications. Perek asserts that collision is another
way space objects will relate to each other, though because space is perceived
to be large relative to the number of intact satellites in Earth orbit (about 1000
at this time), the risk of collision is usually discounted. Perek points out that
relative velocity and cross sectional area are also factors that affect collision
probability. Perek asserts that "satellite cross section will assume its impor-
tance at a more distant future. Since the collision probability is proportional
to the area of the satellite, the picture will be entirely different for solar power
stations with an area of several square kilometers than it is for present day
satellites." Perek also points out that the 1000 satellites in orbit are attended
by about "3500 debris large enough to be tracked by radar and an unknown
number of small debris, nuts and bolts, and fragments weighing a fraction of
a gram, which escape tracking and detection." He asserts that "the small
debris are not without danger." Perek cites Donald Kessler and Burton Cour-
Palais's 1978 paper in the Journal of Geophysical Research and David Brooks'
November 1976 NASA report when describing the small debris environment
and future runaway debris generation. Perek then states that "preventing all
collisions is impossible. Minimizing their effects is and will be expensive, but
it is a bargain price compared to the repair of damage." Specifically, he calls
for
28
September24
1979
• reducing the amount of debris produced during launch
and operations
• deorbiting inactive satellites
• placing inactive satellites into disposal orbits
• "using non-intersecting orbits in specific areas of outer
space."
Perek goes on to suggest that "the spirit of the Rule of Good Seamanship"
could be a basis for future space traffic regulation. Finally, Perek states that
"the operators of space objects discharge larger responsibilities than the
many operators of vehicles on roads, in the seas, and in the air," so it is
appropriate for "the international community to adopt regulatory or recom-
mendatory measures wherever and to whatever degree is found necessary."
Lubos Perek, "Outer Space Activities versus Outer Space," in Proceedings of
the 22nd Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space, Munich, West Germany,
AIAA, 1980, pp. 283-286; interview, David S. F. Portree with Joseph P. Loftus,
Jr., August 25, 1993.
Christopher Kraft writes to John F. Yardley, NASA Associate Administrator
for Space Transportation Systems, to explain his request that orbital debris be
discussed at a NASA Management Council meeting. Kraft originally asked
to brief the Council at its September meeting, but Yardley struck the briefing
from the agenda. According to Joseph Loftus, Yardley did this because
"orbital debris was an unpleasant subject and he didn't want to talk about it."
In addition, Yardley was fully occupied with moving the Space Shuttle
toward flight. Kraft tells him that his motive in putting the matter on the
agenda "was to introduce you to the implications of the growing population
of man-made objects in space. This situation is one we will have to face some
time in the future." Kraft summarizes JSC's findings by stating that "the
man-made population is very real and detectable," and that while "this
population is the subject of continuous measurement.., there may be a
significant gap in measurements of smaller objects." He admits that, "the
present population does not.., warrant any immediate changes to our cur-
rent mission planning; however, it is increasing and could become self-
propagating." Kraft concludes by saying that "corrective measures are
evident and should be considered." These include "policy control measures
and operational practices to curtail unnecessary population growth; the
establishment of an environmentally acceptable population flux model; and
the management of programs to operate within the limits of the flux model."
In connection with this last point, he states that "we have brought the unusu-
ally large debris contribution of the Delta second stage to the attention of the
Expendable Launch Vehicles Program Office." Joseph Loftus drafted the
letter for Kraft.
Letter, Christopher Kraft, JSC, to John F. Yardley, NASA Headquarters,
September 24, 1979; note, Joseph P. Loftus, Jr. to David S. F. Portree, August
2, 1993; interview, David S. F. Pot'tree with Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., August 25,
1993.
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October
October 22-23
Late
November
The NASA Headquarters Advanced Programs Office, a part of the Office of
Space Transportation Operations, provides the JSC orbital debris team with
$70,000 to fund its activities. This is the first funding at JSC specifically for
research into the orbital debris problem.
Donald J. Kessler, "A Partial Historyof Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part
2)," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1, 1993.
JSC researchers and engineers discuss space nuclear power systems with U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) contractors. The contractors tell NASA that
nine U.S. nuclear power sources orbit Earth, with others planned. One is a
reactor. The others are radioisotope thermal generators (RTGs). Six of the
seven LEO satellites are in high-inclination orbits, increasing the risk that
they will collide with other objects and break up. Only three of the satellites
can be recovered by the Space Shuttle, and then only by using Orbital Ma-
neuvering System (OMS) kits to augment the Shuttle's baseline rendezvous
capability. The nuclear reactor cannot be reached even using three OMS kits
in series. The meeting produces a summary which states that the previous
estimate of the lifetime of nuclear devices in orbit - 150 years or longer - "is
now questionable safety criteria because of collision." The radioactive pieces
from fragmented nuclear devices can be expected to decay from orbit before
radioactive decay can render them harmless. The summary notes that JSC is
developing a program to define the severity of the orbital debris problem in
general and develop control techniques. It reports that no GEO satellite
recovery capability is planned for the Shuttle, and that Shuttle enhancements
(such as OMS kits) are just beginning to be studied. However, "NASA is in
the preliminary phase of defining a system concept [a space tug] that could
provide a variety of services including deployment, inspection, retrieval,
support, and Earth return." The DOE requests that NASA include the
nuclear-powered satellites in its collision studies. It also asks the space
agency to determine Shuttle requirements for rendezvous with and servicing
of nuclear-powered satellites in LEO and GEO. The DOE states that it will
determine a disposal method for nuclear-powered satellites. Possibilities
listed are controlled reentry, return by Shuttle to Earth, and insertion by
unspecified means into solar orbit at 0.82 astronomical units (inside Earth's
orbit).
Memorandum with Attachment, EW4/Reuben Taylor to EW4/Chief, Systems
Design Office, October 25, 1979.
The Snapshot satellite carries SNAP 10-A, the only U.S. space nuclear reactor
launched to date. On this date Snapshot undergoes what orbital debris
researchers term "an anomalous event." The parent body sheds pieces but
remains largely intact. Six more anomalous events occur in the next 6 years,
releasing nearly 50 trackable pieces. Release of radioactives is possible but
not confirmed. A collision with another space object has not been ruled out
as the cause of the initial event, though an unknown internal malfunction is
perhaps more likely. SNAP 10-A shut down prematurely in May 1965, 43
days after launch. The main body of the satellite remains in a 1316-kin-by-
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1268-km orbit at a 90.3-deg inclination. Expected orbital lifetime is more than
3000 years (assuming it avoids a more complete breakup).
Nicholas L. Johnson and Darren McKnight, Artificial Space Debris, revised
edition, Orbit Books, 1991; David J. Nauer, History of On-Orbit Satellite
Fragmentations, 7th edition, Teledyne Brown Engineering, July 1993, p. 266;
Joseph A. Sholtis, Jr., et al, "U.S. Space Nuclear Safety: Past, Present, and
Future," presented at the Tenth Symposium on Space Nuclear Power and
Propulsion, Albuquerque, New Mexico, January 10-14, 1993.
The European Space Agency (ESA) launches its first satellite, the CAT test
vehicle, atop an Ariane 1 rocket. The flight is designated V1. The third stage
is left in a 21,510-km-by-178-km orbit at a 17.8-dog inclination. The Ariane
V1 third stage apparently exploded in orbit on March 1, 1980. However, the
Goddard Satellite Situation Report for December 31, 1992, lists only two cata-
logued objects associated with V1, both of which decayed by 1990. Low
perigee means most of the debris produced decays rapidly. Detection and
tracking of debris from this event was difficult because of the low inclination
and high apogee of the orbit.
Space Log 1957-1991, TRW, 1992, p. 182; David J. Nauer, History of On-
Orbit Satellite Fragmentations, 7th edition, Teledyne Brown Engineering, July
1993, p. 138; Satellite Situation Report, Project Operations Branch, GSFC, Vol.
32, No. 4, December 31, 1992, p. 253.
1980 Cumulative launches (since 1957)
2145 )Catalogued objects in orbit 4228*
Beginning this
year
During the year
*The decline since 1979 was caused by
record-high levels of solar activity during the 1978-1980 solar
maximum period.
During the first half of the 1980s, Donald Kessler, Joseph Loftus, and Burton
Cour-Palais present tutorial briefings on orbital debris to the Department of
State, U.S. Air Force Space Division, Department of Transportation (DOT),
NORAD, NASA centers, and other government organizations and agencies.
Most of the briefings were organized by Loftus.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., August 25, 1993.
This year Herbert Zook, Uel Clanton, and Richard Schultz, all of the Geology
Branch, Planetary and Earth Sciences Division, JSC, analyze impact pits in the
Skylab 4 Apollo CSM windows. Zook and Schultz count and measure the
pits. Clanton then uses SEM analysis to determine that half of the pits (pre-
dominantly the smallest) are lined with aluminum expelled from solid rocket
motors. They conclude that, in their size range (smaller than 30 microns),
aluminum particles already outnumber meteoroids in near-Earth space.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Herbert Zook, June 16, 1993; Donald J.
Kessler, "A Partial History of Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part 2),"
Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1, 1993.
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January 14
March 31
David H. Suddeth, Space Technology Division, GSFC, contacts Donald
Kessler at JSC for information on orbital debris to aid him in preparing a
proposal for a GEO satellite reboosting program. Suddeth calls the proposed
program "Death with Dignity." It calls for GEO satellites to be boosted to
graveyard orbits above GEO at the end of their useful lives. Suddeth later
briefs NASA Headquarters Chief Engineer Waiter C. Williams on the pro-
posal. At the JSC orbital debris workshop in July 1982 he describes GEO
satellite problems. Suddeth states that "NASA is considering establishing a
policy for the limitation of the physical crowding of the geostationary orbit.
This paper was requested by the Director, Communication and Data Systems
Division, Code TS, NASA HQ." In "Recommendations for Action," Suddeth
calls for NASA policy to state that
The GEO insertion burn should be accomplished using a
motor which remains attached to the spacecraft after the
burn.
• No objects should be released from spacecraft in GEO.
• Fuel should be retained to boost GEO spacecraft to non-
synchronous graveyard orbits.
Spacecraft should be disposed of into higher (westward
drifting) graveyard orbits, if possible, "to avoid communi-
cation interruption and impeding later arrivals."
Governmental policy should require that all GEO users
"'desynchronize" GEO satellites before they exhaust their
fuel.
"NASA and the U.S. should strive to establish a world-
wide policy for removal, binding on all users of the geo-
synchronous orbit."
"Ultimately, NASA should plan and carry out a procedure
for clearing dead spacecraft and debris from the geosyn-
chronous orbit."
David H. Suddeth, "Debris in the Geostationary Ring - the Endless Shooting
Gallery - the Necessity for a DisposalPolicy," Orbital Debris (NASA CP
2360), Donald J. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su, editors, 1985;interview, David S. F.
Portree withJoseph P. Loftus, Jr., September 9, 1993.
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Space Debris and Geostationary Crowding
meets at NASA Headquarters. Its members include representatives from
NASA Headquarters, GSFC, and JSC. The meeting aims "to establish com-
munication among those concerned with some aspect of debris and its conse-
quences; to define, in broad terms, a base of common information as to the
scope and significance of the debris problem; and to determine what steps, if
any, could or should be taken to provide within NASA a coherent framework
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1980-1981
for pursuing further coordinated activity with respect to space debris and
geostationary crowding."
Marta Cehelsky, "Issues Paper: Space Debris," Meeting Summary Prepared for
Deputy Administrator Alan Lovelace "at the request of Mr. Culbertson," June
2, 1980.
The Soviets launch Cosmos 1174 in pursuit of the Cosmos 1171 target satel-
lite. The ASAT satellite explodes 60 km from the target, so the test is consid-
ered a failure. Of the nearly 40 trackable debris pieces produced, 12 re-
mained in orbit on December 31, 1992. About 6% of the debris tracked in
1983 originated in Soviet ASAT explosions.
Gautam Badhwar and Phillip Anz-Meador, "Mass Estimates in the Breakups of
Soviet Satellites," Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 43, No. 9,
September 1990, pp. 403-410; Nicholas L. Johnson, "Artificial Satellite
Breakups (Part 2): Soviet Anti-Satellite Programme," Journal of the British
Interplanetary Society, Vol. 36, 1983, pp. 356-363; Satellite Situation Report,
Project Operations Branch, GSFC, December 31, 1992.
The Soviet Union launches Cosmos 1176, the first RORSAT nuclear-powered
ocean surveillance satellite launched since Cosmos 954 scattered radioactive
debris across northwestern Canada in January 1978. The U.S. State Depart-
ment issues a "Statement of Regret" chiding the Soviets for resuming
RORSAT operations.
lnteravia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, p. 192.
The AIAA Technical Committee on Space Systems begins a formal review of
the orbital debris problem in preparation for writing an AIAA position paper
on the subject.
India launches its first satellite, Rohini 1B, atop an SLV-3 launch vehicle. The
40-kg test satellite describes a 745-km-by-295-km orbit at a 44.7-deg inclina-
tion. It decays from orbit on May 20, 1981.
Three fuses blow on the Solar Maximum Mission (Solar Max) satellite, which
was launched in February 1980. Four of its six telescopes lose pointing
ability. Solar Max has a modular design to permit routine servicing by Space
Shuttle astronauts, so NASA schedules a Shuttle mission to repair the satel-
lite. The usefulness of its Gamma Ray Spectrometer is reduced by anomalous
gamma ray emissions. In 1988 these are revealed to have been traced to
Soviet RORSAT nuclear reactors.
Nicholas L. Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1989, pp. 83-84.
1981 Cumulative launches (since 1957)Catalogued objects in orbit
2268
4489
During the year Cutbacks in NASA meteoroid research funding in the mid-1970s forced
Donald Humes at LaRC to postpone analysis of Explorer 46 meteoroid data
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January 27
March
April5
April12
May
until 1980-81. Donald Kessler reviews Humes' paper on the Explorer 46 data.
Using raw data included in the paper, Kessler detects directionality in the
impacts on Explorer 46. He believes this indicates a population of small
Earth-orbiting debris objects. The impacts show a correlation with solid
rocket motor firings in orbit. This is difficult to explain, as the aluminum
oxide particles produced by solid rocket motors are believed to be too small
to trigger the Explorer 46 detectors.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 1, 1993.
The Delta second stage which placed the Landsat 3 and Oscar 8 satellites in
near-polar, 98.9-deg inclination orbits on March 5, 1978, explodes into more
than 200 trackable pieces while over Antarctica. About 160 trackable pieces
remained in orbit on December 31, 1992. The JSC orbital debris team writes a
memorandum on the breakup to NASA Headquarters, which is subsequently
passed on to McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company, the maker of the
Delta rocket.
lbid; Nicholas L. Johnson, "Preliminary Analysis of The Fragmentation of the
Spot 1 Afiane Third Stage," Orbital Debris from Upper-Stage Breakup, Joseph
P. Loftus, Jr., editor, 1989, pp. 41-106.
Joseph Mahon, Director of the ELV Office in the Office of Space Transporta-
tion Operations at NASA Headquarters, issues a directive to the Delta Pro-
gram Office at GSFC calling for an investigation into Delta breakups.
Ibid.
On this date, pieces from Delta second stage explosions make up about 27%
of the 3904 tracked objects with orbital periods under 225 min.
Nicholas L. Johnson, "The Crowded Sky: The Danger of Collisions in
Geostationary Orbit," Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, Vol. 24,
No. 12, December 1982,
pp. 446-449.
NASA launches Columbia on the first Space Shuttle mission, STS-1. When
the Shuttle was designed in the 1970s, orbital debris was not a recognized
hazard. In the latter half of the 1980s cost per flight was estimated at $200-
400 million. Orbiter replacement cost was estimated at $1-2 billion. Each
orbiter is 37 m long and 24 m wide across its delta wings. Crew complement
is variable, depending on mission requirements; STS-1 carried 2 crew, and
flights prior to the Challenger accident carried as many as 8 crew. In its April
1990 report, the U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) stated that an
unnamed NASA orbital debris expert had estimated that most of the orbiter
surfaces will not be penetrated by debris particles 0.4 cm or smaller, while the
triple-paned windows require a hit from at least a 1.5-cm object before loss of
cabin pressure will occur.
Space Program Space Debris: A Potential Threat to Space Station and Shuttle,
GAO, April 1990.
The NORAD/ADCOM Directorate of Analysis publishes TM 81-5, "The
Explosion of Satellite 10704 and Other Delta Second Stage Breakups."
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Nimbus 7 was launched with the Cameo (Chemically Active Material Into
Orbit) experiment on a Delta rocket on October 24, 1978. Nimbus 7, the
primary payload, is the first satellite equipped to monitor the atmosphere for
natural and artificial pollutants. It carries a Total Ozone Mapping Spectrom-
eter (TOMS) instrument which in 1987 discovers the human-made ozone hole
over Antarctica. The Cameo experiment studies Earth's auroral belts. Cameo
remains attached to the spent Delta second stage. On this date two trackable
pieces detach from the Delta stage-Cameo combination at an altitude of 900
km. Though expected to remain in orbit for years, they decay from orbit
within 2 weeks. This high susceptibility to atmospheric drag implies a very
large area-to-mass ratio.
John Gabbard, "History of Satellite Breakups in Space," Orbital Debris (NASA
CP 2360), Donald J. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su, editors, 1985, pp. 30-39; Satellite
Situation Report, Project Operations Branch, GSFC, December 3 l, 1992; letter,
Nicholas L. Johnson to Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., JSC, August 17, 1993.
GSFC notifies McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company that Delta
rockets are exploding in orbit, and asks it to find out why.
The AIAA Technical Committee on Space Systems produces the first major
position paper on the orbital debris problem. It states that "there is... no
strong national or international concern for space debris management," even
though "space debris control needs to be dealt with.., as a common problem
shared by all space users." In its conclusions and recommendations, the
document calls the orbital debris problem "real but not severe," though
"action to resolve it is imperative," and "no obvious, simplistic resolution is
evident." It goes on to say that "continuation of present.., practices and
procedures ensures that the probability of collision.., will eventually reach
unacceptable levels, perhaps within a decade," and that "coordinated action
should be taken immediately if the future use of space is not to be severely
restricted." Specifically, the position paper calls for
development of bumpers to shield spacecraft from small
debris impact, and evasive capability for avoiding large
debris
• immediate action in education, space vehicle design, and
operational procedures and practices
• national and international space policies and treaties.
The AIAA position paper concludes by stating that, "corrective action must
begin now to forestall the development of a serious problem in the future."
"Space Debris: An AIAA Position Paper," AIAA Technical Committee on
Space Systems, July 1981.
Cosmos 1275, a Tsikada-class navigation satellite launched into a 1014-km-by-
961-km orbit on June 4, 1981, disintegrates into more than 307 trackable
debris pieces at an altitude of 977 km. Only 28 pieces had decayed from orbit
on December 31, 1992. The satellite, a 700-kg cylinder 1.3 m in diameter and
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1.9 m long, operates within an altitude range populated by a large fraction of
the total mass of orbital debris, and at an inclination with a high probability
of collision. Intentional destruction is unlikely, as this would endanger the
remainder of the satellite constellation of which Cosmos 1275 was a member
(at least ten satellites for the Tsikada-class). It is believed that Cosmos 1275
carried no pressurized propellant vessels which could explode. Eliminating
these explanations leads many analysts to conclude that the breakup was
caused by a collision with a piece of orbital debris. Darren McKnight, U.S.
Air Force Academy, stated in 1987 that it was impossible to be certain of the
cause of the Cosmos 1275 breakup because the Soviets were withholding
information. McKnight stated that, "one of the most easily implemented and
most useful countermeasure[s to the orbital debris problem] is open exchange
of information on space systems." After the breakup of the Soviet Union in
1991, Russian space officials were more forthcoming. They confirmed that
collision is also their leading candidate for the cause of the Cosmos 1275
breakup.
Darren McKnight, "Determining the Cause of a Satellite Fragmentation: A
Case Study of the Cosmos 1275 Breakup," Space Safety and Rescue 1986-
1987, Univelt, Inc., San Diego, pp. 145-163; "A Position Paper on Orbital
Debris Compiled by An Ad Hoc Expert Group of the International AstIonauti-
cal Academy," Committee on Safety, Rescue, and Quality, August 27, 1992.
The Cosmos 434 satellite was launched into a 261-km-by-194-km orbit at a
51.6-deg inclination on August 12, 1971. After an unusual series of maneu-
vers it was left in an 11,804-km-by-186-km orbit. The satellite reenters over
Australia on this date. To dispel fears that it might carry radioactive materi-
als, the Soviets announce that Cosmos 434 is a "lunar cabin." The Soviet
Union used the same term to describe the U.S. Apollo Lunar Module. The
announcement helps confirm long-held suspicions that Cosmos 434 was a
relic of the failed Soviet manned lunar program. At least two other probable
Soviet "lunar cabin" test vehicles (Cosmos 382 and Cosmos 398) remain in
LEO on December 31, 1992. Their presence in LEO points up the existence of
an enormous space hardware museum which orbits overhead every day.
Dennis Newkirk, Almanac of Soviet Manned Space Flight, Gulf Publishing
Company, 1990, p. 105.
A piece of the NOAA 4 Delta second stage which exploded in August 1975
undergoes a secondary breakup, perhaps through collision. Another expla-
nation is that the piece was a small pressure vessel which exploded. It breaks
into six pieces too small to catalog.
John Gabbard, "History of Satellite Breakups in Space," Orbital Debris
(NASA CP 2360), Donald J. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su, editors, 1985, pp. 30-39.
NASA signs a Memorandum of Agreement formalizing NORAD/ADCOM's
commitment to provide collision avoidance support for Shuttle missions.
The agreement was in effect informally before the STS-1 launch in April 1981.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Michael Collins and J. Steven Stich, August 3 l,
1993; interview, David S. F. Porcee with Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., August 25, 1993.
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January
April
April 19
INASAN begins photometric observations of selected Earth-orbiting objects.
Lydia Rykhlova, "Optical Observations in the Oeostationary Orbits: Data
Reduction" (not dated), Loftus Orbital Debris Files.
Jeanne Lee Crews establishes the Orbital Debris Impact Laboratory at JSC. Its
first project is to study the hypervelocity impact characteristics of composite
materials.
Memorandum, Eric Christiansen to David S. F. Portree, "Historical Data on the
NASA JSC Hypervelocity Impact Test Facility (HIT-F)," July 2, 1993; Jeanne
Lee Crews and Eric Christiansen, "The NASA JSC Hypervelocity Impact Test
Facility (HIT-F)," AIAA 92-1640, presented at the AIAA Space Programs and
Technologies conference, March 24-27, 1992.
McDonnell-Douglas Space Systems Company publishes MDC-H0047, Investi-
gation of Delta Second Stage On-Orbit Explosions. The company's investigative
team concludes that Delta second stage explosions are caused when residual
hypergolic propellants mix accidentally. Delta upper stages have a single
propellant tank divided by a bulkhead which separates the fuel from the
oxidizer (fig. 5). Those in high-inclination, Sun-synchronous orbits are
especially prone to breakup because they undergo periods of prolonged solar
heating, which can overpressurize the propellant tank and eventually rup-
ture the separating bulkhead. Deltas in other orbits explode because the
second stage undergoes thermal stresses as it passes in and out of sunlight
many times each day. These stresses can crack the bulkhead. The policy of
restarting Delta second stages after payload separation to vent oxidizer was
established informally in August 1981, when the cause of the explosions was
first understood. It is formalized by NASA this year. In 1985 Joseph Loftus
briefs the National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) on the
Delta problem. NASDA subsequently adopts similar venting policies for its
Delta-derived H-1 rockets.
Nicholas L. Johnson and Darren McKnight, Artificial Space Debris, revised
edition, Orbit Books, 1991.
The Soviet Union launches the Salyut 7 space station, a near-twin of the
Salyut 6 station it replaces. It features improvements to its cosmonaut living
facilities, strengthened docking rings, and more efficient solar arrays. In
addition, Salyut 7 has transparent plastic covers mounted over several of its
portholes to protect them from micrometeoroids and orbital debris. Of the
crews living on Salyut 7, Soyuz T-10B cosmonauts Leonid Kizim, Vladimir
Solovyev, and Oleg Atkov spend the most time aloft - a world-record 237
days.
Dennis Newkirk, The Almanac of Soviet Manned Space Flight, Gulf Press
Company, 1990, pp. 228-230, 255.
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Figure 5.
In this cutaway of the second stage of the Delta launch vehicle, the stippled area is a wall dividing
the common propellant tank into oxidizer and fuel sections. The oxidizer and fuel are hypergolic -
that is, they ignite on contact. A rupture in the separating wall, possibly caused by corrosion or
thermal stresses (repeated expansion and contraction), permits them to mix and ignite, producing
an explosion which destroys the stage. Often hundreds of catalogued pieces result. Chinese Long
March 4 upper stages and Soviet/Russian Block DM upper stage ullage motors are of similar
design and use hypergolics. They have also undergone on-orbit explosions. Ariane upper stages
also have a common propellant tank divided by a wall, but do not use hypergolics. They are
thought to break apart because of overpressurization of the propellant tank, possibly through solar
heating. Venting the oxidizer remaining in the stage after it reaches its intended orbit can prevent
inadvertent explosions.
June 18
July 2
July 27-29
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The Soviet Union launches Cosmos 1379 against the Cosmos 1375 target
satellite. Intercept occurs at an altitude of 1005 km after two orbits, but
Cosmos 1379 fails to explode. The test is part of a 7-hr strategic exercise
which also includes six missile launches. It simulates a Soviet nuclear assault
on the U.S. and western Europe. After this test, the Soviets impose a morato-
rium on ASAT tests and urge the U.S. to do the same. U.S. Secretary of
Defense Frank Carlucci told the U.S. Congress in 1989 that the Soviet ASAT
system was maintained in "a constant state of readiness" in spite of the
moratorium.
Nicholas L. Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1988, Teledyne Brown
Engineering, 1989, p. 84; Nicholas L. Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1990,
Teledyne Brown Engineering, 1991, p. 96; Douglas Hart, The Encyclopedia of
Soviet Spacecraft, Exeter Books. 1987, p. 50-51.
On mission STS-4 Space Shuttle orbiter Columbia passes within 10 km of the
Soviet upper stage which placed the Intercosmos 14 science satellite into
orbit. At the time of the conjunction, Columbia is in a 28.5-deg orbit at 324
km, a record altitude for the Shuttle program. The Intercosmos 14 upper
stage reached a 1707-km-by-345-km orbit at a 74-deg inclination on December
11, 1975. Within a few months of the conjunction with Columbia the upper
stage reenters Earth's atmosphere.
Letter, Nicholas L. Johnson to Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., August 17, 1993; Jane's
Spaceflight Directory 1988-89, Reginald Turnill, editor, Jane's Information
Group, p. 163; Interavia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, p.
169.
JSC conducts the first major conference dedicated to the orbital debris prob-
lem. More than 100 participants representing NASA Jet Propulsion Labora-
tory (JPL), GSFC, MSFC, and JSC, the Department of Defense (DoD), Battelle
Institute, Lockheed Sunnyvale, ESA, the National Science Foundation,
NORAD, Comsat, the Max Planck Institiit in West Germany, and more than
40 other organizations present 37 papers on definition of the debris environ-
ment, spacecraft shielding requirements, and space object management
(including disposal methods and policy considerations). The workshop
recommends that
The LEO debris environment should be better defined, and
sensors should be orbited to gather data in LEO and GEO.
One significant result of the conference is, however, a shift
in emphasis away from using expensive flight experiments
for data gathering, to using less expensive, usually exist-
ing, ground-based sensors.
• The costs and effectiveness of orbital debris control meth-
ods should be analyzed in detail.
New operational procedures should include reducing the
number of unplanned explosions; using reentry trajectories
for planned explosions; using "anti-litter design and
operational habits"; and using solar and lunar perturba-
tions to reenter GEO objects.
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The workshop showed its participants "for the first time that there was a
community of interest" in the orbital debris problem.
Interview, David S. F. Portre.e with Andrew E. Potter, May 14, 1993; Donald J.
Kessler, "Summary of Workshop Activities," Orbital Debris (NASA CP 2360),
Donald J. Kessler and Shin-Yi Su, editors, 1985.
Interlude: Orbital Debris and Popular Culture
Space exploration excites much public interest and enthusiasm. It is thus not surprising that orbital
debris, like many other space issues, has established itself in popular culture.
Non-technical popular science articles inhabit the marches between technical articles and popular
culture entertainment. For the orbital debris researcher they are important public education ven-
ues. In 1978 space writer Leonard David published in Future magazine the article "Space Junk: It's
Time to Invent Orbital Baggies," a non-technical piece inspired by the Kessler and Cour-Palais
technical article in the Journal of Geophysical Research. It was the first popular piece to describe the
large uncatalogued debris population. In 1980 Burton Cour-Palais, Donald Kessler, NORAD
Civilian Analyst Preston Landry, and Reuben Taylor, a JSC engineer planning on-orbit satellite
servicing, collaborated to produce "Collision Avoidance in Space" for IEEE Spectrum. In 1982
Kessler published "Junk in Space" in Natural History magazine. Jim Shefter, writing for Popular
Science, approached NORAD for an interview in 1981. Resistance from some then in authority at
NORAD (justified later on the grounds that Popular Science is not a refereed technical publication)
was overruled by the NORAD public affairs office. Shefter's July 1982 article, "The Growing Peril
of Space Debris," won an important science writing award. It put the orbital debris problem on the
cover of the widely-circulated Popular Science magazine, helping to raise public awareness. This is,
of course, not a complete list of popular audience orbital debris publications - hundreds have been
published.
Among the earliest references to the orbital debris problem in popular culture entertainment is a
Donald Duck comic book published in 1963. The "lost-in-space Professor Hermit" fires rocket trash
cans into space so he will not litter his planet. Donald Duck and his nephews crash on his planet
after their spacecraft collides with one of the professor's garbage rockets. The message is that
scientists should not fire garbage into space without understanding the consequences. Much later
(1990), Pogo explored the world of orbital debris. "Alien robocoppers" arrive and see humanity's
space junk orbiting the Earth. Owl announces to Churchy the turtle that he plans to build a "space
junk junk" from materials gathered at a junkyard and collect orbital debris for disposal in the Sun.
Unfortunately, Owl's Icarus II spaceship explodes. The orbital debris problem is left unsolved.
Science fiction literature is a natural venue for orbital debris speculation. In Homegoing (1989),
award-winning author/editor Frederik Pohl postulated a future Earth surrounded by "garbage
belts" of 90,000 trackable debris pieces. A character trained as an astronaut describes the final
attempt to orbit a spaceship with a crew. The craft was destroyed by debris strikes, and her col-
leagues killed. Previous generations "shot us out of space foreverV' she exclaims. Pohl writes that
"the thing that keeps the human race trapped on the surface of the Earth is its own previous activi-
ties in space. Just as has happened often before in human history, the human race has been de-
feated by its own success."
Television has also touched on the orbital debris issue. In the short-lived late 1970s television series
Salvage 1, Andy Griffith starred as lone entrepreneur who saw potential profit in salvaging disused
space hardware. Orbital debris has not yet been a major source of inspiration for feature films.
However, at least one orbital debris researcher's office is graced by a quote from Star Trek V: The
Final Frontier. A Klingon warship appears near the drifting Pioneer 10 space probe (launched in
40
1982-1983
1972) and blasts it to pieces. On the bridge, the warship's captain, bored from a prolonged interstel-
lar peace, declares that, "shooting space garbage is no test of a warrior's mettle."
Jim Shefter, "The Growing Peril of Space Debris," Popular Science, July 1982,
pp. 48-5 l; Donald J. Kessler, "Junk in Space," Natural History, Vol. 91, No. 3,
March 1992, pp. 12-18; Walt Disney's Donald Duck Beyond the Moon, Gold
Key, April 1963; "Pogo," Los Angeles Times Syndicate, March 6-1 l, April 16-
28, 1990; Leonard David, "Space Junk: It's Time to Invent Orbital Baggies,"
Future, November 1978, pp. 68-69; interview, David S. F. Portree with Joseph
P. Loftus, Jr., August 25, 1993; interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J.
Kessler, June l, 1993; Frederik Pohl, Horaegoing, Ballantine, 1989; note,
Donald J. Kessler to David S. F. Portree September 14, 1993.
October The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT-LL) uses
its Experimental Telescope System (ETS) outside Socorro, New Mexico, to
record the second-stage burn of a two-stage, solid-fueled Inertial Upper Stage
(IUS) in GEO. The ETS is the prototype for the DoD's Ground-based Electro-
Optical Space Surveillance (GEODSS) network. The IUS second-stage burn
circularizes and changes the plane of the orbit. The plume of aluminum
oxide particles, hundreds of kilometers across, is bright with reflected sun-
light. The JSC orbital debris team requests that MIT-LL record an IUS burn
scheduled for early 1983 to permit additional study of aluminum oxide
particle dispersion.
Donald J. Kessler, "A Partial History of Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part
2)," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 4, October l, 1993.
November The JSC Orbital Debris Impact Laboratory conducts its first hypervelocity
impact test. It uses a 1.78-mm two-stage light-gas gun built inhouse using
plans provided by Donald Humes at LaRC.
Memorandum, Eric Christiansen to David S. F. Portree, "Historical Data on the
NASA JSC Hypervelocity Impact Test Facility (HIT-F)," July 2, 1993;
"Hypervelocity Impact Test Facility" brochure, 199 I.
1983 Cumulative launches (since 1957)Catalogued objects in orbit 25164984
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Burton Cour-Palais and Donald Kessler discuss orbital debris with space
station planners at JSC and MSFC. Cour-Palais works closely with MSFC,
which is designing habitation modules. He asks Kessler to develop an orbital
debris reference environment for a space station.
Donald J. Kessler, "A Partial History of Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part
2)," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1, 1993.
The joint U.S.-Dutch-British Infrared Astronomy Satellite (IRAS) images most
of the sky in Infrared wavelengths, providing data for revolutionary discov-
eries about our universe. IRAS also detects orbital debris. Data showing
debris are discarded as noise. Donald Kessler and Andrew Potter obtain a
sample of the noise data and analyze it for signs of orbital debris. Analysis
proves to be much more difficult than expected and is abandoned. Analysis
of discarded data in the early 1990s by IRAS Space Research Groningen, in
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the Netherlands, shows that many known orbital debris objects above 3000
km were detected. Two transtages in near-geosynchronous orbits and a
geodetic satellite 6000 km high are positively identified in the data. No
objects could be detected below the satellite's 900-km orbital altitude or
above 300,000 km.
P. R. Wessehus, "Mid-term Review of IRAS Results on Orbital Debris," March
1, 1991; note, Andrew E. Potter to David S. F. Portree, August 2, 1993.
The Cosmos 1402 RORSAT was launched on August 30, 1982. Normally
three pieces are produced when a RORSAT completes its mission. Two
pieces remain in LEO and decay quickly, while the third, the nuclear reactor
with an attached rocket, boosts to an 800-900-km storage orbit with an esti-
mated lifetime of 300-1000 years. Only two pieces were produced when
Cosmos 1402 made ready to send its reactor to storage orbit on December 28,
1982, signifying a separation malfunction which fouled the reactor boost
engine. On January 8 the Soviets confirm that Cosmos 1402 carries nuclear
fuel. They eject the fuel elements from the reactor vessel. This procedure
helps ensure that the fuel elements will burn up during reentry and not strike
the ground. On this date the fuel elements reenter over the South Atlantic.
No increase in atmospheric radioactivity is detected in the area. The Soviet
news agency TASS implies that the satellite performed normally and states
that "extraction of the fuel core.., from the reactor guaranteed its complete
incineration." RORSAT launches resume in 1984.
Nicholas L. Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1983, Teledyne Brown
Engineering, 1984, pp. 31-32; lnteravia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew E.
Wilson, editor, pp. 191-192.
Space Shuttle Challenger, on its maiden flight (STS-6), deploys the second
IUS and the first Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS). The TDRS series
comprises large GEO satellites (17.4 m wide fully deployed) essential to
NASA's plans for the Space Shuttle and major LEO facilities, such as the
Hubble Space Telescope. Overall cost of the TDRS system was nearly $3
billion by 1985. The IUS first stage performs flawlessly. The MIT-LL ETS
records for JSC the second stage burn, which is designed to place TDRS-1 in
GEO. Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory in Chile also observes the
burn. The second stage motor fails, tumbling the satellite and injecting it into
a useless orbit (later it is stabilized and maneuvered to a useful GEO posi-
tion). Joseph Loft-us arranges briefings at which NASA, DoD, and contractor
officials view the recordings of the normal (October 1982) and failed bums.
The size and intensity of the plumes make obvious the huge number of
aluminum oxide particles produced in solid rocket motor bums.
Donald J. Kessler, "A Partial History of Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part
Two)," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1, 1993; interview,
David S. F. Portree with Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., August 25, 1993.
On mission STS-7, Space Shuttle Challenger collides at 5 km/sec with a
titanium-rich paint chip 0.2 mm across, producing a window pit 4 mm in
diameter. The crew notes the pit while still in space, and reports it to the
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Mission Control Center (MCC) in Houston. Replacing the damaged window
costs over $50,000.
Space Program Space Debris: A Potential Threat to Space Station and Shuttle,
GAO, April 1990.
While working aboard the Salyut 7 space station, cosmonauts Alexander
Alexandrov and Vladimir Lyakhov have their routine experimental program
interrupted by a loud noise. They evacuate to their Soyuz T-9 spaceship,
which is docked at the station's rear port. After they return to the station's
work compartment, they discover an impact pit 3 mm in diameter in one of
the viewports. It is not possible to confirm that this was formed by an orbital
debris impact. The Soviets suggest the pit was caused by a meteoroid from
the Delta Aquarid shower.
David S. F. Portree, "Soyuz T-8, T-9, and T-10A," Magill's Survey of Science:
Space Exploration Series, 1988, pp. 1538.
Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES) "reorbits" the French-German
Symphonie GEO satellite, raising its orbital altitude to 80 km beyond GEO.
The U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) Ad Hoc Committee on
Potential Threat to U.S. Satellites by Space Debris meets at the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C. In 1984 the SAB publishes a report on the meeting. It
states that the smallest object detectable by NORAD radars at 500 km is 4 cm
in diameter. At GEO altitude no objects smaller than about I m are detect-
able. The report also comments on the national and international orbital
debris policy environments. It maintains that because the "'U.S. space com-
munity is fragmented from an overall management perspective.., broad
common policies are difficult to implement. Hence, our immediate concern
[regarding developing orbital debris policies] should be domestic." It states
that the main reason for the lack of coordinated effort on orbital debris on the
U.S. national level is a lack of high-level direction. It says the national situa-
tion is "a microcosm of the international situation." The SAB report calls for
negotiations with the Soviets to set treaty limits on ASAT tests. It recom-
mends that
• NASA and the U.S. Air Force refine their orbital debris
environment model by December 1984.
• Interaction between NASA and the ESA be used as a way
of fostering international cooperation on orbital debris.
Spacecraft and launch vehicle manufacturers "undertake
prudent measures to reduce future space debris by using
techniques such as tethering loose mechanisms, venting
spent propellant tanks, and other steps which.., do not
cause significant hardship or cost impact to their designs."
43
1983-1984
November 3
The report's recommendations conclude with a call for reappraisal of the
orbital debris problem after the recommended measures are implemented,
"perhaps in the January-March 1984 time frame."
Report of the U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Ad Hoc Committee on
Potential Threat to U.S. Satellites Posed by Space Debris, December 1983
(draft copy).
During extravehicular activity (EVA) outside Salyut 7, cosmonaut Alexander
Alexandrov is reprimanded by ground controllers for releasing pieces of
trash to watch them drift away. They fear that reflections from the glittering
bits of junk will confuse Salyut 7's orientation sensors.
David S. F. Portree, "Soyuz T-8, T-9, and T-10-A," Magill's Survey of Science:
Space Exploration Series, 1988, pp. 1539.
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Cumulative launches (since 1957) 2645
Catalogued objects in orbit 5257
During the year
During the year
January
late January-
early February
ESA moves GEtS 2 to a higher orbit, freeing its slot in GEt for future use.
K. Heftman, "Overview of European Activities on Orbital Debris," Orbital
Debris." Technical Issues and Future Directions (NASA CP 10077), Andrew E.
Potter, editor, September 1992, pp. 1-7.
The 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act goes through Congress. Section 7
empowers the Secretary of Transportation to license U.S. launches. Section
6(b)(2) gives the DOT limited jurisdiction over foreign payloads launched by
U.S. corporations, and over U.S. payloads not subject to regulation by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) or NOAA, so that they do not
"jeopardize the public health and safety, safety of property, or any national
security interest or foreign policy interest of the United States." These sec-
tions are later seen as broad enough to mandate DOT regulation of the
creation of some types of orbital debris.
Orbital Debris Mitigation Techniques: Technical, Economic, and Legal
Aspects, AIAA Special Project Report SP-016-1992.
In his State of the Union address, President Ronald Reagan calls for NASA to
build a space station within a decade.
The MIT-LL uses the ETS to record on videotape orbital debris environment
data for NASA. The space agency signed a contract with MIT-LL in late 1983.
The ETS is used in staring mode - that is, its telescopes point always toward
one place in the sky. Orbiting debris pieces pass through the fields of view of
the telescopes. After processing and analysis at JSC, the videotapes show
that about 4 fragments per hour were detected. The number expected, based
on the NORAD catalog, was only 1.3 fragments per hour. During 2 hours of
exceptional sky clarity, the ETS detects 8 objects per hour. Later ETS data,
combined with ground-based infrared telescope data and data on debris
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albedo collected by Karl Henize in 1987-1990, makes clear that the initial ETS
tests detected pieces not much smaller than 10 cm. The tests show correctly
that there is an uncatalogued debris population potentially more important
to spacecraft operations than the catalogued population. They also make
clear that the optical orbital debris environment is not adequately under-
stood, leading to the JSC-USSPACECOM GEODSS agreement implemented
in 1988.
L. G. Taft, D. E. Beatty, A. J. Yakutis, and P. M. S. Randall, "Low Altitude,
One Centimeter Space Debris Search at Lincoln Laboratory's (M.I.T.)
Experimental Test System," Advances in Space Research, Vol. 5, 1985, pp. 35-
45; Donald J. Kessler, "A Partial History of Orbital Debris: A Personal View
(Part 2)," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1, 1993.
NASA launches the LDEF inside the cargo bay of Space Shuttle Challenger
on the STS 41-C mission. Challenger deploys it into a 480-km-by-474-km
orbit at 28.5-deg inclination. After its cargo bay is cleared of the 11-ton, bus-
sized LDEF, Challenger retrieves the Solar Max satellite. Astronauts James
van Hoften and George Nelson perform the first on-orbit satellite repairs in
the Shuttle cargo bay. About 1.5 m 2 of thermal blankets and I m 2 of louvers
from Solar Max are removed and returned to Earth. JSC acquires "every
louver with a hole in it." The louvers are excellent debris capture cells,
though of course they were not built with that in mind. They are hollow and
resemble Whipple Bumpers. The outer surface broke up particles, and the
inner surface captured them in molten aluminum. The JSC orbital debris
team analyzes the captured partides in the facility which studied the Apollo
lunar samples. The Space Science Branch at JSC earlier suggested that a
Shuttle might retrieve a disused satellite for analysis, but retrieval of the Solar
Max material reduces the need for an old satellite. The idea surfaces again in
1988-89, when NASA and the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
(SDIO) become interested in studying the effects on hardware of long expo-
sure to space conditions. Both organizations plan to build space facilities
with lifetimes of decades.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Andrew E. Potter, May 14, 1993; interview,
David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 1, 1993.
The PARCS radar observes debris produced by the December 20, 1983,
breakup of Cosmos 1405, spotting more than 130 fragments. Conventional
NORAD tracking had catalogued only 33.
Nicholas L. Johnson, "History and Consequences of On-Orbit Breakups,"
Advances in Space Research, Vol. 5, 1985, pp. 11-19.
The orbital debris workshop at the COSPAR (Committee For Space Research)
XXV meeting in Graz, Austria, is the first international workshop dedicated
entirely to orbital debris. About 20 researchers from the U.S., Britain, ESA,
Czechoslovakia, and West Germany present papers.
Space Debris, Asteroids, and Satellite Orbits, Donald J. Kessler, et al, editors,
Pergamon Press, 1985; interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler,
June 7, 1993.
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July JSC 20001, entitled "Orbital Debris Environment for Space Station," is pub-
lished. NASA uses this orbital debris reference environment model for space
station design until 1991.
Cumulative launches (since 1957) 2766 )
 1985 Catalogued objects in orbit 5781
February
April 4
May 23
June 6
Early this month Soviet ground controllers lose radio contact with the 20-ton
Salyut 7 space station. It had been functioning normally with no crew
aboard.
The Governor of the State of Idaho, John V. Evans, signs a proclamation
making July 16, 1985, through July 24, 1986, U.S. Space Observation Year, and
July 16, 1985, Space Exploration Day. The proclamation states, in part, "we in
Idaho encourage those involved in the [space] Program... to consider Idaho
a place where the problems associated with space debris can be addressed."
Idaho's interest in space is attributed in the prodamation to its serving as a
training area for astronauts and a supplier of metals used in aerospace hard-
ware.
Proclamation, Office of the Governor, State of Idaho, Boise, April4, 1985.
George Kovolos, University of Thessaloniki, Greece, logs the last in a series of
seven photographs of the young moon at 17:41:50 UT (Universal Time). One
photo captures a flash of light near the lunar terminator. Kovolos interprets
it as an energetic event on or near the lunar surface - possibly a meteoroid
impact, a volcanic eruption, or some kind of ionization phenomenon. In
1989, JSC's Paul Maley and Richard Rast independently discover that the
derelict U.S. military weather satellite DMSP F3 passed 0.25 deg east of the
flash location about 80 sec before Kovolos logged his last photograph. After
John Seiradakis supplies better data on Kovolos' location at the time he
photographed the flash, Rast and Maley independently determine that DMSP
F3 passed just 2-3 arc min from the flash location at 17:40:04 LIT. Photometry
data supplied by USSPACECOM and MIT-LL confirm that sunlight reflects
unpredictably off the satellite's surfaces. Several times in the 1980s astrono-
mers mistook sunlight glinting off satellites for new astronomical phenom-
ena. According to Maley, the potential for harm to the science of astronomy
is not known, because very little research into satellite optical phenomena has
been conducted.
"Lunar Flash Revisited," Sky & Telescope, June 1990,p. 590; interview, David
S. F. Portree with Paul D. Maley, May 14, 1993.
The Soviets launch the Soyuz T-13 rescue mission to prevent Salyut 7 from
undergoing an uncontrolled reentry. They also want to keep the station
available to Soviet cosmonauts until after the overdue launch of its successor.
Cosmonauts Vladimir Dzhanibekov and Viktor Savinykh perform a perilous
manual docking with the slowly tumbling station. They stabilize it, orient its
solar arrays toward the Sun, and recharge its batteries. Salyut 7's own orbit-
boosting engines were crippled by a line rupture in 1983, so an automated
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Progress freighter serves as a tugboat to raise Salyut 7's orbit. It also delivers
replacement parts for repairs. On October 2, 1985 Cosmos 1686 docks with
Salyut 7. The 18-ton spacecraft can serve as a greenhouse, space tug, or
laboratory.
Phillip Clark, The Soviet Manned Space Program, Salamander Books, Ltd.,
1988, pp. 142-145.
On the STS 51-F mission, the Space Shuttle Challenger carries Spacelab 2, a
suite of astronomy instruments. On mission day two, astronaut Karl Henize
notices a small red object keeping station with the Shuttle about 3 m above
the payload bay. The object is apparently a bit of debris left in the payload
bay during prelaunch preparations. A few hours later the object drifts off to
become a short-lived, uncatalogued member of the population of 1-cm
debris. A few months later Henize, who worked with Fred Whipple on
satellite tracking from 1956 to 1959, left the astronaut corps to join the JSC
orbital debris team.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Karl Henize, June 8, 1993.
A U.S. Air Force F-15 fighter plane launches a small kinetic-energy intercep-
tor at the Solwind (P-78) gamma ray solar physics satellite. USSPACECOM
catalogs 287 trackable pieces of debris from this Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) ASAT test, of which 11 remained in orbit on December 31, 1992.
The Solwind ASAT Test (1985)
Members of the JSC orbital debris team learned of U.S. Air Force plans for the Solwind ASAT test in
July 1985. Shin-Yi Su, with Lockheed at JSC, modeled the effects of the test. He determined that
debris produced would still be in orbit in the 1990s. It would force NASA to enhance debris shield-
ing for its planned LEO space station.
Earlier the U.S. Air Force and NASA had worked together to develop a Scout-launched target
vehicle for ASAT experiments. NASA advised the U.S. Air Force on how to conduct the ASAT test
to avoid producing long-lived debris. However, congressional restrictions on ASAT tests inter-
vened. In order to get in an ASAT test before an expected Congressional ban took effect (as it did in
October 1985), the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, determined to use the existing Solwind
astrophysics satellite as a target. Andrew Potter, John Stanley, and Donald Kessler worked with the
Department of Defense (DoD) to monitor the test's effects.
After Solwind broke up, the JSC team took two orbital debris telescopes and a reentry radar to
Alaska. It was the only U.S. territory from which Solwind pieces were observable. Potter took
JSC's Lenzar orbital debris telescope aloft in a Learjet and flew from Anchorage toward Nome.
Stanley set up a smaller telescope at Circle Hot Springs on the banks of the Yukon River, and a
reentry radar on the North Slope, near Barter Island.
The JSC team assumed torn metal would be bright. Surprisingly, the Solwind pieces turned out to
appear so dark as to be almost undetectable. Only two pieces were seen. Kessler remembered how
fragments produced by firing a hypervelocity pellet at a scaled-down satellite in a laboratory were
dark with what appeared to be soot. The tests were conducted at the U.S. Air Force Arnold Engi-
neering Development Center (AEDC). Potter theorized that the unexpected Solwind darkening
was due to carbonization of organic compounds in the target satellite; that is, when the kinetic
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energy of the projectile became heat energy on impact, the plastics inside Solwind vaporized and
condensed on the metal pieces as soot. JSC's Faith Vilas used U.S. Air Force infrared telescopes to
show that the pieces were warm with heat absorbed from the Sun. This added weight to the con-
tention that they were dark with soot, and not reflective. (Recent research, however, supports
another explanation, which some orbital debris researchers contend is more likely given how
quickly the Solwind pieces decayed from orbit. Unfortunately, this explanation remains classified.)
The Solwind test had three important results. It raised the possibility that the objects optical sys-
tems were detecting were large and dark, not small and bright as was generally assumed. This had
implications for the calibration of optical and radar orbital debris detection systems. The test also
created a baseline event for researchers seeking a characteristic signature of a hypervelocity colli-
sion in space. In addition, NASA protests raised DoD awareness of the orbital debris problem.
This contributed to more responsible conduct of DoD debris-producing activities, and prepared the
way for DoD orbital debris policies.
In the end, the Solwind ASAT test had few consequences for the planned U.S. space station. For
economic and political reasons unrelated to orbital debris, station completion has been pushed
beyond the mid-1990s. More important was the record-high level of solar activity during the 1989-
1991 solar maximum. This heated and expanded the atmosphere more than anticipated in 1985,
accelerating Solwind debris decay.
Interview, David S. F. Portre¢ with John Stanley, June 21, 1993; interview,
David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, May 11, 1993; Donald J. Kessler,
"A Partial History of Orbital Debris: A Personal View (Part 2)," Orbital Debris
Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 4, October 1, 1993; lnteravia Space Directory 1992-93,
Andrew Wilson, editor, p. 198; interview, David S. F. Portree with Joseph P.
Loftus, Jr., August 25, 1993.
October 25 The Soviet Union places the first Luch/SDRN spacecraft in GEO at 95 deg
east. Each Luch weighs 2.2 tons and measures 16 m wide. The Luch/SDRN
satellites are roughly equivalent to those of the NASA TDRS series. Using
three transponders, they relay communications and telemetry from orbiting
Mir and Soyuz TM spacecraft to ground stations.
November The International Astronomical Union (IAU) holds its 19th General Assembly
in New Delhi, India. The IAU unanimously adopts a resolution which notes
"with grave concern the.., contamination of space that adversely affects
astronomical observations from the ground and from space." The resolution
"maintains that no group has the right to change the Earth's environment...
without full international study and agreement" and "urges that all national
representatives bring this concern to the notice of adhering organizations and
space agencies in their countries."
Cumulative launches (since 1957) 2869
1986 Catalogued objects in orbit 6612
During the year The Structures Working Group at NASA Headquarters develops Space
Station Freedom (SSF) program design requirements for orbital debris. The
group consults engineers at MSFC, who are designing the habitation mod-
ules, and takes into account the 1984 NASA orbital debris model.
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On mission STS 51-L the Space Shuttle Challenger explodes, killing its crew
of seven and grounding the U.S. Space Shuttle fleet for nearly 3 years.
The Space Shuttle and Orbital Debris
The Challenger accident highlighted the dangers of space travel and led to reexamination of
NASA's space safety policies, including its policies on orbital debris. Shuttle planners first consid-
ered the implications of orbital debris for the Space Shuttle before STS-1 flew in April 1981.
NORAD agreed to provide the Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) at JSC with data on Shuttle
conjunctions with space objects. MOD deferred creating a Flight Rule on orbital debris avoidance,
however, in favor of making flight directors responsible for deciding orbital debris avoidance
actions on a case-by-case basis.
After the Challenger accident, MOD developed Shuttle Flight Rule 4-61, which stated that an
avoidance maneuver would be called for "if a predicted miss distance is less than 2 km radially
[below or above the of the orbiter's track], 5 km downtrack [ahead or behind], and 2 km out-of-
plane [to either side] and if the maneuver does not compromise either primary payload or mission
objectives." This 2-km-by-5-km-by-2-km area around the orbiter is sometimes called the maneuver
box.
Implementation of Flight Rule 4-61 begins when the MCC Flight Dynamics Officer (FDO) provides
orbiter trajectory data to USSPACECOM. This is done several times each day during a mission and
before and after each orbiter burn. USSPACECOM then runs a Computation of Misses Between
Orbits (COMBO) analysis program using the data supplied by the FDO. Within I hour of the FDO
sending data to USSPACECOM, the COMBO analysis results reach the MCC. Objects within a 5-
km radial, 25-kin downtrack, and 5-kin out-of-plane alert box are flagged. USSPACECOM contin-
ues tracking any risk objects to refine the accuracy of the estimate of their locations. Updates are
sent to the MCC so the FDO can model the conjunction. If the conjunction falls inside the alert box
a maneuver is not called for, but if it falls "inside of the 2-km radial, 5-km downtrack, 2-km out-of-
plane maneuver box, a maneuver will be considered per the flight rule."
MOD determined that because the chance of collision is small, "compromising either primary
payload or mission objectives cannot be justified. However, if there are no perturbations to...
mission objectives, it is best to maneuver for any conjunction with a greater than I in 100,000 chance
of collision." Flight Rule 4-61 goes on to state that "an acceptable risk of I in 100,000 is based on...
the level of risk taken by other space shuttle elements. The [2 km-by-5-km-by-2 km] ellipsoid stated
in the rule guarantees this risk."
Prior to STS-26 in September 1988, it was predicted that an avoidance maneuver would be called for
once in every 10 Shuttle flights. This estimate has proven reliable - twice in the 31 Shuttle flights
since the Challenger accident (STS-26 through STS-57), objects have intruded on the 2-km-by-5-km-
by-2-km maneuver box. MCC conducted three avoidance maneuvers and modified operations
slightly once to avoid debris. Only one of the maneuvers was prompted by an intrusion into the
maneuver box. No avoidance maneuver was carried out for the other maneuver box intrusion, as
per the portion of Flight Rule 4-61 permitting the rule to be waived if collision avoidance impinges
on mission objectives.
Flight Rule 4-3, "Orbit Conjunctions and Conflicts," also relates to orbital debris. It states, in part,
that if COMBO analysis "predicts an on-orbit conjunction within 5 km in the radial and out-of-
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plane directions and 15 km in the downtrack direction during the first 4 hours of a nominal mis-
sion, launch will be held until the next even minute to assure clearance."
"NASA Johnson Space Center Flight Rules," Flight Rule 4-3, 1/20/89, p. 4-3
and Flight Rule 4-61, 4/16/92, p. 4-40; interview, David S. F. Portree with
Michael F. Collins, Chief, Trajectory Operations Branch, Flight Design
Dynamics Division, JSC MOD, and J. Steven Stick Rendezvous Flight
Dynamics Officer, Trajectory Operations Branch, Flight Design Dynamics
Division, JSC MOD, August 17, 1993; J. Steven Stich, "STS Collision
Avoidance Procedures" (presentation materials), January 17, 1992, p. 8.
February 20 The Soviet Union launches the Mir space station base block. The Kvant
astrophysics module is added to its rear port in April 1987. The Kvant-2
module arrives at Mir in December 1989. The KristaU module is placed
opposite Kvant-2 in June 1990, creating a T-shaped space station complex
with a mass of about 80 tons. In early 1993 Mir was about 30 m wide across
its solar arrays. It revolves about Earth in a 51.6-deg orbit 300-400 km high.
Mir is almost always inhabited by two or three cosmonauts. Visiting crews
can swell its population to five or six.
May 12-13 The U.S. Air Force SAB begins work on a report on the implications of orbital
debris for future U.S. Air Force space activities.
June Karl Henize and Faith Vilas take JSC's Lenzar telescope to Oregon to observe
Solwind debris. They detect fewer than 10 pieces.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Karl Henize, June 8, 1993.
June 30-
July 12
August
August
At the COSPAR XXVI conference in Toulouse, France, JSC researchers
present a paper in which they state that at least 30% of the material captured
from space by a Solar Max thermal blanket comprises micrometeorites. The
majority of the particles found are, however, orbital debris - mostly paint
chips and aluminum particles.
Franz J. M. Rietmeijer, et al, 'q'he Main Electronics Box Thermal Blanket of
the Solar Maximum Mission Satellite as an Inadvertent Capture Cell for Orbital
Debris and Micrometeorites," abstract in Scientific and Technical Papers
Presented or Published by JSC Authors in 1986 (NASA TM 100457), July
1987, p. 113.
Harlan Smith, Director of the University of Texas McDonald Observatory,
proposes "the ultimate ground-based optical detector of space debris." It
consists of two 8-m f/4.3 Cassegrain telescopes 100 m apart. Computers to
analyze the mountain of data collected by the telescopes would cost $12
million. Theoretically, the system could detect objects as small as 1 mm. It is
ultimately killed by its cost, which is estimated at $100 million.
Thornton L. Page, Andrew E. Potter, and Donald J. Kessler, 'q'he History of
Orbital Debris," 1990 (unpublished draft paper).
Researchers at the Space Telescope Science Institute publish a study of the
probability that satellites, including orbital debris, will collide with the
Hubble Space Telescope (HST). They conclude that a 5-mm object will strike
HST once in 17 years. A strike on the 40% of HST comprising solar arrays
will cause little damage. A strike elsewhere could destroy the mission or
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pass unnoticed, depending on the criticality of the component struck. The
researchers note that HST's Fine Guidance Sensors had to be designed so
they would not track on satellites and lose guide star lock. They warn that
light trails from satellites will appear in many of the images from HST and
future orbiting instruments.
Michael Shara and Mark D. Johnston, "Artificial Earth Satellites Crossing the
Fields of View of, and Colliding With, Orbiting Space Telescopes," Publica-
tions of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific, Vol. 98, August 1986, pp. 814-
820.
SDIO conducts the Delta 180 test in orbit over Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific.
An SDI satellite carrying an explosive is placed on a collision course with an
instrumented Delta second stage. They collide at 10,450 km/hour, and both
vehicles are completely destroyed. Although several hundred pieces are
observed by ground radar, only 18 debris pieces are eventually catalogued.
The test is conducted at an altitude of 192 km to ensure rapid reentry of its
products. Half of the pieces reenter within an hour - most of the remainder
follow within a few days. One of the reasons Delta 180 is significant is that it
is the first U.S. debris-producing test in which orbital debris is taken into
account. Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, head of the SDIO, was NASA Associ-
ate Administrator for Space Flight when the TDRS-1 IUS failed in 1983. He
was present at the briefings Joseph Loftus arranged at JSC at which tapes of
the first two IUS second stage burns were shown. In 1984 Abrahamson
became Director of the SDIO, where he heard NASA's concerns about the
1985 Solwind ASAT test. Abrahamson directed that the Delta 180 test be
conducted so as not to add to the amount of debris in orbit. Before the test
the Delta 180 experiment design team consulted with Donald Kessler on
orbital debris lifetimes. After the test Kessler joins Andrew Potter and Eu-
gene Stansbery, a radar expert at JSC, in a measurement campaign coordi-
nated by John Stanley. The campaign uses the Air Force Maui Optical Site
(AMOS), GEODSS, and other sensors. Nicholas Johnson, Advisory Scientist
at Teledyne Brown Engineering, testified in 1988 to the House of Representa-
tives Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications that the test was "an
excellent example of responsible planning of a debris-generating experiment
in space."
Interavia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, p. 220; interview,
David S. F. Portree with John Stanley, June 21, 1993; Orbital Space Debris,
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, Commit-
tee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, July 13,
1988, p. 81; note, Andrew E. Potter to David S. F. Portree, July 24, 1993.
Thomas W. Inman of MSFC publishes a paper titled "Analysis of Orbital
Debris Collision Probabilities for Space Station." He applies to SSF the
probabilistic approach to assessing potential orbital debris collision hazards
used by James McCarter in 1971-72. Inman starts with a catalogued popula-
tion of 6409 objects in August 1986. He assumes a 7.5% average annual
growth rate for the catalogued population. He states that the catalogued
debris population will number 16,311 by the year 2000 and 48,262 by 2015.
Inman updates McCarter's approach by assuming a large population of
uncatalogued objects smaller than 4 cm, but larger than I mm. Based on
models by Donald Kessler, Vladimir Chobotov, and others, Inman assumes
that the uncatalogued population is five times the size of the catalogued -
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32,045 objects in 1986. Again using a 7.5% annual growth rate, this yields an
uncatalogued population of 81,555 in 2000 and 241,310 in 2015. The space
station selected for analysis is a large dual-keel design with four habitable
modules. A collision occurs when an object intrudes on the 85-m radius
sphere enclosing the station. The collision probability is also computed for a
19-m radius sphere enclosing the four modules. The station is assumed to be
in a 28.5-deg inclination orbit 250-500 km high. Inman finds that for the 85-m
sphere the probability of a collision with a catalogued object is already
significant in 1986 - about 0.3 at an altitude of 500 km. Uncatalogued objects
naturally increase the colhsion probability. The hazard to the habitable
modules is not significant, but "if present growth rates of orbital debris
continue, this can be expected to change," Inman states. He concludes by
calling for NASA to give high priority to hypervelocity impact testing.
Thomas Inman, "Analysis of Orbital Debris Collision Probabilities for Space
Station," October 9, 1986.
On February 22, 1986, an ESA Ariane I launch vehicle carried the French
SPOT 1 commercial remote sensing satellite and Swedish Viking astrophysics
satellite into orbit. This was the 16th flight (V16) of an Ariane rocket. Its
third stage was left in a 835-km-by-829-km orbit at a 98.7-deg inclination
(Sun-synchronous). On this date the third stage explodes over east Africa,
producing a debris cloud immediately detected by the U.S. FPS-79 radar in
Pirinclik, Turkey.
Nicholas L. Johnson, "Preliminary Analysis of the Fragmentation of the Spot 1
Ariane Third Stage," Orbital Debris from Upper-Stage Breakup, Joseph P.
Loftus, Jr., editor, 1989, pp. 41-106; interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald
J. Kessler, June 1, 1993.
The Ariane V16 third stage debris cloud passes over the U.S. for the first time
8 hrs after breakup. It passes through the coverage of the FPS-85 missile
early warning radar at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. The FPS-85 detects 44
debris pieces. They orbit at 550-1300-km altitude and have orbital periods of
98-107 min. Within hours Nicholas Johnson informs Donald Kessler of the
breakup. He passes word to Joseph Loftus, who informs NASA Headquar-
ters. At a meeting already scheduled for this date, NASA Administrator
James Fletcher informs ESA Director-General Reimar Lfist of the Ariane
breakup.
Ibid.
Ninety-three trackable pieces are associated with the Ariane V16 breakup.
Ibid.
Catalogued pieces associated with the Ariane V16 breakup number 274 by
this date.
Ibid.
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During the year
During the year
January 5-16
February 4
mid-February
Darren McKnight, U.S. Air Force Academy, and Nicholas Johnson, Teledyne
Brown Engineering, publish Artificial Space Debris, the first book devoted to
orbital debris. A revised and updated edition is published in 1991.
Gamma ray astronomy instruments carried by the Japanese Ginga (Astro-3)
satellite, Solar Max, and instrumented balloons adrift in Earth's upper atmo-
sphere suffer from interference from anomalous gamma ray sources. In 1988
it is revealed that Soviet RORSAT reactors are the sources of the interference.
During its 9 years in orbit, Solar Max suffers interference from 18 RORSAT
reactors.
lnteravia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, p. 117.
Andrew Potter, Karl Henize, and Jerry Winkler use JSC's Lenzar telescope to
study the albedo of Ariane V16 debris swarm at the U.S. Naval Observatory's
Black Birch facility on the South Island of New Zealand. They look at debris
from the Landsat I and 3 Delta second stages and Cosmos 1275 satellite for
comparison. Faith Vilas and John Stanley use infrared sensors in Hawaii.
They find that the Ariane pieces are brighter than average, and that there are
significant albedo differences between debris swarms. There is no readily
apparent correlation between probable breakup cause and swarm albedo. In
general, most debris pieces are very dark, with an average reflectivity of
about 0.1 (much darker than the widely-accepted value of 0.5).
lbid; interview, David S. F. Portree with Karl Henize, June 8, 1993; Karl G.
Henize, et al, "Optical Properties of Orbital Debris" (AIAA 93-1062),
presented at the 31st Aerospace Sciences Meeting & Exhibit, Reno, Nevada,
January 11-14, 1993.
The DoD issues its first official orbital debris policy. It states that the "DoD
will seek to minimize the impact of space debris on its military operations.
Design and operations of DoD space tests, experiments and systems will
strive to minimize or reduce accumulation of space debris consistent with
mission requirements." DoD Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for Policy
Philip Kunsberg told the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applica-
tions in 1988 that "the DoD space policy.., broke new ground by expressly
addressing space debris as a factor in planning military space operations."
He continued, saying "this does not mean we will curtail or avoid space
activities that are necessary for our national security."
Orbital Space Debris, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Space Science and
Applications, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of
Representatives, July 13, 1988, p. 24.
Four hundred and sixty-five trackable debris pieces are associated with the
November 13, 1986, Ariane V16 breakup. They form a 30-deg-wide ring
around the Earth inclined 98.7 deg to the equator, and range in altitude from
500-1400 km. The ring expands in width at 10 deg per month. By this time it
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April 14
May 8
May 14-15
June
June
July 14
September 19
was abundantly clear that the Ariane V16 breakup was the worst known
orbital debris-producing event in history. Robert Culp, Director of the
Colorado Center for Astrophysics Research, estimated the explosion pro-
duced "over 500 trackable debris pieces.., and an estimated 5000 pieces of
debris capable of destroying a spacecraft." In testimony to the U.S. House
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications in 1988, Nicholas Johnson,
Advisory Scientist at Teledyne Brown Engineering, estimated that this single
explosion increased the debris population by 7%.
Ibid; Nicholas L. Johnson, "Preliminary Analysis of the Fragmentation of the
Spot 1 Ariane Third Stage," Orbital Debris from Upper-Stage Breakup, Joseph
P. Loftus, Jr., editor, pp. 41-106.
The last trackable piece produced by the September 1986 Delta 180 experi-
ment decays from orbit.
ESA organizes its Space Debris Working Group. Dietrich Rex, Director of the
Instittit fiir Raumflugtechnik und Reaktortechnik (IfRR) of the Technische
Universit/it Braunschweig (TUBS), is made chair.
In the wake of the Ariane V16 breakup, JSC holds the Upper Stage Breakup
Conference. NASA shares with ESA the operational procedures it developed
after it realized the hazard posed by unvented Delta second stages. NASA
and ESA begin holding regular orbital debris coordination meetings.
James Fletcher tells the NASA Headquarters Office of Space Flight (OSF) to
develop a strategy for dealing with orbital debris.
Karl Henize conducts the first of six annual 2-week orbital debris observing
sessions at the Rattlesnake Mountain Observatory of Battelle Pacific North-
west Laboratories. One purpose of the sessions is to determine a mean
albedo of orbital debris objects, which can be used to determine the sizes of
uncatalogued objects detected by the GEODSS telescopes.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Karl Henize, June 8, 1993; note, Andrew E.
Potter to David S. F. Portree, August 3, 1993.
Darrell Branscombe, NASA Headquarters Shuttle Program Office, briefs
James Fletcher on a proposal to establish a coordinated NASA orbital debris
program. Donald Kessler and Andrew Potter laid groundwork by briefing
NASA Headquarters senior staff. A central issue is the need for a ground
radar which can sample the 1-cm debris environment. Fletcher agrees to the
orbital debris program proposal. He directs Robert Aller, Associate Adminis-
trator for Tracking and Data Acquisition, to have radar experts at JPL study
the cost and feasibility of the radar. It becomes known as the Debris Environ-
ment Characterization Radar (DECR).
Interview, David S. F. Portree with John Stanley, June 21, 1993; interview,
David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 7, 1993; note, Andrew E.
Potter to David S. F. Portree, July 24, 1993.
Israel becomes the eighth country to launch its own satellite. The Offeq-1
satellite is placed into a 1150-km-by-250-km orbit at a 142.9-deg inclination
(retrograde). It decays from orbit on January 14, 1989.
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Joseph Loftus and Andrew Potter meet ESA representatives in Rolleboise,
France, to exchange information on orbital debris activities. This is the first in
what become regular semi-annual ESA-NASA orbital debris coordination
meetings. They are held alternately in the U.S. and Europe. The Rolleboise
meeting is held concurrently with a meeting of the AIAA Space Transporta-
tion Technical Committee, of which Loftus is chair.
The U.S. Air Force SAB releases Current and Potential Technology to Protect Air
Force Space Missions from Current and Future Debris, the first important report
on orbital debris from a military perspective. It is a follow-up of the 1983
study. According to the report, renewed attention to the orbital debris issue
is required because of SDI ASAT testing, SSF, and the projected large increase
in the number, weight, and type of spacecraft to be deployed as part of SDI.
In its conclusions, the report states that debris is already an important design
consideration for large, long-duration space vehicles. It adds that future
traffic models range from constrained, which would double the mass in orbit
below 2000-km altitude (estimated at 2 million kg in 1987), to the SDI traffic
model, which would multiply the mass by 15 times. The report contends that
debris management will require international cooperation and agreements,
but recommends that the U.S. proceed unilaterally until these agreements can
be put in place. The report also recommends that
• The U.S. Air Force, NASA, and the Department of Com-
merce should join forces to establish specifications and
design practices to minimize production of orbital debris.
• The U.S. should take the lead in establishing an international
commission on orbital debris to encourage cooperation and
exchange of data on the debris environment, and to imple-
ment agreed-upon specifications and design practices for
future space systems. The U.S. should also foster interna-
tional cooperation in dealing with hazardous events and in
providing satellite collision warnings.
• The U.S. should establish guidelines for ASAT and other
space weapons systems to minimize production of long-
lived orbital debris.
Operational U.S. space tracking systems should be alerted to
debris-producing events, and should be tasked to provide
special monitoring and services when debris-producing
events occur.
• New concepts and technology should be developed by 2000
to protect U.S. Air Force space assets from debris.
As a general recommendation, the report calls for more attention to the
debris problem from all organizations which operate in space.
Report on Orbital Debris, U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, December
1987; Ross T. McNutt, Orbiting Space Debris: Dangers, Measurement, and
Mitigation, Phillips Laboratory, Directorate of Geophysics, Air Force Systems
Command, Hanscom AFB, June 1, 1992.
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Late in
the year JPL proposes building the QUICKSAT orbital debris research satellite. It
would operate in Sun-synchronous orbit 500 km above Earth's terminator.
The satellite would image debris in stereo using two telescopic cameras. It
would keep the Sun behind it so debris pieces would be imaged fully lit.
Debris particles as small as I mm would be visible up to at least 6 km away.
The name QUICKSAT comes from the need to ready the spacecraft for a late
1989 launch, to take advantage of a surplus U.S. Air Force Atlas E rocket.
QUICKSAT is not approved, in part because it would cost $100 million, plus
$5 million annually for operations.
Thornton L. Page, Andrew E. Potter, and Donald J. Kessler, "The History of
Orbital Debris," 1990 (unpublished draft paper); interview, David S. F. Pora'ee
with Donald J. Kessler, June 7, 1993.
Cumulative launches (since 1957) 3095 )1988 Catalogued objects in orbit 6917
During the year
During the year
February 11
Donald Kessler works with Jeff Anderson of MSFC to update the 1984 orbital
debris model. The update takes into account new data from Solar Max
analyses and telescopic measurements which indicate that debris is darker,
and thus larger, than in the 1984 model. It depicts a debris environment
approximately eight times more severe than that described in 1984.
John Stanley and his colleagues begin implementing an agreement with the
U.S. Air Force for optical monitoring of orbital debris using the GEODSS
telescopes on Diego Garcia and Maui. The GEODSS sites collect data in
vertical staring mode before dawn and after dusk each clear day at the two
sites through 1991, then at the Diego Garcia site alone.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with John Stanley, June 21, 1993.
The orbital debris issue reaches the White House. President Reagan issues
the National Directive on Space Policy, which contains the first U.S. national
policy statement on orbital debris. The policy uses much the same language
as the February 4, 1987, DoD orbital debris policy. It states that "All space
sectors will seek to minimize the creation of space debris. Design and opera-
tions of space tests, experiments and systems will strive to minimize or
reduce accumulation of space debris consistent with mission requirements..
" At the insistence of the Office of Management and Budget, it adds the
caveat "...and cost effectiveness." In its implementation instructions, the
Directive calls for the National Security Council to establish the Interagency
Group (IG) (Space) to draw together many Federal agencies for consideration
of orbital debris issues. The 1989 final revision adds the statement, "The
United States government will encourage other spacefaring nations to adopt
policies and procedures aimed at debris minimization." E. Lee Tilton, III,
Chair of the Orbital Debris Committee at NASA Headquarters, inserted this
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May
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reference to the orbital debris problem into the President's Space Policy
Directive.
Nicholas L. Johnson and Darren McKnight, Artificial Space Debris, revised
edition, Orbit Books, 1991; interview, David S. F. Portree with Andrew E.
Potter, May 14, 1993; interview, David S. F. Portree with E. Lee Tilton, III,
August 23, 1993.
The orbital debris team at JSC details the requirements for the DECR radar
system, which will "collect statistical data on orbital debris down to a size of
1 cm or smaller diameter at an altitude of 500 kin." DECR would be the first
radar specifically designed for orbital debris research. It would draw on
lessons learned during a decade of debris detection using tracking radars.
DECR would not track (using a "non-tracking radar simplifies the design and
resources requirements," the document states), and would have "a narrow
radiation pattern, which would, ideally, be directed vertically... [and] would
be stationary and let debris particles pass through the beam." The document
contains reports from JSC, Lockheed, Battelle, and Teledyne Brown Engineer-
ing dated from May 1987 through January 1988.
"Debris Environment Characterization Radar Design Studies" (JSC 22827),
February 24, 1988.
The U.S. Air Force cancels its program to develop kinetic-energy interceptor
ASATs launched by F-15 fighter planes in the face of on-going Congressional
opposition to ASAT testing. In the course of testing, four ASATs were
launched against points in space, one with only partial success. The third
test, in 1985, destroyed the Solwind satellite. The last test occurred in Octo-
ber 1986.
The first issue of The Orbital Debris Monitor is published. The quarterly
publication is the first dedicated to orbital debris. Its editor is Darren
McKnight.
This month a particle blasts a crater in the outer pane of a two-pane Mir base
block viewport. The crater is surrounded by cracks up to 3 mrn long. The
damage area is 6-8 mm across. The Soviets assume the impactor was a piece
of orbital debris.
lnteravia Space Directory 1992-1993, Andrew Wilson, editor, p. 183; Nicholas
L. Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1990, Teledyne Brown Engineering,
1991.
The Office of Commercial Space Transportation (OCST) of the DOT publishes
Hazard Analysis of Commercial Space Transportation, a three-volume report
prepared by the Transportation Systems Center in Cambridge, Massachu-
setts. Chapter 6 of Volume 2 deals with orbital debris hazards. The OCST
issues the report because the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 calls for
it to "promulgate and enforce appropriate safety criteria and regulatory
requirements for licensing the commercial space industry."
Hazard Analysis of Space Transportation, OCST, DOT, May 1988.
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May 13
May 17-19
June 30-July 2
July 13
TASS announces that radio contact has been lost with the Cosmos 1900
RORSAT. In 1989 the Soviets reveal that contact was lost on April 9. On
April 13 Cosmos 1900 ignored a command to boost its reactor to a higher
storage orbit.
Nicholas L. Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1988, Teledyne Brown
Engineering, 1989, pp. 72-77.
The Environmental Aspects of Activities in Outer Space Workshop is held in
Cologne, West Germany. It is an interdisciplinary meeting on orbital debris
and related issues attended by lawyers, scientists, and engineers.
JPL uses the 300-m Arecibo radio telescope in Puerto Rico to test the concept
of statistically monitoring orbital debris with a radar in a vertical staring
mode. Andrew Potter suggested the test to Robert AUer. The test is designed
to provide data to support development and construction of the DECR. It
provides data consistent with Kessler's estimates of the population of 1-cm
debris. Fifteen 1-cm pieces per day pass through the 2-arc-min main beam -
Kessler predicted 13 pieces. However, the beam pattern is not well under-
stood, reducing the utility of the experiment.
Thornton L. Page, Andrew E. Potter, and Donald J. Kessler, "The History of
Orbital Debris," 1990 (unpublished draft paper); interview, David S. F. Portree
with Donald J. Kessler, May 17, 1993; note, Andrew E. Potter to David S. F.
Portree, July 24, 1993.
The Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology holds a
hearing on the orbital debris problem.
The 1988 Congressional Hearing on Orbital Debris
Before 1988, interest in orbital debris outside the DoD and NASA was intermittent. After President
Reagan mentioned the problem in his National Directive on Space Policy, however, many Federal
agencies developed sustained interest in orbital debris.
The Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications hearing of July 13, 1988, provides a good
overview of the state of orbital debris awareness at the time. It also gives insights into the orbital
debris concerns of different parts of the U.S. government. The Subcommittee heard testimony from
Joseph B. Mahon, Deputy Associate Administrator for Flight Systems in the NASA OSF; Philip
Kunsberg, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, DoD; Michael A. Michaud, Director of the
Office of Advanced Technology, Department of State; S. Neil Hosenball, former NASA General
Counsel and former NASA delegate to the U.N. COPUOS; and Nicholas Johnson, author of books
and articles on the orbital debris problem and Advisory Scientist for Teledyne Brown Engineering.
Mahon summarized NASA's three-thrust debris strategy. The technical thrust, he said, involved
developing mathematical models and maintaining a database to characterize the orbital debris
environment. The measurements thrust involved developing a special orbital debris radar (the JPL
DECR) to detect objects in the 1-10-cm range in time for the SSF Critical Design Review (CDR) in
mid-1991. According to Mahon, "a firm requirement to protect the station against a future orbital
debris hazard has been documented." The policy thrust involved "devisIng management options
for orbital debris prevention, protection, and possible elimination." "NASA has already taken
concrete steps to reduce the amount of debris in space.., the most significant has been the NASA
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requirement in force since 1982 which established the procedure for Delta upper stages of venting
the unspent propellants and gases to prevent an explosion of the Delta upper stage," Mahon added.
He also cited establishment of the NASA-ESA Working Group, which developed from joint NASA-
ESA efforts to apply NASA's experience with Delta breakups to Ariane.
Philip Kunsberg reported that PARCS radar tests indicated a debris population 7-35% larger than
that catalogued. He stated that study of returned surfaces from the Solar Maximum Mission satel-
lite indicated the possibility of billions of small debris particles, each about 0.1 mm in size, in LEO.
Kunsberg echoed the February 4, 1987, DoD orbital debris policy when he declared that, "while we
cannot solve the problem of space debris without the cooperation of other nations, the United
States, in the meantime, should address the problem as a nation, both to protect our spacecraft and
ameliorate the problem as much as possible."
Michael A. Michaud stated that Soviet Foreign Minister Edvard Schevardnadze had said in May
1988 that space "pollution" needed to be prevented. He declared that the State Department saw
"space debris as an inherently international issue. Orbital debris does not observe national bound-
aries.., we are all in this together. Sooner or later we need to consult with others." S. Neil
Hosenball also described international orbital debris policy. He stated that two international
treaties are relevant to the orbital debris problem - the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (the Outer Space Treaty), and the 1972
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (the Liability Conven-
tion). (For detailed descriptions, see Laws for Orbital Debris: The U.N. Space Treaties of 1967 and 1972,
page 15).
Nicholas Johnson then provided an overview of the orbital debris technical issues. He reported
that only 5% of the artificial objects in space are operational spacecraft. In the year prior to his
testimony, he stated, seven Soviet spacecraft had undergone high-intensity explosions. Johnson
also stated that less than 20% of the human-made objects in space were catalogued.
Orbital Space Debris, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Space Science and
Applications, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives, July 13, 1988.
September 29-
October 3 Discovery deploys a TDRS during STS-26, the first Shuttle mission since the
loss of Challenger in January 1986. USSPACECOM detects an orbital debris
object in the Shuttle's 5 km-by-25-km-by-5-km alert box. It does not enter the
2 km-by-5-km-by-2-km maneuver box, so the MCC takes no action.
J. Steven Stich, "STS Collision Avoidance Procedures" (presentation materi-
als), January 17, 1992, p. 10.
September 30 The Cosmos 1900 RORSAT continued its uncontrolled decay over the sum-
mer. In mid-September the Soviet Union gave the International Atomic
Energy Agency of the U.N. a complete inventory of the reactor's contents in
anticipation of a large-scale release of radioactive material. On this date
Cosmos 1900 unexpectedly depletes its attitude control propellant. An
automatic safety system activates which blasts the reactor, with its 31 kg of
enriched uranium fuel, to a 763-km-by-695-km storage orbit. The main body
of the satellite reenters over the Indian Ocean the next day. TASS announces
that the Soviet Union will continue to launch RORSATs. As of July 1, 1993,
however, no new RORSATs had been launched.
Nicholas L. Johnson, The Soviet Year in Space 1990, Teledyne Brown
Engineering, 1988, p. 77.
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November
November
December 2-6
The ESA Space Debris Working Group publishes the report Space Debris. In
his preface, Professor Reimar Lfist, Director General of ESA, states that the
report aims to increase public awareness of the threat to the near-Earth
environment posed by orbital debris. He also says that by our failure "to
take preventative measures, future generations will inherit an ominous
legacy." Dietrich Rex told the University of Chicago Preservation of Near-
Earth Space for Future Generations symposium that "by the European report
it became clear that Europe heavily depended on U.S. knowledge and data in
the space debris field and that increased European activities should be initi-
ated." The Space Debris Working Group was succeeded by the ESA Space
Debris Advisory Group and the Space Debris Coordination and Technical
Analysis Group after it released this report.
Space Debris: A Report from the ESA Space Debris Working Group, European
Space Agency, 1988; Dietrich Rex, "The Current and Future Space Debris
Environment as Assessed in Europe," presented at the Preservation of Near-
Earth Space for Future Generations symposium, University of Chicago, June
24-26, 1992.
Gautam Badhwar, with other JSC researchers, develops a method for deter-
mining the probable cause of breakups using data on orbital plane change
angles and the radar cross sections of pieces produced. Application of this
method to breakups of uncertain cause reveals that several breakups thought
to have been caused by exploding propellants could have been caused by
collisions.
Gautnm Badhwar, et al, "Characteristics of Satellite Breakups from Radar
Cross Section and Plane Change Angle," Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets,
Vol. 25, 1988, pp. 420-426.
STS-27 is a DoD Shuttle mission. Four orbital debris objects enter the 5-km-
by-25-km-by-5-km alert box, and one enters the 2-km-by-5-km-by-2-km
maneuver box. As permitted in Flight Rule 4-61, the MCC waives the ma-
neuver requirement, because maneuvering would impact mission objectives.
J. Steven Stich, "STS Collision Avoidance Procedures" (presentation materi-
als), January 17, 1992, p. 10.
1989
Cumulative launches (since 1957) 3196
Catalogued objects in orbit 6492*
During the year
*The decline since 1988 was caused by
record-high levels of solar activity during the 1988-1991 solar
maximum period.
The ESA Council approves the Resolution on the Agency's Policy vis-a-vis
the Space Debris Issue, based on the findings and recommendations of the
ESA Space Debris Working Group.
K. Heftman, "Overview of European Activities on Orbital Debris," Orbital
Debris: Technical Issues and Future Directions (NASA CP 10077), Andrew E.
Potter, editor, September 1992, pp. 1-7.
6O
January
1989
At JSC Gautam Badhwar and Phillip Anz-Meador develop a means of calcu-
lating the mass of a debris object based on its radar cross section and the
changes in its orbital elements caused by atmospheric drag. They find that
the mass distribution differs according to the type of breakup, providing a
new clue to determining breakup causes.
Gautam Badhwar and Phillip Anz-Meador, "Determination of Area and Mass
Distribution of Orbital Debris Fragments," Earth, Moon, and Planets, Vol. 45,
1989, pp. 29-51.
February The IG (Space) publishes Report on Orbital Debris, the first report on the
orbital debris problem to draw on broad-based input from U.S. Federal
agencies. It calls for joint NASA-DoD orbital debris studies, and mandates
international cooperation on orbital debris.
Report on Orbital Debris, IG (Space), February 1989.
February The U.S. National Security Council endorses the IG (Space) report.
Ibid.
The Interagency Group (Space) Report, International Cooperation on Orbital Debris,
and the Changing World of Spaceflight
According to Donald Kessler, the IG (Space) report was extremely significant, though not for its
technical content. "It said what we [members of the orbital debris community] had been saying all
along," he stated. The report also put on record the orbital debris views of a number of different
Federal agencies. Loftus called it "the culmination of consciousness-raising activities in the U.S.
government." It constituted a U.S. government consensus position on the orbital debris problem.
More important in the long-term, however, the IG (Space) report was, according to Kessler, "a
charter for us to educate the international community.., if it had not been for this report, we would
not have had a clear charter to do that." In effect, the U.S. government got its policy house in order,
clearing the way to foster orbital debris policies and awareness beyond U.S. borders. Members of
the JSC orbital debris team and NASA Headquarters officials visited Japan, the Soviet Union,
Europe, and China. They shared reports on their discussions with other agencies of the U.S. gov-
ernment.
Only a few months after the IG (Space) report was published, revolution swept the Soviet Union's
satellite states in eastern and central Europe. The border between East and West Germany was
erased and the once-outlawed Solidarity movement took charge in Poland. The Cold War ended on
January 1, 1992, when the tricolor flag of Russia replaced the red flag of the Soviet Union over the
Moscow Kremlin. The first day of 1992, the International Space Year, saw the creation of more than
a dozen new nations in eastern Europe and central Asia, as the unitary Soviet state officially ceased
to exist.
Such sweeping political changes could not help but have profound implications for human space
activities. Some argued that large space projects had no place in the post-Cold War world. They
advocated diverting the resources of large space projects, such as SSF, SDI, Buran, the Space Explo-
ration Initiative, and Hermes, to non-space activities. Others argued that the Cold War's end was
an opportunity for increased space cooperation. Paradoxically, cooperation often benefited when
spacefaring nations reduced the resources available for large space projects. Space programs
strapped for cash came together where they had complementary capabilities. For example, the
United States selected a modified version of the Russian Soyuz spacecraft to serve as a lifeboat for
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SSF. In August 1993, Russia and the U.S. agreed to combine the SSF and Mir 2 space station pro-
grams. European and Japanese concerns about U.S. commitment to SSF gave them impetus to
explore new relationships with Russia and with each other.
The common threat to human space activities from orbital debris was also a catalyst for interna-
tional space cooperation. Countries exchanged knowledge and experience. They took the next step
in cooperation when they began developing joint projects to study orbital debris. The United States
led the way in instigating many of the cooperative orbital debris efforts, thereby helping to raise the
priority assigned to orbital debris in other countries. Discussions on orbital debris became increas-
ingly high-level and multilateral.
Report on Orbital Debris, IG (Space), February 1989; interview, David S. F.
Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 7, 1993.
March 12-18 The STS-29 Space Shuttle mission deploys a TDRS. During postflight inspec-
tion of the Space Shuttle Discovery, a hole I cm wide and 10 cm long is found
in a Thermal Protection System tile. The hole does not resemble those com-
monly caused during launch and landing. Sampling reveals the presence of
silver, an element not commonly used in the Shuttle orbiter, external tank, or
solid rocket boosters. Confirmation that the damage was caused by orbital
debris remains difficult, however, because of the techniques used to examine
the hole. The impactor was probably smaller than I mm. No objects were
detected entering the 5-km-by-25-km-by-5-km alert box during the mission,
pointing up the limitations of ground-based tracking systems - at Shuttle
orbital altitude the smallest object detectable is approximately 10 cm across.
Only about 10% of the objects in orbit large enough to harm a Shuttle orbiter
can be detected using conventional tracking methods.
Space Program Space Debris: A Potential Threat to Space Station and Shuttle,
GAO, April 1990; J. Steven Stich, "STS Collision Avoidance Maneuvers"
(presentation materials), January 17, 1992, p. 10; interview, David S. F. Portree
with Michael F. Collins and J. Steven Stich, August 17, 1993.
April4 The U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and the United
States Space Foundation (USSF) sponsor the Joint Workshop on Space Debris
and Its Policy Implications as part of the USSF's Fifth National Space Sympo-
sium. The workshop looks at technical, policy, and legal orbital debris issues.
Joseph Loftus states that much progress has been made since 1977, when
NASA became interested in orbital debris through Donald Kessler's work.
"Originally," he recounts, "it was very difficult to do any consciousness
raising. And it's natural to understand why... [s]pace is, by definition,
empty... [s]o it's difficult to get people to understand that there can be a
hazard." Loftus concludes by stating his concerns about GEO. He points out
that LEO has been the focus of most orbital debris research. However, GEO
growth rates are higher and objects in GEO remain aloft longer than objects
in LEO. Among other speakers is Howard Baker, an environmental law and
space activities specialist, who states that "on Earth, humanity's failure to
account for environmental protection in planning the development of living
and working communities has yielded both life-taking and life-threatening
situations. [P]roblems analogous to these can be avoided in the relatively
pristine environment of space."
Space: A New Era, proceedings of the Fifth National Space Symposium,
Allison Kinsley, chief editor, 1989.
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May 4-8
June
September 25
September 29
October 2
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Joseph Loftus, Andrew Potter, William Djinis, NASA Headquarters Orbital
Debris Program Manager, and Daniel Jacobs, NASA Headquarters Interna-
tional Relations Office, travel to Japan to discuss orbital debris with ISAS.
Several preliminary agreements on future joint activities are concluded.
NASA/NASDA Technical Interchange Meeting Minutes, January 15, 1991.
On STS-30 the Space Shuttle Atlantis carries the first new American planetary
probe in 11 years, the Magellan Venus radar mapper. Magellan and its IUS
are deployed into LEO and successfully launched onto an interplanetary
trajectory for a 16-month voyage to cloudy Venus. During the 4-day, 58-rain
Shuttle mission three objects intrude on the 5-km-by-25-km-by-5-km alert
box, but none enter the 2-km-by-5-krn-by-2-km maneuver box.
J. Steven Stich, "STS Collision Avoidance Procedures" (presentation materi-
als), January 17, 1992, p. 10.
Karl Henize conducts the third of six 2-week orbital debris photometry
sessions at Rattlesnake Mountain Observatory in Washington State. He uses
the new JSC CCD Debris Telescope (CDT) to gather more data on the optical
characteristics of orbital debris.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Karl Henize, June 8, 1993.
The OTA holds a workshop on orbital debris in Washington, D.C. In atten-
dance are representatives from NASA Headquarters, JSC, Teledyne Brown,
the U.S. Army, Stanford University, the DOT, the Department of State,
General Dynamics, and other organizations. The workshop is the primary
information source for the OTA background paper Orbiting Debris: A Space
Environmental Problem, published in September 1990.
Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental Problem, OTA, 1990.
NASA agrees to use USSPACECOM's existing Haystack radar and the
planned HAX radar for orbital debris measurements. The agreement leads to
cancellation of DECR. NASA accepts a USSPACECOM proposal of August
15 (as modified and expanded September 1) because data from Haystack-
HAX can be available sooner than DECR data. This will permit it to support
the planned 1991 SSF CDR. In addition, Haystack-HAX would be less expen-
sive than DECR.
Space Program Space Debris: A Potential Threat to Space Station and Shuttle,
GAO, April 1990; interview, David S. F. Portree with John Stanley, June 21,
1993; letter, William Lenior, NASA Headquarters, to Vice Admiral Hernandez,
USSPACECOM, June 7, 1990, with enclosed Memorandum of Agreement
between USSPACECOM and NASA for Orbital Debris Data Collection.
NASA and TUBS orbital debris researchers hold the first in a series of semi-
annual meetings on orbital debris environment modeling in Braunschweig.
Atlantis deploys the Galileo Jupiter orbiter and atmospheric probe atop an
IUS. During the Shuttle's nearly 5-day mission, one space object intrudes on
its 5-km-by-25-km-by-5-km alert box.
J. Steven Stich, "STS Collision Avoidance Procedures" (presentation materi-
als), January 17, 1992, p. 10.
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The West German government sponsors a meeting called Safety Aspects of
Nuclear Reactors in Space, in Cologne. Dietrich Rex predicts that Soviet
space nuclear reactors will undergo 2-3 on-orbit collisions in the next 300
years. Each will result in world-wide reentry of radioactive debris.
Note, Andrew E. Potter to David S. F. Portrec, August 2, 1993.
STS-33 is a DoD mission. After the third night launch in Shuttle program
history, Discovery enters a 28.45-deg inclination orbit for 5 days. During that
time one object intrudes on its 5-km-by-25-km-by-5-km alert box. This is the
last time an object enters the alert box until STS-48 in September 1991.
J. Steven Stich,"STS Collision Avoidance" (presentationmaterials),January
17, 1992,p. 10.
Donald Kessler, Joseph Loftus, Andrew Potter, William Djinis, and Daniel
Jacobs meet their counterparts at ZniMash, the Central Research Institute for
the Ministry of General Machine Building, in Moscow. In addition to
ZniMash, NPO Energia, the Ministry of Defense, the Foreign Ministry, and
GLAVCOSMOS send representatives. The Soviets take the NASA delegation
on a tour of Star City, where they examine a mockup of the Mir space station.
They also learn of Soviet cosmonauts' concerns about orbital debris impacts
on Soviet space stations (damage to exterior lights is mentioned). The Soviets
share data from spacecraft recovered after up to a year in LEO. They reveal
that their space station meteoroid shields are of Whipple design, with
bumpers 0.5 to I mm thick suspended 70 to 100 mm above their pressure
hulls. The Soviets say they plan to mitigate the debris hazard by safely
deorbiting all large spacecraft, expelling oxidizer from upper stages left in
orbit, and minimizing launch debris and multiple payload launches. The
U.S.-Soviet Orbital Debris Working Group is estabhshed.
Thornton L. Page, Andrew E. Potter, and DonaldJ. Kessler, "The History of
Orbital Debris," 1990 (unpublished draft paper); interview, David S. F. Portree
with Donald J. Kessler, June 7, 1993; Trip Report, Loftus Orbital Debris Files;
interview, David S. F. Portree with Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., August25, 1993.
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On STS-32, Columbia recovers the LDEF from a nearly circular 331-km orbit.
The satellite was originally intended to spend only about a year in orbit, but
its 57 experiments were forced to remain in space for nearly 6 years after the
Challenger accident.
The GAO sends NASA a draft copy of its report, Space Program Space Debris:
Potential Threat to Space Station and Shuttle.
NASA responds to the GAO report. NASA Assistant Deputy Administrator
John E. O'Brien points out "misunderstandings" which he says lead the GAO
to suggest NASA has been "derelict in its responsibility to protect mission
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crews and valuable hardware from unnecessary risks arising as a result of
space debris." He states that the 1988 update of the orbital debris environ-
ment is not used in SSF design because it contains "the same large degree of
uncertainty" as the 1984 model. He reports that NASA is collecting more
data, citing the NASA-USSPACECOM Haystack-HAX radar agreement.
O'Brien states that the impact rates and probabilities used in the GAO report
are derived from the 1989 IG (Space) report, which, he says, is now out of
date, as national governments and international organizations have modified
their space operations to reduce the amount of orbital debris they create. He
points out that the probability of debris striking SSF has become smaller,
because the current SSF design measures only 2000 m 2. The design measured
5000 m 2 when the IG (Space) made its calculations. O'Brien's response is
printed as an appendix in the final version of the GAO report.
Space Program Space Debris: A Potential Threat to Space Station and Shuttle,
GAO, April 1990, Appendix I, pp. 30-34.
The Soviet Union pledges to inform the U.N. before it launches any more
nuclear reactors into Earth orbit.
The third Intelsat 6 series satellite is launched atop a U.S. Titan 3. The cylin-
drical Intelsat 6 satellites are 3.63 m in diameter and 11.84 m high. They are
capable of carrying 45,000 two-way telephone conversations. A separation
system failure strands the satellite in LEO. It is placed in a 555-km storage
orbit. The satellite is initially declared a $265-million total loss. NASA and
the Intelsat organization commence planning a Space Shuttle mission to
recover the satellite. It was originally meant to be launched on the Space
Shuttle, so Shuttle-compatible handling equipment already exists. In addi-
tion, the enormous cost of the satellite makes practical a rescue attempt.
The Southwest Research Institute (SRI) in San Antonio, Texas, first presents
The Growing Challenge: A Short Course on Dealing with Orbital Debris. The
instructors for the course are Donald Kessler, Burton Cour-Palais, Charles E.
Anderson, Jr., and Randy Tullos. Anderson is an SRI expert in the
hypervelocity impact field, and Tullos is an expert on hypervelocity model-
ing. The course comprises 30% environment modeling, 30% hypervelocity
penetration mechanics, 20% design and validation considerations, and 20%
shielding design.
Brochure, "The Growing Challenge: A Short Course on Dealing with Orbital
Debris," Southwest Research Institute.
The GAO publishes Space Program Space Debris: a Potential Threat to Space
Station and Shuttle.
TUBS and JSC representatives hold a meeting on orbital debris modeling in
Houston.
AIAA sponsors the AIAA/NASA/DoD Orbital Debris Conference in Balti-
more. Researchers from Europe and Japan participate, reflecting growing
international concern over orbital debris. This is the first major orbital debris
conference since 1982. Paper topics include orbital debris shielding for the
U.S., European, and Japanese SSF modules, modeling the debris environ-
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ment, debris detection using optical telescopes, radars, and IRAS, and analy-
sis of returned spacecraft surfaces.
Orbital Debris: Technical Issues and Future Directions (NASA CP 10071),
Andrew E. Potter, editor, September 1992, p. i.
William Lenoir, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight, sends a
letter to Vice Admiral D. E. Hernandez, Deputy Commander in Chief of
USSPACECOM. He encloses a signed memorandum of agreement (MOA)
on Haystack-HAX. He opens his letter by declaring that the "timely collec-
tion of orbital debris data to support the Space Station Freedom is of very
high priority." The MOA lists U.S. Air Force Space Command as
USSPACECOM's representative in the arrangement, and JSC as NASA's.
The agreement stipulates that NASA will pay $11.38 million for the HAX
radar and for modifications to Haystack. In exchange for paying for part of
the maintenance and operations of the Haystack radar, NASA will receive at
least 400 hours of Haystack data in fiscal year (FY) 1990 and 800 in FY 1991.
in FY 1992 NASA will receive 700 hours each from the Haystack and HAX
radars. From FY 1993 through FY 1997, NASA will receive 800 hours from
each radar. If NASA elects to use the planned Ground Based Radar-Experi-
mental (GBR-X) facility on Kwajalein Atoll, USSPACECOM will provide 700-
1200 hours of data per year for 5 years beginning when GBR-X is operational.
If NASA elects not to use the GBR-X, it will build an equatorial site radar,
and USSPACECOM will pay for operations and maintenance. Vice Admiral
Hernandez signs the MOA on June 12.
letter, William Lenior, NASA Headquarters, to Vice Admiral Hernandez,
USSPACECOM, June 7, 1990, with enclosed Memorandum of Agreement
between the USSPACECOM and NASA for Orbital Debris Data Collection.
At the COSPAR XXVIII meeting in the Hague, Netherlands, Donald Kessler
presents "Collisional Cascading: The Limits of Population Growth in Low
Earth Orbit." According to Kessler, collisional cascading will occur
... in the long term... [when] a critical population density is
reached, [and] the rate of fragment production from random
collisions exceeds the rate of removal by atmospheric drag.
Once this critical density is reached, the debris population will
increase without placing any more objects into orbit. This
increase will stop only when the population of large objects is
sufficiently reduced, either by active removal or by fragmenta-
tion. However, by the time fragmentation reduces the popula-
tion of large objects, the resulting debris environment is likely
to be too hostile for future space use .... [T]he data that al-
ready exists is sufficient to show that cascading collisions will
control the future debris environment with no or very minor
increases in the current low Earth orbit population. Two
populations control this process - explosion fragments and
expended rocket bodies and payloads. Practices are already
changing to limit explosions in low Earth orbit. It is now
necessary to begin limiting the number of expended rocket
bodies and payloads in orbit.
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In his concluding remarks, he reports that some LEO regions are already
unstable. Assuming no increase in the LEO population, the rate of new
debris production will be slow - one breakup every 10-20 years, depending
on the size of the uncatalogued population - with half the breakups in the
unstable regions. Large debris objects produced will remain confined to the
unstable regions. However, small debris will be ejected into other orbits,
"increasing the amount of small debris in LEO for centuries."
Donald J. Kessler, "Collisional Cascading: The Limits of Population Growth in
LEO," Advanced Space Research, Vol. 11, No. 12, 1991.
July NASA and DoD begin the joint orbital debris studies called for in the IG
(Space) report of February 1989. The U.S. Air Force is lead service, with the
Air Force Space Technology Center (Phillips Laboratory) as DoD technical
lead. NASA chooses JSC as its technical lead. The joint NASA/DoD research
program plan is approved by the National Space Council this month. It has
two objectives - to characterize the LEO debris environment down to I mm,
and to identify candidate technologies for minimizing debris production and
enhancing spacecraft survivability. Implementation of the second objective
depends on the results of the environment studies called for in the first
objective. NASA and the DoD also begin work on a guide for spacecraft
builders and launch operators, which they plan to call the Space Debris Mini-
mization and Mitigation Handbook.
Albert Reinhardt, Jr., "Potential Effects of the Space Debris Environment on
Military Space Systems," presented at the Preservation of Near-Earth Space for
Future Generations symposium, University of Chicago, June 24-26, 1992.
August At North Carolina State University (NCSU) teams of students compete to
design systems for deploying radar calibration spheres from a Space Shuttle
in LEO. Andrew Potter and John Stanley foster the project, which develops
into the Orbital Debris Radar Calibration Spheres (ODERACS) experiment.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with John Stanley, July 30, 1993.
August 11-14 In St. Petersburg, the joint U.S-Soviet Orbital Debris Working Group holds its
second meeting.
Autumn John Stanley conducts a three-part test to calibrate the Haystack Radar for
orbital debris studies. In the first part he selects 100 1-5-cm pieces of a satel-
lite fragmented on Earth in a DoD experiment. The pieces are characterized
using the radar calibration laboratory at Science Planning Corporation in
Virginia. Algorithms are developed for interpreting the radar signatures of
the pieces. In the second part of the test, nine pieces are dropped by balloons
from altitudes between 12,500-20,000 m at Kwajalein Atoll, in the Marshall
Islands. The four radars of the Kiernan Reentry Measurements Site track the
objects. The XonTech Corporation analyzes the radar results and correctly
determines the sizes and shapes of the pieces. The radars also take data on
over 100 satellites. The third part of the test involves tracking 25 objects in
orbit using optical sensors and radars simultaneously, with the aim of com-
paring observed characteristics.
John Stanley and Eugene Stansbery, "Orbital Debris Measurements," The JSC
Research and Technology Annual Report 1990 (NASA TM 102172), pp. II 17-
18; interview, David S. F. Portree with John Stanley, June 21, 1993.
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The OTA publishes Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental Problem, a back-
ground paper largely based on the September 25, 1989, orbital debris work-
shop in Washington, D.C. Additional information was drawn from the April
4-7, 1989, Fifth National Space Symposium, jointly sponsored by the OTA
and the USSF, the 1989 IG (Space) report, and the 1988 ESA report. The OTA
report presents eleven commonly-held concerns of the orbital debris commu-
nity. They are
• Prompt action is called for from space users, lest certain
orbits be restricted in the near future.
• Better data is needed on the orbital distribution and size of
debris.
• Additional debris mitigation techniques need to be devel-
oped.
• Paying for debris removal is not warranted at this time.
• Protection technologies (shielding) can reduce the debris
hazard.
• The threat to the lives of astronauts and cosmonauts posed
by high-speed objects in LEO is significant.
• Active involvement by all space-faring nations is required
to control orbital debris.
• Existing treaties are inadequate for minimizing debris.
Legal issues, such as the definition of the term orbital
debris, jurisdiction and control over orbital debris, and
liability for damage caused by orbital debris must be
resolved.
• Private sector space users will need to aid governments in
mitigating the orbital debris population.
• International education on orbital debris is necessary as
many misconceptions exist about the problem.
Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental Problem, OTA, 1990.
The Japan Society for Aeronautical and Space Sciences 0SASS) founds its
Space Debris Study Group. It aims to "promote overall space debris-related
research, to stimulate public awareness of this issue and to provide guide-
lines to cope with it."
Susuma Toda, "The Current and Future Space Debris Environment as Assessed
in Japan," presented at the Preservation of Near-Earth Space for Future
Generations symposium, University of Chicago, June 24-26, 1992.
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NASA and NASDA hold their first Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) on
SSF meteoroid and orbital debris issues at MSFC. After the meeting, NASDA
reevaluates the Japanese Experiment Module (JEM) meteoroid and orbital
debris shielding development process and determines that a new process
should be established.
Memorandum to Distribution with enclosures, "NASA/NASDA TIM Min-
utes," from Raymond L. Nieder, Chairman, JSC Meteoroid and Debris
Protection Working Group, January 15, 1991.
At the AIAA Space Programs and Technologies Conference in Huntsville,
Alabama, Eric Christiansen, Research Engineer, JSC Hypervelocity Impact
Test Facility (HIT-F) (formerly the Orbital Debris Impact Laboratory), Jeanne
Lee Crews, HIT-F Manager, and Jennifer Horn, Aerospace Engineer, MSFC,
describe ways of augmenting SSF orbital debris shielding to prevent critical
damage to the station during its planned 30-year lifetime. They use the 1988
Kessler-Anderson orbital debris environment model. They report that "the
small and medium debris environment is predicted to be worse than was
expected when the SSF program began," and that the problem will "grow
with time, becoming even more severe during station assembly and opera-
tions." The researchers contend that the existing module design will be
adequate for only 6-9.5 years after SSF deployment. They propose that the
baseline shielding be augmented after SSF assembly is completed. This
would permit the original design to be used. The augmentation configura-
tion could also be tailored to meet unforeseen demands of the changing
orbital debris environment. They suggest that the baseline SSF Whipple
Bumper be augmented with the Multi-Shock Shield (MSS) invented by
Burton Cour-Palais and Crews, or by Christiansen's Mesh Double-Bumper
(MDB) shield (fig. 6). They also propose systems which would activate only
when a debris impact is imminent, such as inflatable Nextel ceramic fabric
MSS airbags. To reduce the population of small orbital debris, the research-
ers suggest deployment of a 1-10-km diameter space sweeper comprising a
multilayer Nextel balloon. The sweeper would move through space indepen-
dent of SSF, impacting with and absorbing debris particles. They describe
methods for delivering augmentation shielding to the station and deploying
it with minimal astronaut EVA time.
Jeanne Lee Crews and Burton Cour-Palais, "A Multi-Shock Concept for
Spacecraft Shielding," International Journal of Impact Engineering, Vol. 10,
1990, pp. 135-146; Eric Christiansen, Jennifer Horn, and Jeanne lee Crews,
"Augmentation of Orbital Debris Shielding for Space Station Freedom," AIAA
paper 90-3665, AIAA Space Programs and Technologies Conference, Septem-
ber 25-28, 1990.
The U.S. Air Force Haystack radar on Millstone Hill, Tyngsboro, Massachu-
setts, commences occasional observations of orbital debris.
The Chinese launched the Fengyun 1-2 weather satellite atop a Long March 4
rocket on September 3, 1990. On this date the rocket's upper stage explodes,
producing more than 80 trackable debris pieces. It described a 895-km-by-
880-kin orbit at an inclination of 89.9 deg.
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Figure 6.
The Multi-Shock Shield (MSS) and Mesh Double Bumper (MDB) are variations on the Whipple
Bumper (see figure 4) designed to reduce its weight and enhance its effectiveness as protection
against orbital debris. The MSS (top) relies on multiple layers of ceramic fiber to disrupt impactors
and shock them to higher temperatures. They melt and sometimes vaporize before they reach the
aluminum backplate (the spacecraft hull). The MDB (bottom) augments the basic Whipple design
by placing a layer of lightweight ceramic fabric between its aluminum bumper and the aluminum
backplate (again, the spacecraft huU). A layer of lightweight aluminum mesh is placed above the
bumper. The mesh disrupts impactors, permitting the bumper to be thin and light. The layer of
ceramic fabric catches fragments of the impactor which penetrate the bumper as well as fragments
of the bumper punched out by the impactor (these can under certain conditions cause more damage
to the spacecraft hull than the original impactor). See also the Stuffed Whipple (figure 8).
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1990-1991
A Cooperation Meeting on Orbital Debris is held in Braunschweig between
representatives of JSC, Deutsche Agentur fiir Raumfahrtangelegenheiten
(DARA), and TUBS. The main topic is orbital debris environment modeling.
NASA and ESA hold their Fifth Space Debris Coordination Meeting at the
ESA European Space Operations Center (ESOC) in Darmstadt, Germany.
Helmut Heusmann of the ESA-ESOC Columbus System Division describes
meteoroid and orbital debris protection systems on the ESA Columbus SSF
module. Donald Kessler describes the 1988 orbital debris environment model
(modified 1990), the basis for proposed revisions to the SSF orbital debris
design requirements.
Draft of Minutes of the Fifth ESA-NASA Space Debris Coordination Meeting,
October 24-25, 1990.
Four years after the Ariane V16 upper stage explosion, ESA estimates that the
orbits of the pieces produced have spread to form a shell around the Earth.
Only the extreme northern and southern latitudes of the Earth are not over-
flown by Ariane V16 debris.
The Subcommittee on Micrometeor and Debris Protection of the Space Sta-
tion Advisory Committee, led by Edward Crawley of MIT, publishes its
findings and recommendations on this date. The report is based largely on
two fact-finding sessions held in June 1990 at the Space Station Program
Office in Reston, Virginia, and at JSC. It recommends that NASA adopt the
1988 Kessler-Anderson orbital debris model, as modified by memorandum
SN3-90-68 (1990). The Subcommittee states that "this model is currently the
best available and is supported by data from Solar Max and various ground
observatories." They also recommend a review of the orbital debris environ-
ment every 5 years, a permanent board to assure SSF survivability, and a
memorandum of understanding arranging for USSPACECOM to provide
services and information on the orbital environment during the SSF opera-
tions phase. The Subcommittee calls for exchange of data on orbital debris
and micrometeoroids with other nations. They single out the Soviet Union,
which they say has "extensive long-duration orbital experience."
"Report of the Subcommittee on Micrometeor and Debris Protection," Space
Station Advisory Council, November 13, 1990.
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January 15-17 NASA and NASDA hold a TIM at JSC on SSF orbital debris issues. NASDA
seeks to coordinate with NASA the resolution of problems encountered in
implementing the new JEM orbital debris shielding development process.
The basic JEM shielding comprises a pressure wall/backplate 3.2 mm thick
and two aluminum bumpers. The bumpers have a total thickness of less than
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4 mm. The outer bumper is 102 mm from the backplate. Multilayer insula-
tion is attached to the inner surface of the inner bumper.
Memorandum to Distribution with enclosures, "NASA/NASDA Technical
Interchange Meeting Minutes," from Raymond L. Nieder, Chairman, JSC
Meteoroid and Debris Protection Working Group, January 15, 1991.
February 5 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress releases
a report on orbital debris by Marcia S. Smith, Aerospace Policy Specialist in
the Science Policy Research Division. The document, which is titled Space
Debris: A Growing Problem, is prepared for Members and committees of
Congress. It runs six pages, and references White House, GAO, OTA, and
ESA reports on orbital debris published since 1988. Smith's report references
no NASA sources, but the sources it uses depend almost entirely on NASA
reports and experts for their information.
Marcia Smith, Space Debris: A Growing Problem, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, 1991.
February 7 After hosting more than 20 cosmonauts, Salyut 7 was finally abandoned in
mid-1986 with the large Cosmos 1686 module still attached. The 43-ton
combination was boosted to a higher altitude to forestall reentry, and plans
were floated to revisit the derelict station in the future to collect materials
exposed to spaceflight conditions for years. It was even suggested that the
Soviet space shuttle Buran could return the entire core station to Earth. In
late 1989 cosmonaut Vladimir Dzhanibekov, a former Salyut 7 resident who
helped rescue the station in 1985, called plans to retrieve Salyut 7 "fantasy."
Controlled deorbit was not an option, he said, because the station contained
no fuel. Plans to deorbit Salyut 7 using the engines on an automated
Progress freighter or manned Soyuz were complicated by the station's slow,
wobbling spin. On this date the Salyut 7/Cosmos 1686 combination makes
an uncontrolled reentry over Argentina. The Soviets announce in advance
that at least 1500-2000 kg of the complex are expected to reach the ground,
including the large reentry module attached to Cosmos 1686. Traffic control-
lers at Buenos Aires International Airport watch the fireball for 2 min. Large
pieces are found northwest of the Argentine capital. A piece the size of a car
lands 500 km north of Buenos Aires and sets fire to trees. No other injuries or
property damage are reported.
"News Breaks," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 11, 1991, p. 15;
"Soviets plan to 'scuttle' Salyut 7," Spaceflight, The British Interplanetary
Society, January 1990, p. 7; Loftus Orbital Debris Files.
April
April 9
NASA and TUBS hold a meeting on orbital debris modeling at JSC.
The International Workshop on the Salyut 7/Cosmos 1686 Reentry is held at
ESOC.
Salyut 7 Cosmos 1686 Reentry (ESA SP-345), B. Battrick, editor, ESA-ESOC,
August 1991.
April 16-17 NASA and ESA hold their Sixth Orbital Debris Coordination Meeting at JSC.
Participants discuss ESA and NASA LDEF research and other topics.
Minutes of the Sixth ESA/NASA Space Debris Coordination Meeting, April
16-17, 1992.
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Nimbus 6, a weather satellite, was launched on a Delta rocket on June 12,
1975. On this date its derelict Delta second stage explodes in orbit, producing
235 trackable debris pieces. About 190 remained in orbit on December 31,
1992.
Joseph Loftus and Eugene Stansbery meet CNES and Arianespace officials in
Evry, near Paris. They discuss provisions for debris control for the planned
Ariane 5 booster. Loftus is in Paris to attend the Fourth European Aerospace
Conference, where he chairs a session on orbital debris.
Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., "Trip Report - Discussion with CNES-Arianespace and
ESA, re: Ariane 5."
The Haystack radar begins providing calibrated useful data to orbital debris
researchers at JSC. MIT-LL, which operates Haystack on contract to the U.S.
Air Force, collects data on magnetic tape and sends it to JSC. JSC's Orbital
Debris Data Analysis Facility then transfers the data to optical disks and
analyzes it. Each January JSC provides the SSF program with an orbital
debris environment report based on the Haystack measurements.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with John Stanley, June 21, 1993.
During the annual 2-week optical debris detection session at Rattlesnake
Mountain Observatory in Washington State, Karl Henize uses the JSC CDT to
make 655 observations of 270 objects.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Karl Henize, June 8, 1993.
John Stanley briefs a Haystack Radar peer review group on the NCSU contest
to develop a radar calibration sphere deployment system. The peer review
group calls for orbital debris radar calibration spheres to be deployed in orbit
as soon as possible.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with John Stanley, July 30, 1993.
NASA holds the First LDEF Post-Retrieval Symposium in Kissimrnee,
Florida. The LDEF Space Environmental Effects Newsletter reports that "the
major achievement to date in the analysis of LDEF meteoroid and debris data
is a preliminary comparison of the combined environment and its effects
observed on LDEF with existing models." Less than 10% of the significant
impact pits on LDEF have been analyzed by this date. However, impact pits
on LDEF's trailing surfaces provide the first clear evidence for debris in
elliptical orbits. Researchers also find impact pits formed by small particles
accelerated from the direction of the Sun by solar radiation, and evidence for
debris clouds produced by the Shuttle and other launch vehicles.
"Summary of the First LDEF Post-Retrieval Symposium," LDEF Space
Environmental Effects Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 3, June 15, 1991; LDEF- 69
Months in Space: First Post-Retrieval Symposium (NASA CP 3134, Part l ),
Arlene Levine, editor, 1991.
USSPACECOM issues "Minimization and Mitigation of Orbital Debris"
(USSPACECOM Regulation 57-2). It lists guidelines for the operation and
development of current and future space systems, with an eye toward miti-
gating the production of orbital debris. In 1992 an AIAA special report states
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that some of its provisions could "serve as models for the civil sector agen-
des" in the development of orbital debris policies.
Orbital Debris Mitigation Techniques: Technical, Economic, and Legal
Aspects, AIAA Special Project Report SP-016-1992.
June 11 New SSF orbital debris shielding design requirements based on the 1988
Kessler-Anderson orbital debris environment model, as amended by a 1990
memorandum, are submitted to the Space Station Control Board for consider-
ation.
June 11-12 Joseph Loftus, Andrew Potter, Donald Kessler, Daniel Jacobs, and George
Levin, NASA Headquarters Orbital Debris Program Manager, travel to Japan
for orbital debris discussions. They visit NASDA Headquarters, the light-gas
guns at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and other facilities.
Trip report memorandum, Loftus Orbital Debris Files.
June 12 The International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) of the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) formulates a draft recommendation stating
that "as little debris as possible should be released into geostationary orbit"
and that "every reasonable effort should be made to shorten the lifetime of
debris in transfer orbit." The non-binding recommendation also states that
GEt satellites should be transferred to "supersynchronous graveyards"
(orbits above GEt altitude) at the end of their useful life. No minimum
acceptable graveyard altitude is recommended.
Pamela Meredith, "A Legal Regime for Orbital Debris: Elements of a Multilat-
eral Treaty," presented at the Preservation of Near-Earth Space for Future
Generations symposium, University of Chicago, June 24-26, 1992.
GEt and Orbital Debris
GEt contains far fewer objects than LEO. The GEt population was about 435 known objects in
October 1991. The present rate of increase is about 25 objects per year. If the current GEt popula-
tion did not change, we would not see our first significant debris-producing collision for about
10,000 years. If the present rate of increase continues, however, our first collision will likely occur
after only a century. If the increase rate grows, then the first collision will, of course, occur sooner.
Atmospheric drag plays little role in the decay of GEt debris. Solar radiation pressure can remove
micron-size debris particles (those with the least potential for causing damage) in less than year.
Intermediate-size particles (a fraction of a I mm to I crn) are made to decay by a combination of
solar radiation pressure and the solar radiation pressure drag component (the Poynting-Robertson
Effect). Even so, they need at least 60,000 years to leave GEt. Large objects, like intact satellites,
require a million years or longer to leave GEt.
Uncontrolled objects in GEt drift in longitude. Their orbital plane also precesses with a period of
53 years. As a result, about 20 years after active station-keeping ends, a satellite's orbit reaches an
inclination of about 15 deg. The inclination of the orbit cycles back to 0 deg 53 years after station-
keeping ends. The cycle then repeats.
Satellites in 15-deg inclination orbit cross the equatorial belt twice each day. The difference in
velocity between a satellite in a 15-deg inclination GEt orbit and one at equatorial inclination is
about 800 m/sec. This is faster than a jet aircraft.
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Several GEO users have instituted a policy of clearing GEO by changing the orbital height of their
satellites when they near the end of their planned useful lives. The JSC orbital debris team and ESA
have jointly agreed that minimum separation distances above or below GEO in the hundreds of
kilometers should be used. Objects should be moved to at least 300 km from GEO, plus 2000 km for
every m2/kg of satellite to compensate for the effects of solar radiation pressure. For example, for a
10 m 2 satellite weighing 1000 kg, 20 km of altitude would need to be added to take into account
solar radiation pressure. This yields a recommended graveyard orbit altitude of 320 km.
Another opportunity for GEO debris management is the stable plane. The stable plane is inclined
7.3 deg to the Earth's equator, and has a right ascension (RA) of 0 deg (that is, the plane is inclined
toward the Sun). Satellites do not achieve the stable plane RA without intervention by their opera-
tors. Once a satellite is in the stable plane, no station-keeping is needed to maintain that orbital
plane. The collision velocity between satellites in the stable plane is 5 m/sec - about as fast as a
running person. This is useful for orbital debris management because low-velocity collisions
produce far fewer pieces than high-velocity collisions.
Stable plane orbits above or below GEO altitude use the best features of the stable plane and grave-
yard orbit strategies. However, neither the stable plane nor graveyard orbits hundreds of kilome-
ters above GEO can do anything to protect GEO from satellite explosions. These can be prevented
only by depleting stored energy sources. If stored energy source depletion is not routinely em-
ployed, graveyard orbits thousands of kilometers above GEO will be needed to protect it for future
human use.
Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., "Orbital Debris Issues in GEO" (presentation materials),
June 1992; interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 23,
1993; Larry Jay Friesen, "Orbital Debris and Power Satellites," The Journal of
Space Development, May, June 1993.
June 12-22 Joseph Loftus, Andrew Potter, Donald Kessler, George Levin, NASA Head-
quarters Office of Space Flight, and Daniel Jacobs visit the People's Republic
of China. They hold orbital debris discussions with the Chinese Academy of
Space Technology and other organizations. The Chinese report they formed
their Orbital Debris Study Group in 1989. It has representatives from the
Ministry of Aerospace Industry, the Chinese Academy of Science, the Science
Commission, and the Foreign Ministry. A major topic of the meeting is the
breakup of the Fengyun 1-2 satellite's Long March 4 launch vehicle upper
stage on October 4, 1990. NASA describes modifications made to U.S. Delta,
Japanese H-l, and European Ariane rockets to avoid explosions. The sides
discuss making similar modifications to the Long March 4 upper stage.
Trip Report, Loftus Orbital Debris Files; note, Andrew E. Potter to David S. F.
Portree, July 24, 1993.
July The new SSF shielding requirements based on the 1988 Kessler-Anderson
orbital debris environment model, as modified by a 1990 memorandum, are
accepted by the Space Station Control Board.
July 17 ESA's first ERS (European Remote Sensing) satellite is launched atop an
Ariane 4 rocket into a 782-km-by-777-km, 98.5-deg Sun-synchronous orbit.
ERS-1 carries ground-pointing radar altimeter, radiometer, and microwave
sensors. The satellite, which cost $550 million, provides data to subscribing
receiving stations on every continent save Africa. Mass at the beginning of
operations is 2384 kg. ERS-1 measures 11.8 m high and 11.7 m across its solar
arrays. The size, orbital altitude, and importance of the ERS-1 satellite make
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it especially vulnerable to orbital debris. It is only one of an increasing
number of large, extremely costly satellites. The loss of any one of these to
orbital debris would seriously damage the space programs of which they are
part.
In St. Petersburg, representatives from NASA meet Soviet representatives
from the Institute for Space Research (IKI), the Foreign Ministry, and the
KOSMOS organization. They discuss exchange of satellite catalogs and
flown witness plates, flight of a NASA capture cell experiment on Mir, timely
exchange of data on major breakups, and means of cataloguing debris events.
Trip report, Loftus Orbital Debris Files.
JSC engineers select a multi-spring design from among the working proto-
types of a debris calibration sphere deployment system designed and built by
NCSU students. JSC begins ODERACS flight hardware fabrication. John
Stanley is flight hardware program manager and experiment Principal
Investigator. Development proceeds toward a planned September 1992
launch.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with John Stanley, July 30, 1993.
On the STS-48 mission, Space Shuttle Discovery deploys the Upper Atmo-
sphere Research Satellite (UARS), an important component of NASA's
Mission to Planet Earth program. The STS-48 mission lasts 5 days, 8 hours.
Twice space objects enter Discovery's 5 km-by-25-km-by-5-km alert box.
One, the spent Cosmos 955 upper stage (launched in 1977), intrudes on the 2-
km-by-5-km-by-2-km maneuver box. Discovery avoids it by firing its thrust-
ers for 7 seconds, slowing its motion by about 0.6 m/sec. This is the first time
an orbital debris avoidance maneuver is conducted in the history of space-
flight.
"STS-48 Mission Report," NASA JSC, October 1991; J. Steven Stich, "STS
Collision Avoidance" (presentation materials), January 17, 1992, p. 10.
In a paper published this month, Phillip Anz-Meador and Andrew Potter
write that they have applied the NASA EVOLVE evolutionary debris envi-
ronment computer model to determine the collision risk for Soviet space
nuclear reactors. Their study confirms that several collisional breakups
among the more than 30 reactors in orbit can be expected in the next few
centuries.
PhiUip Anz-Meador and Andrew E. Potter, "Radioactive Satellites: Intact
Reentry and Breakup by Debris Impact," Advanced Space Research, Vol. l 1,
1991, pp. 37-42.
JSC and USSPACECOM sign an MOA on Space Station orbital debris colli-
sion avoidance support.
Leonid A. Gorshkov, Head of the Department of Orbital Station Design,
Energia Design Bureau, talks with members of the JSC orbital debris team
while in Houston to speak at the Exploration 91 meeting. He was the Chief
Designer of the Mir space station. Gorshkov and other Energia officials
discuss participation by the design bureau in U.S.-Soviet Orbital Debris
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Working Group discussions scheduled to take place in Moscow. They also
discuss flying a U.S. capture cell on Mir and Soviet experience with orbital
debris gained during the Mir program. The Soviet delegation shows little
interest in sharing returned capture cells, but does express interest in ex-
change of services - specifically in NASA help to set up a communications
relay for Mir for the period of its orbit when it is out of sight of Soviet ground
stations and communications ships. They tell the JSC team they want NASA
to buy space on Mir for the capture cell. The Soviet delegation also describes
the Mir pressure hull. It is a chemically milled sheet 2 mm thick with webs 4
mm thick welded to form the station's cylindrical body. The largest cylinder
(the main compartment) is covered by a body-mounted radiator with a 20-
mm standoff from the pressure hull. The radiator is 2 mm thick. The smaller
cylinders are covered by a multilayer thermal blanket comprising 40 layers of
aluminized Mylar and scrim. Several layers of Kevlar-like material cover the
thermal blanket. Gorshkov reports that Mir has suffered impact damage on
its outer windows and on the flat sealing surface of one of its six docking
rings. The Soviet officials do not wish to discuss the exact nature of the
damage because doing so would compromise a commercial proposal they
plan to make to Boeing Corporation of Seattle, Washington.
"Memorandum for the Record," Joseph P. Loftus, Jr. to Andrew E. Potter,
November 4, 1991.
JSASS and ISAS hold Space Debris Workshop 91 in Sagamihara, Japan.
The manifest for the STS-44 mission includes several DoD experiments.
Atlantis maneuvers to avoid a spent Soviet upper stage which intrudes deep
into its 5-km-by-25-km-by-5 km alert box. It passes very near the edge of the
orbiter's 2-km-by-5-km-by-2-km maneuver box. The MCC elects to conduct
an avoidance maneuver 10 hrs ahead of the predicted conjunction at a time
"consistent with payload objectives and crew timeline." The crew fires two
+X (aft) thrusters for 7 secs.
"STS-44 Mission Report," NASA JSC, January 1992; J. Steven Stich, "STS
Collision Avoidance Procedures" (presentation materials), January 17, 1992, p. 10.
In March 1988, Faith Vilas received funding for a Phase A study of the Debris
Collision Warning Sensors flight experiment. The experiment would be
carried in the Space Shuttle payload bay, and would sample the debris
population in LEO and GEO. It would use infrared and visible light sensors
to study debris down to I mm dia in LEO and objects as small as 3 cm to an
altitude of 2000 kin. Vilas presented results of the Phase A study to the NASA
Headquarters Office of Aeronautical and Space Technology in August 1988.
The experiment was augmented to include a plan to release objects, the
properties of which would be characterized on the ground before launch,
from the Shuttle payload bay. These would be observed by the Debris Colli-
sion Warning Sensors. JSC carries out in-house Phase B studies. In April 1989,
Kaman Sciences and Ball Electro-Optics/Cryogenics Division were selected
to carry out additional Phase B studies, which were completed in April 1991.
Faith Vilas was Principal Investigator, and C. Donald Harris of JSC was
Project Manager for the contracted Phase B studies. In July 1991 Harris and
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Vilas presented Phase B results to Arnold D. Aldrich, Associate Administra-
tor of the NASA Headquarters Office of Aeronautics, Exploration, and
Technology. Aldrich asked them to study ways of reducing costs. He also
suggested the use of existing sensors, and placement of the experiment on a
free flying platform and SSF. This month Ball and Kaman Sciences present
final extended Phase B study results at JSC. Cost is estimated at $50 million.
The Shuttle-borne option is found to be less expensive than the SSF or free-
flyer options. A Shuttle payload proof-of-concept experiment using visible
light only is priced at $8.9 million. NASA elects not to fund the experiment
through the development Phase C/D because of costs.
Note, Faith Vilas to David S. F. Porlree, December 3, 1993.
1992 Cumulative launches (since 1957) 3495Catalogued objects in orbit 6922
During the year An informal team of orbital debris researchers, with cooperation and support
from the DoD service space commands, the Naval Research Laboratory,
Raytheon, XonTech, Lockheed, Mitre, and other organizations, conducts a
year-long feasibility study of the "design of a family of instruments and the
configuration of a network to provide collision avoidance for the space
station and all other high value assets in low earth orbit against a threat
environment of 1-cm particles." It would comprise a fence of dedicated
debris sensors extending thousands of km across the Earth's surface. The
system would shrink the 2-km-by-5-km-by-2-km Shuttle maneuver box to
about 100 m on a side (space station size), reducing the number of SSF debris
avoidance maneuvers required. As many as 20 avoidance maneuvers per
year would be required if the station were to use the Shuttle maneuver box,
playing havoc with sensitive experiments dependent on extended periods of
microgravity. The team finds that "to move the threshold of the [existing]
Space Surveillance Network [SSN] from 10-30 crn to I crn, one needs to
upgrade the sensors from 70-cm... to 5-cm wavelengths. To accommodate
that change in sensitivity and the increase in targets that wiU be detected one
needs to improve the database processing." The team points to experience
gained using the SSN, GBR-X, and other systems to support its assertions.
The total cost of setting up the system is given as $1 billion, with an annual
operating cost of $100 million. The team states that this estimate "may sound
high but such a system could 'shut down' numerous less capable facilities
[so] the savings might pay for the new capability in a very few years." The
ground-based system could be augmented with onboard optical sensors of
the type studied by Bail Aerospace and Kaman Sciences under direction of
Vilas and Harris. They would further reduce the false alarm rate by provid-
ing additional location data on objects tagged as collision threats by the
ground-based system. The informal team briefs Space Station Program
management on December 4, 1992.
Note, Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., to David S. F. Portree, September 9, 1993;
interview, David S. F. Portree with Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., August 25, 1993;
interview, David S. F. Portree with Joseph Loftus, December 3, 1993.
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The Space Debris Study Group of JSASS publishes its Interim Report. The
report was summarized by Susuma Toda of the National Aerospace Labora-
tory of Japan at the University of Chicago Centennial Symposium, June 24-26,
1992. According to Toda, the report presents an overview of orbital debris
issues, with particular attention paid to Japanese contributions in the field.
The report cites observations made by Kyoto University's Middle and Upper
atmosphere radar (MU) and optical observations of GEt objects by the
Communications Research Laboratory (CRL) 1.5-meter telescope as sources
of orbital debris data. Only known GEt satellites were detected. Toda states
that the report declares Japan's debris record to be "clean," though debris-
producing "past mission failures concerned with the upper stage motor
collision [the ECS-1 satellite collided with its own upper stage in 1979] and
abnormal engine burning" are acknowledged. Toda states that the report
characterizes NASDA's orbital debris achievements as "still very limited
compared with those of the U.S.A. and Europe."
Susuma Toda, "The Current and Future Space Debris Environment as Assessed
in Japan," Presented at the Preservation of Near-Earth Space for Future
Generations symposium, University of Chicago, June 24-26, 1992.
Oscar 22, an unused satellite of the Transit series, is destroyed by a 150-gm
aluminum pellet traveling at 6 km/sec at the U.S. Air Force AEDC. The
purpose of the exercise is to simulate an orbital debris strike on a satellite in
orbit. Many more micron-sized particles are created than expected.
lnteravia Space Directory 1992-93, Andrew Wilson, editor, p. 183.
An orbital debris modeling coordination meeting is held at TUBS in Ger-
many. Papers are presented on solid rocket motor particulates, optical and
radar orbital debris measurements, the Tethered Remover Satellite (TERESA)
concept, and other issues. Representatives from JSC, TUBS, and DARA
participate.
Minutes of Orbital Debris Modeling Coordination Meeting, NASA and TUBS,
February 9-10, 1992.
By this date, 1092 hours of orbital debris data have been collected as a result
of the Haystack-HAX agreement between USSPACECOM, MIT-LL, and
NASA.
Minutes of the Seventh Space Debris Coordination Meeting, ESA/U.S./Japan,
February 12-13, 1992.
The Seventh Space Debris Coordination Meeting is held at the European
Space Technology Center (ESTEC) in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. Japan,
NASA, and Europe participate. The Europeans give presentations on mete-
oroid and orbital debris protection for Columbus and the Hermes shuttle.
/b_
A conference called Technogenic Space Debris: Problems and Directions of
Research is held at the IKI in Moscow. The Russian Defense Ministry, Rus-
sian Space Agency (RKA), and Russian Academy of Sciences sponsor the
conference. The approximately 200 attendees include representatives from
Japan, Europe, and U.S. companies. NASA debris experts were invited, but
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none could attend because the invitation came too late for them to prepare
for the trip to Moscow. Papers are presented on the Soviet/CIS space sur-
veillance system, optical and radar systems used to compile the CIS satellite
catalog, and other topics. Proposals are made for a dedicated phased array
equatorial orbital debris radar, and for a joint U.S.-CIS tracking exercise using
the Pion subsatellites (at this time scheduled for deployment in Spring 1992).
A report on Cosmos 1275 reveals that the Russians believe a collision caused
its breakup. The Russians also reveal that the Ekran 2 DBS broke up in GEO
in 1978. The Russians report that condenser meteoroid detectors have flown
on Soviet space stations since Salyut I in 1971, and that hypervelocity tests to
17 km/sec were performed in support of the Vega Halley's Comet probes.
"Memorandum for the Record, Subj.: Technogenic Space Debris Conference,"
Kaman Sciences Corporation, March 9, 1992.
German orbital debris researchers share with NASA radar images of orbital
debris objects. The images were collected using the German FGAN radar
system. Half the objects observed are not rotating. Presumably the breakups
which produced them would have made them spin. The Germans also detect
objects with slowing spin rates. Researchers suggest that interactions with
Earth's magnetic field are stabilizing the debris pieces. Stable objects compli-
cate optical observing because they do not present many sides as they move
through the field of view of a telescope. It is thus more difficult to derive a
mean value for shape and brightness for stable objects, as brightness depends
on the viewing angle. This implies a new parameter to be taken into account
in orbital debris albedo measurements.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Karl Henize, June 8, 1992; interview, David
S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, June 23, 1993.
On the STS-49 mission, Endeavour recovers the Intelsat 6 satellite stranded in
LEO 2 yrs earlier. The rescue is considered practical because of the enormous
cost of building and launching a replacement (about $260 million) and the
long lead-times before a replacement can be readied. NASA is to charge the
Intelsat Organization $90-98 million for the rescue, depending on how much
of the repair effort can be justified as SSF EVA practice. After the first 3-
person EVA, Intelsat 6 is fitted with a kick stage and boosted to a GEO slot at
325.5 deg east, over the Atlantic.
The Space Debris Forum is held in Tokyo by JSASS and NEC Corporation.
International experts on orbital debris provide overviews of several aspects
of the issue.
After the U.K. proposed in an ITU consultative working group that all GEO
satellites be boosted to 53 km above GEO at end of useful life, the U.S. De-
partment of State and the FCC approached JSC to learn if the proposed
separation distance was sufficient to safeguard GEO. The 53 km separation
marks the outer boundary of the nominal migration of an object left to drift in
a perfect geosynchronous orbit (period of 1436.1 min at 37,000 km). When
JSC orbital debris team members declared the distance to be inadequate,
pointing out that not all objects in GEO are in perfect geosynchronous orbits,
the FCC and State Department asked Donald Kessler, Larry Jay Friesen of
Lockheed Corporation at JSC, and Joseph Loftus to prepare the U.S. position
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paper on the issue. This was completed on April 15, 1992. Loftus attends the
CCIR 4 meeting in Geneva May 25-June 3, where his draft of a recommenda-
tion for GEO satellite disposal is accepted by the CCIR and routed to the
more than 180 member-states of the ITU for comment. It recommends that as
little debris as possible be left in GEO, that the lifetime of objects in transfer
orbits be minimized, and that transfer to graveyard orbits be carried out in
such a way as to avoid blocking the radio communications of active satellites.
A later draft (June 17, 1992 - CCIR document 4/141-E) adds the recommen-
dation that an effective graveyard orbit for satellites be determined. While
not bearing the force of international treaty or law, the recommendation
would carry substantial weight if endorsed by a consensus of the countries in
the ITU.
Interviews, David S. F. Portree with Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., August 9, 1993, and
September 9, 1993; CCIR Document, USWP. 4A/9, "Management of Orbital
Debris in the Geosynchronous Orbit"; CCIR Document 4A/TEMP/92(Rev. 2-
E) and CCIR Document 4/141-E, "Draft New Recommendation, Environmen-
tal Protection of the Geostationary Orbit."
May 28 Douglas S. Adams, JSC Structural Mechanics Branch, and Karen Edelstein,
JSC Structural Subsystem Manager for the Orbiter Forward Fuselage and
Crew Module, respond to a request from Valerie Neal, Smithsonian Institu-
tion Department of Space History, for a piece of Shuttle window glass con-
taining an impact pit. They offer a left-side windshield thermal pane from
Columbia. It was pitted during the STS-35 mission in December 1990. The
pit is one of the largest in the history of the Shuttle program. Edelstein and
Adams call it "an excellent display piece." Columbia's crew noticed the pit
while they were still in orbit. Most researchers favor impact by a fragment of
an upper stage as the most probable cause. SEM analysis detected zinc and
aluminum, neither of which normally occurs in meteoroids. The zinc signa-
ture was, however, atypical.
Letter, Douglas S. Adams and Karen Edelstein to Valerie Neal, May 28, 1992.
June The GAO releases Space Station: Delays in Dealing with Space Debris May
Reduce Safety and Increase Costs. In it, the GAO states that SSF was designed
using the 1984 NASA orbital debris model, and that the model adopted by
NASA in 1991 describes an orbital debris environment eight times worse. It
reports that NASA ordered its centers to incorporate the 1991 model, but that
no decisions had yet been made to implement the changes. The GAO cites
January 1992 testimony by unnamed NASA engineers and debris experts,
who stated that the new orbital debris model raises to 36% the risk of critical
component shielding penetration in the first decade of operation. This would
increase to 88% over SSF's projected 30-year lifetime. In its conclusions, the
report states that difficult trade-offs between costs and risks will have to be
made before the SSF CDR in 1993 (this was moved from 1991 after an SSF
redesign). The GAO recommends that the CDR be delayed until "the 1991
model of the debris environment is fully implemented[,] changes to NASA's
debris safety criteria are thoroughly assessed[,] and NASA develops a com-
prehensive strategy for dealing with debris." The GAO calls on NASA to
develop shielding augmentation for small debris and other protection sys-
tems for medium and large debris.
Space Station: Delays in Dealing with Space Debris May Reduce Safety and
Increase Costs, GAO, June 1992.
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In Moscow, the U.S. and Russia hold their third joint Orbital Debris Working
Group meeting.
At the Second LDEF Post-Retrieval Symposium 26 papers are presented on
meteoroid and debris topics. Several researchers report that orbital debris
caused 15% of the impacts on LDEF trailing surfaces - preflight modeling
indicated these should be far fewer. The researchers state that this implies a
population of debris in highly elliptical orbits 20-30 times larger than previ-
ously estimated. It probably originates in explosions of upper stages in
transfer orbits. The largest LDEF impact feature is 5.25 mm across. No
impactor is found, but researchers speculate that aluminum beads found in
the crater are the remnant of an orbital debris impactor. Other debris found
embedded in LDEF surfaces includes metal of many kinds, paint, and human
waste.
Michael Zolensky, "Summary of the Second LDEF Symposium," LDEF Space
Flight Environmental Effects Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 3, June 30, 1992; H. W.
Dursch, et al, Analysis of Systems Hardware Flown on LDEF - Results of the
System Special Investigation Group (NASA CR 189628), April 1992; Second
LDEF Post-Retrieval Symposium Abstracts (NASA CP 10097), Arlene Levine,
editor, 1992.
NASA and CNES representatives meet in Toulouse, France. The French ask
to participate in the NASA ODERACS experiment.
Minutes of Space Debris Meeting, NASA/CNES, Toulouse, France, June 4,
1992.
The University of Chicago marks the beginning of its second century with a
Centennial Symposium called The Preservation of Near-Earth Space for
Future Generations. Because 1992 is the International Space Year, an impor-
tant focus is international cooperation on orbital debris. Representatives
from the space establishments of Europe, China, India, Japan, France, Russia,
and the U.S. report on their orbital debris policies and methods.
"Debris Meeting in Chicago," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 4, October
1, 1992, pp. 12-19.
Columbia orbits Earth for nearly 14 days on the first Extended Duration
Orbiter (EDO) mission (STS-50). The oldest orbiter spends nearly 10 days
with its nose toward space and its payload bay facing its direction of motion.
After landing, NASA and Lockheed engineers discover 51 hypervelocity
impact damage sites on the windows, reinforced carbon-carbon wing leading
edges, and radiator panels. The Thermal Protection System (the bulk of the
surface of the orbiter) is not examined because it normally sustains from 50-
200 low-velocity debris strikes during launch and landing, and there are
insufficient resources available to distinguish this damage from
hypervelocity impact damage. SEM analysis shows that 35% of the
hypervelocity impact damage sites contain orbital debris objects (paint flecks,
stainless steel, aluminum, and titanium). Meteoroids caused 25% of the
damage sites. The remaining 40% are of unknown origin. Six craters are
found in five of the orbiter windows, including the deepest found in the
history of the Shuttle program (0.57 mm). It was caused by a titanium-rich
particle. Three windows are replaced at a cost of $50,000 each. Up to STS-45
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(March 24-April 2, 1992) Shuttle windows suffered impact damage 49 times,
resulting in 25 discarded thermal glass panes.
Eric Christiansen, et al, "Assessment of High Velocity Impacts on Exposed
Shuttle Surfaces," presented at the First European Conference on Space Debris,
Darmstadt, Germany, April 5-7, 1993; Memorandum, "Orbiter Window
Damage," Karen Edelstein to Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., April 22, 1992; "New
Shuttle Flight Rule," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 5, No. 4, October l, 1992.
The Space Shuttle Atlantis deploys the European Retrievable Carrier (Eureca)
on the STS-46 mission. It carries the Timeband Capture Cell Experiment
(TiCCE) from the University of Kent (England), which collects micron-sized
particles in "Space Station-type" orbits. The device unrolls a tape at a steady
pace, exposing new sections (timebands) to space every 2-3 days over 9
months. This permits the time of impact events to be determined. Eureca
was recovered by the Space Shuttle Endeavour on the STS-57 flight in June
1993.
T. J. Stevenson, "Eureca TiCCE - A Nine-Month Survey of Cosmic Dust and
Space Debris at 500 km Altitude," Journal of the British Interplanetary
Society, Vol. 41, 1988, pp. 429-432.
John Vedder, Jill Tabor, and Diane Walyus, McDonnell Douglas Space Sys-
tems Company, describe the orbital debris problems of future Nuclear Elec-
tric Propulsion (NEP) spacecraft on Moon and Mars missions. Such vehicles
would accelerate slowly, spending weeks or months spiraling slowly out-
ward from Earth before attaining escape velocity. The researchers determine
that the greatest danger exists in LEO, and that 80% of the total hazard is in
the 800-1100-km altitude region. They recommend spending as little time as
possible in LEO, and that the long axis of an NEP vehicle be kept parallel to
its direction of motion so it presents a smaller target to debris.
John Vedder, et al, "Orbital Debris Hazard for Nuclear Electric Propulsion
Earth-Escape Trajectories," 1992 AIAA/AAS Astrodynamics Conference, A
Collection of Technical Papers, pp. 165-175.
NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin writes to Ralph Carlone, Assistant
Comptroller General of the GAO, in response to the GAO report Space Sta-
tion: Delays in Dealing with Space Debris May Reduce Safety and Increase Costs.
Goldin states that the SSF orbital debris model adopted in 1991 was devel-
oped by NASA and is accepted by the international space community. He
says NASA will check and upgrade the model as appropriate, using data
from its ongoing debris measurement program. Any proposed changes will
undergo scrutiny by an independent review team before being implemented.
Goldin says that the "safety of humans in space is our highest priority." He
states that the 1993 CDR will not be delayed.
Letter from Daniel Goldin, NASA Administrator, to Ralph Carlone, Assistant
Comptroller General, GAO, August 15, 1992.
The RKA launches the Vostok-based Resurs F-16 imaging film return space-
craft. It carries a Beryllium 7 collection experiment provided by the U.S. Air
Force Space Test Program and the Naval Research Laboratory. Resurs F-16
also carries the Pion 5 and Pion 6 subsateUites, metal spheres approximately
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60 cm in diameter. Resurs F-16 releases them on September 4, just before it
returns to Earth. They are tracked as they decay from orbit. Pion 6 reenters
on September 24, and Pion 5 reenters the next day. In 1989 the U.S.S.R.
conducted two similar missions to help update their space tracking capabili-
ties. NASA's planned ODERACS experiment is similar in principle to the
Russian experiments.
"Russian Satellite Deploys First U.S. Military Test," Aviation Week & Space
Technology, August 31, 1992, p. 23; TRW Space Log 1992, p. 54.
The JSC MOD Orbit Flight Techniques Panel holds its 131st meeting, at which
representatives of Rockwell Corporation (builder of the Shuttle orbiters) and
Donald Kessler and Eric Christiansen present results of a study of orbital
debris damage risks associated with certain Shuttle flight attitudes. The
study indicates that "the -ZVV [payload bay forward] attitude.., is the worst
attitude from a catastrophic damage perspective. The risk was between three
and five times greater.., than the best attitude which is -ZLV, -XVV (bay
down, tail forward)." The study also finds that the risk of damage to the
Shuttle radiators, which are deployed from the inside of the payload bay
doors, is 16 times greater in -ZVV than in -ZLV. Damage to windows is 20
times more likely in -ZVV with the +XVV (nose forward) attitude almost as
risky (fig. 7). These results are reinforced by examination of Columbia's
surfaces after the STS-50 EDO flight. In October 1992 the Orbit Flight Tech-
niques Panel develops Flight Rule 2-77, "Attitude Restrictions for Orbital
Debris," which states that use of the -ZVV and +XVV, +XLV (payload bay
up) or +YLV (payload bay out of plane) attitudes will be minimized during
preflight mission planning and during the mission. It further states that the
"-ZLV attitude will be the normal orbiter attitude unless payload or orbiter
requirements dictate otherwise." The rule calls for orbiter preflight planning
to be tailored so the orbiter will spend fewer than 48 hrs of cumulative time
during a mission in the higher-risk attitudes. Exceptions will be made on the
basis of flight requirements and documented in the annex to the flight rules
for a given flight. In addition, MOD adds section 4.2.4.2., "Altitude Adjust-
ment Strategy," to its "Space Shuttle Operational Flight Design Standard
Ground Rules and Constraints." Section 4.2.4.2. states that mission designs
will be selected which keep Shuttle orbital altitudes below 320 km, provided
that such altitudes are "compatible with mandatory payload constraints and
other high priority objectives." In addition, when the mission activities
which require the orbiter to operate above 320 km conclude, the orbiter
should be moved to a lower orbit if propellant supply permits.
"NASA Johnson Space Center Flight Rules," Flight Rule 2-77, pp. 2-80a - 2-
80b; interview, David S. F. Portree with Michael F. Collins and J. Steven Stich,
August 17, 1993; "Space Shuttle Operational Flight Design Standard Ground
Rules and Constraints" (NSTS-21075 Rev. A), Level B, Change 6, April 30,
1993, 4.2.4.2.
An ESA-Russia Workshop on objects in GEO is held at ESOC.
Letter, Walter Flury, ESA ESOC, to Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., NASA JSC,
September 29, 1992.
The International Academy of Astronautics (IAA) Ad Hoc Expert Group of
the Committee for Safety, Reliability, and Quality circulates to its members a
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Figure 7.
More than 25 Shuttle windows have had to be replaced because of impact damage since the Shuttle
program began in 1981. This chart above, which is based on calculations using the BUMPER
computer program devised by the Space Science Branch, JSC, shows the number of orbiter window
replacements expected for various attitudes. The safest attitude places the orbiter's tail toward the
direction of flight and the cargo bay toward Earth (away from space). Shuttle Flight Rule 2-77
(1992) states that this orientation will be used in orbit unless it compromises mission objectives.
The nose-down, belly-forward orientation is preferred when astronauts conduct spacewalks in the
Shuttle cargo bay. The cargo bay forward, nose-up attitude increases risk to Shuttle windows and
vital components, such as the radiator panels on the inside of the cargo bay doors, and tanks under
the cargo bay floor. Flight Rule 2-77 states that this attitude should be avoided unless it is required
to fulfill mission objectives.
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draft copy of "A Position Paper on Orbital Debris." The Ad Hoc Expert
Group includes representatives from the U.S., Russia, Japan, Germany, ESA,
and Czechoslovakia. The position paper calls for internationally accepted
debris controls, international coordination meetings, educational efforts,
space law specifically governing orbital debris, a forum to coordinate multi-
lateral agreements, and other measures. The position paper has three objec-
tives - "to make clear how significant and severe the continued deposition of
orbital debris into the near-Earth environment is to the future use of space for
all mankind, to provide some clear guidelines as to how the international
community might wish to proceed in order to combat this growing space
environmental hazard, and to extend discussion of the debris issue by other
international groups to exercise the techniques and dialog necessary to begin
to formulate international agreements on this topic."
"A Position Paper on Orbital Debris Compiled by an Ad Hoc Expert Group of
the International Academy of Astronautics, Committee on Safety, Rescue, and
Quality," August 27, 1992 (draft).
The World Space Congress convenes in Washington, D.C. In conjunction
with the Congress, papers on orbital debris issues are presented and orbital
debris meetings are held.
Nicholas Johnson and Darren McKnight, Kaman Sciences Corporation, J. M.
Cherniyevski of the Center for Program Studies of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, and B. V. Cherniatiev, Energia Scientific Production Association,
meet to determine the probable cause of five debris events linked to the
Proton Block DM (fourth stage). They occurred between 1984 and September
1992. Through "unprecedented international cooperation," the team deter-
mines that two small (56-kg dry mass) auxiliary motors used to settle fuel in
the Block DM after weightless coast (ullage motors) are responsible. They are
routinely ejected when the Block DM stage ignites for the final time. Remain-
ing in each auxiliary motor at ejection are 10-40 kg of hypergolic propellants.
The international team decides that an explosion occurs when a thin interior
wall ruptures, allowing the fuel and oxidizer to mix. Additional debris-
producing explosions are likely because the Proton launch vehicle is com-
monly used. Thirty-four auxiliary motors remain in orbit from Russian
global positioning navigation system (GLONASS) launches alone.
B. V. Cherniatiev, et al, "Identification and Resolution of an Orbital Debris
Problem with the Proton Launch Vehicle," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No.
1, January 1, 1993, pp. 7-9.
An orbital debris coordination meeting is held in Washington, D.C. between
NASA and the TUBS.
The Fourth Meeting of the Joint U.S.-Russia Orbital Debris Working Group is
held in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with the World Space Congress.
The countries provide each other with copies of their satellite catalogs. An
agreement to exchange modeling results is reaffirmed. The Russians propose
that ESA participate in orbital debris talks with NASA and the Russian
KOSMOS organization. The sides also discuss a joint debris-tracking radar.
The Russians tell NASA that Walter Flury of ESA and Nicholas Johnson,
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Senior Scientist at Kaman Sciences, will participate in the Pion subsatellite
tracking experiment. The question of NASA participation is left unresolved.
Eugene Stansbery is made point-of-contact between the U.S. and Russia for
the Pion experiment.
Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the U.S./Russian OrbitalDebris Working
Group, September 5-6, 1992.
Lubos Perek, Astronomical Institute, Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences,
presents "Must Space Missions Be Beneficial?" at the 35th Colloquium on the
Law of Outer Space, Washington, D.C., a paper describing novel space
activities and their implications. He refers to the Outer Space Treaty (1967),
which calls for space to be used for the benefit of all countries. He points out,
however, that the potential exists for conflicts of interest over what is benefi-
cial and what is not. What one country, agency, company, or community of
interest caUs "harmful interference" (the term used in Article IX of the treaty),
another might consider beneficial space activity. He uses the example of the
conflict between the satellite launching industry and the community of
astronomers over the effects on optical astronomy of disused satellites. Perek
then describes several other projects, including
A proposed ARSAT (Art Satellite) which would have com-
memorated the centennial of the Eiffel Tower in 1989. It
would have consisted of 100 inflatable spheres, each 6 m
across, linked by cables to form a "ring of stars" as large as
the full moon.
Celestis Space Services' Urnsat scheme to launch cremated
human remains into orbit. Perek writes that "[t]he genera-
tions succeeding those cremated and launched would know
that their ancestors are still moving overhead and posing a
hazard to the lives of astronauts. What a cruel and unusual
punishment beyond anything Dante Alighieri could think of
for his Comedia Divina!"
Lunetta, Powersoletta, Agrisoletta, and Biosoletta, which
would reflect sunlight over large areas of the Earth from
orbit for a variety of beneficial purposes. Perek points out
that despite detailed technical studies of these systems in the
late 1970s, little thought was given to their possible environ-
mental effects, and none to their effects on astronomy.
Solar Power Satellite (SPS) systems of the type supported by
Christopher Kraft in the mid-to-late 1970s in GEO. Perek
points out that these were studied for their environmental
effects (in part by the EEO under Andrew Potter at JSC).
Each SPS would be as bright as Venus at its brightest. The
combined brightness of many SPS would interfere with
optical astronomy, and SPS in GEO would contribute to
GEO crowding.
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Perek states that "[t]he real danger of such projects is not in proposing them
because a grain of truth may be in any product of human imagination. The
danger lies with official agencies reviewing and approving space projects on
formal grounds only without taking into account all implications and with-
out realizing that the consequences of their decisions may be with us much
longer than anything else that mankind ever produced."
Lubos Perek, "Must Space Missions be Beneficial?" Proceedings of the 35th
Colloquiumon the Law of Outer Space, Washington, A1AA, 1993, pp. 303-
306.
The Eighth Coordination Meeting on Orbital Debris, NASA/ESA/Japan, is
held at JSC. Naoki Sato of NASDA describes the status of JEM debris protec-
tion development, and Heimut Heusmarm briefs the meeting on Columbus
debris protection. Christiansen and Crews describe SSF shielding. H.
Klinkrad and R. Jehn of ESA tell the meeting that analysis of the decay of the
Pion 5 and 6 subsatellites released by the Russian Resurs F-16 satellite on
September 4 has improved decay predictions.
Minutes of the Eighth Coordination Meeting on Orbital Debris, ESA/NASA/
Japan, October 20-21, 1992; Memorandum, Andrew E. Potter to Distribution,
January20, 1993.
Aerospace Daily reports that the amount of EVA assembly time planned for
SSF has been reduced, in part because of the orbital debris hazard to space-
walkers. The article refers to statements by William Raney, NASA Special
Assistant for Space Station. U.S. spacesuits have a pressurized inner suit and
an outer thermal garment which provides protection against meteoroids and
orbital debris to about I rnm in size. Russian suits are of generally similar
design.
Aerospace Daily, October29, 1992.
An LDEF II planning briefing is held at JSC. Michael Zolensky, Office of the
Curator (of Lunar Samples), Solar System Exploration Division, JSC, de-
scribes lessons learned from working with the first LDEF. Zolensky suggests
that the next LDEF have improved capabilities for gathering data on meteor-
oids and orbital debris. He states that the same care used in handling LDEF
experiments during removal should be used when installing them before
launch. No anodized aluminum surfaces should be used, because they
contain nonmetallic impurities which complicate analysis. In addition,
collection systems which permit accurate impact time determination should
be included.
Memorandum,MichaelZolensky to LDEF IImeeting attendees, December 1,
1992.
The International Journal of Impact Engineering publishes an article by Eric
Christiansen and Justin Kerr, JSC, titled "Mesh Double-Bumper Shield: a
Low-Weight Alternative for Spacecraft Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Protec-
tion." The MDB shield was first described by Christiansen in a 1990 paper
presented at the AIAA/NASA/DoD Orbital Debris Conference. They state
that, "The MDB shield was developed to demonstrate that a Whipple shield
could be 'augmented'... to substantially improve protection by adding a
mesh.., in front of the Whipple bumper and inserting a layer of high
November8
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strength fabric between the second bumper and the wall." Research in the
JSC HIT-F indicates that by using the MDB design a 30-70% weight savings
can be achieved without a corresponding loss in level of protection.
Eric Christiansen and J. H. Kerr, "Mesh Double-Bumper Shield: A Low-
Weight Alternative for Spacecraft Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Protection,"
International Journal of lmpact Engineering, November 1992; Eric
Christiansen, "Advanced Meteoroid and Debris Shielding Concepts," A1AA
paper 90-1336, Orbital Debris: Technical Issues and Future Directions (NASA
CP 10077), Andrew E. Potter, editor, September 1992.
Cosmos 1508 is a 550-kg, 1.8-m octagonal satellite. It was launched into a
394-km-by-1943-km, 82.9-deg inclination orbit on November 11, 1983, to
carry out a minor military mission (possibly radar calibration, air density
measurements, electronic monitoring, or technology demonstration). On this
date the disused satellite passes within 300 m of the Mir space station, which
at this time is home to Soyuz TM-15 cosmonauts Anatoli Solovyov and Sergei
Avdeyev. This is the closest known conjunction between an uncontrolled
satellite and a manned spacecraft.
TRW Space Log 1992, p. 28; Jos Heyman, Spacecraft Tables 1957-1990, p.
136; letter, Nicholas L. Johnson to Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., August 17, 1993.
The British company Sira, working with Unispace and the Royal Greenwich
Observatory, completes a feasibility study as part of an ESA contract. The
company calls the study "the first step in the development of instruments to
detect and characterize debris in Earth orbit." It proposes ground-based and
space-based optical, infrared, and radar instruments for monitoring LEO and
GEO. The system would collect data on the sizes, shapes, densities, albedos,
spin rates, altitudes, and orbital inclinations of debris pieces. The four-phase
development program would require 3 years from inception to launch or
installation.
Tim Furniss, "Spying on Space Debris," Flight International, December 23,
1992-January 5, 1993, p. 36.
On the STS-53 Space Shuttle flight, the orbiter Discovery carries the
ODERACS experiment. ODERACS comprises six spheres of different diam-
eters, made of aluminum or steel, which are to be deployed from a Get-Away
Special (GAS) canister in the payload bay. The experiment is meant to
provide calibration targets in LEO for ground-based radar and optical sys-
tents. After deployment at 256 kin, the spheres will be tracked using the
Haystack radar and other U.S. radar and optical tracking systems. The
German FGAN radar and French, Japanese, Russian, and Chinese tracking
systems will also take part. Through no fault of its NCSU student designers
or the program staff under John Stanley, the door on the GAS canister fails to
open. The experiment is not powered up and the spheres cannot deploy.
The ODERACS experiment is subsequently rescheduled for flight on the STS-
60 mission in early 1994. On flight day 6 Discovery avoids a large piece of
orbital debris by changing velocity by 0.7 m/sec with an 8-sec burn using the
+X (aft) thrusters.
"STS-53 Mission Report," NASA JSC, February 1993, p. 4; "Orbital Debris
Radar Calibration Spheres" (copies of transparencies), June 15, 1993; inter-
view, David S. F. Portree with John Stanley, June 21, 1993.
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December 17-18 A sixth Block DM auxiliary motor explodes. The ullage motor was part of the
Proton launch vehicle which inserted the Soviet Gorizont 17 domestic com-
munications satellite into GEO in 1989. Between 75 and 100 trackable pieces
are produced.
B. V. Cherniatiev, et al, "Identification and Resolution of an Orbital Debris
Problem with the Proton Launch Vehicle," Orbital Debris Monitor, Vol. 6, No.
l, January 1, 1993, pp. 7-9.
1993
Cumulative launches (since 1957)
Catalogued objects in orbit
3555
January 10-14
January 27-28
In a paper presented at the Tenth Symposium on Space Nuclear Power and
Propulsion, planners of space nuclear power system operations state that it is
necessary to take into account the possibility of orbital debris collisions with
space nuclear power systems.
J. A. Sholtis, et al, "U.S. Space Nuclear Safety: Past, Present, and Future,"
presented at the Tenth Symposium on Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, January 10-14, 1993.
JSC holds a meeting to evaluate in light of new Haystack radar data the SSF
orbital debris model NASA adopted in 1991. Representatives from XonTech,
JSC, Kaman Sciences, MSFC, AFSPACECOM, and other organizations attend
the meeting. They reach general consensus that
For the sizes of interest to SSF shielding designers (smaller
than 3 cm), the new Haystack observations fall within the
expected uncertainty of the 1991 model.
For objects in the larger "mid-range and collision avoidance
regime," Haystack provides "convincing evidence that the
size [of the population] of these objects has been overesti-
mated.., perhaps by a factor of two." However, this has
little impact on SSF engineering considerations.
The uncertainty in projecting the future orbital debris envi-
ronment remains as high as before Haystack data became
available, because "previously unmodeled sources of debris
appear to be required to fully understand the Haystack
data." The participants conclude that Haystack data should
be gathered over a full solar cycle, and that the times and
operative modes of the radar, as agreed upon by NASA and
USSPACECOM, might require changing.
The participants recommend that the SSF program continue to use the orbital
debris environment model adopted in 1991. They acknowledge, however,
that some Haystack data point already to a need for the model's eventual
refinement. They resolve to continue their critical examinations of the exist-
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Figure 8.
The Stuffed Whipple is a hybrid of the Multi-Shock Shield and Mesh Double Bumper protection
systems (see figure 6). It is designed to augment the baseline Space Station Freedom Whipple
Bumpers. A "blanket" comprising multiple layers of aluminum mesh and ceramic fabric would be
unrolled between the aluminum bumper and the backplate (the spacecraft hull), probably after
Freedom deployment in orbit. NASA would thereby avoid any Space Station deployment delay
caused by a need to redesign its existing orbital debris protection. In addition, the blanket could be
rapidly tailored to take into account possible refined assessments of the debris environment. The
blanket would further break up impactors and capture most impactor and bumper pieces before
they could strike the spacecraft hull.
91
1993
February 4
March
March
March
ing model, using data not only from the Haystack radar, but also from the
LDEF, the Goldstone radar, and USSPACECOM.
Memorandum, Donald J. Kessler to George Levin, NASA Headquarters,
February 6, 1993.
The Russian Progress M-15 cargo spacecraft undocks and backs away from
the Mir space station complex after 3 mos docked at its forward port.
Progress M-15 deploys Znamya (Banner), a 20-m dia solar reflector, from its
nose. It is billed as the world's first solar sail, but during this test it is used as
a soletta, reflecting sunlight down toward the Earth. The reflector completes
four orbits of the Earth in 5 hrs, passing over Spain, France, Austria, Poland,
Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Japan, and portions of South
America. It is then detached from Progress M-15. It remains visible, tum-
bling and sparkling, for 24 hrs after the test, and is seen widely in Canada.
The mission manager for the Znamya experiment, Vladimir S.
Syromiatnikov, NPO Energia company, reports that the beam of light was
more diffuse than anticipated. He says, however, that the test was a success,
and that "I believe we can persuade our leaders to perform a second test very
soon." The area on the ground lit by Znamya at any one time measured 4 km
across.
Peter B. de Selding, "Russians Deploy Reflector, Test Illuminating Idea,"
Space News, February 8-14, 1993, pp. 3-21.
Researchers at the HIT-F complete tests begun in November 1992 on the
Stuffed Whipple meteoroid and orbital debris protection system (fig. 8). The
Stuffed Whipple, a hybrid of the MDB and MSS designs, is designed to
augment the baseline SSF Whipple shield. It comprises a layered blanket of
aluminum mesh, Nextel ceramic fabric, and Kevlar polymer, which would be
placed between the aluminum Whipple bumper and the aluminum backplate
(the SSF module pressure hull). Hypervelocity impact tests show the Stuffed
Whipple can meet or exceed the SSF orbital debris design requirements.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Eric Christiansen, May I l, 1993.
The Space Debris Study Group of ]SASS releases its final report. It describes
shuttle and spacesuit debris protection, impact tolerant designs, and debris
crater formation. It cites many ESA and NASA authors.
Space Debris Study Group Report, Space Debris Study Group, JSASS, March
1993.
The Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) satellite is an SDIO vehicle. The
Space-Based Visible Experiment Principal Investigator team, lead by Michael
Gaposchkin of MIT-LL, is responsible for the satellite's many optical experi-
ments. This month Faith Vilas and Phillip Anz-Meador at JSC complete
designs for three MSX experiments with application to orbital debris studies.
The Debris Detection and Characterization experiment will search the region
around three fragmentation events - one each for LEO, GEO, and a highly
eccentric orbit. The Ram/Anti-Ram Debris Observations experiment will
search for debris ahead of and behind MSX, providing data for search strate-
gies for collision avoidance by spacecraft and space stations in Earth orbit.
The Resident Space Object Fragmentation experiment will observe a frag-
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mentation event in LEO 24-48 hrs after it is spotted by ground-based
USSPACECOM tracking systems, with the aim of characterizing the frag-
ments produced. MSX orbital debris experiments are constrained by the
requirements of the many other experiments on the satellite. For this reason
they will be aimed at targets of opportunity - they will not monitor the debris
environment. The MSX satellite is scheduled for launch in August 1994. Its
mission is projected to last 4-5 years.
Note, Faith Vilas to Davis S. F. Portree, December 6, 1993; interview, David
S. F. Portree with Faith Vilas, December 7, 1993.
April In the face of a mounting U.S. federal budget deficit, President William
Clinton calls on NASA to redesign SSF to reduce its costs. With the selection
of Option Alpha, the U.S. Space Station becomes smaller and more compact -
in theory a smaller target for orbital debris. In practice, Option Alpha may
contain greater risks as it lacks the "shadowing" common in earlier SSF
designs. That is, the critical components, such as crew modules, are not as
shielded against orbital debris impacts by less critical or more durable com-
ponents as they were in the SSF configurations. Late in the summer the U.S.
and Russia agree to combine the U.S. station and the planned Russian Mir 2
station. The new joint station will be placed in a 51.6-deg inclination orbit so
it is accessible to both U.S. and Russian spacecraft. Orbital debris poses a 15-
20% greater risk for a vehicle in a 51.6-deg inclination orbit than for one in a
28.5-deg orbit (the original SSF inclination). If they are to operate at SSF
altitude, Mir 2 components might require shielding augmentation to bring
them up to the standards adopted by the U.S., Japan, and Europe for SSF
meteoroid and orbital debris shielding. A rigorous assessment will be re-
quired to determine the level of augmentation needed. At lower Mir 1
altitudes, such shielding is not as important. Mir 1 operates within the
"sensible atmosphere," meaning that debris approaching the station is bound
for rapid decay. This reduces the chances that its path will intersect the
station's on a future orbit.
Interview, David S. F. Portree with Donald J. Kessler, September 8, 1993;
interview, David S. F. Portree with Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., September 9, 1993.
April 2-3 Representatives of ESA, NASDA, RKA, and NASA - in short, all the major
space powers - meet in Darmstadt, Germany, for multilateral talks on orbital
debris. The four agencies decide on formal terms of reference and a working
group structure. They agree to exchange technical information and experi-
ence in the context of a Space Debris Coordination Committee. The Commit-
tee agrees to meet regularly. It is aided by four international technical work-
ing groups. These have two formal representatives from each of the four
space powers, and cover modeling, mitigation, protection, and observation.
"First European Conference on Space Debris Held," ESA Bulletin, No. 74, May
1993, p. 94.
April 5-7 ESA holds the First European Conference on Space Debris in Darmstadt.
More than 250 orbital debris researchers from the U.S., China, Russia and the
other CIS countries, Japan, India, and a dozen other states attend. In a joint
statement, they conclude that the more than 7000 objects in Earth orbit do not
pose an immediate danger to human space activity, though measures must
be taken to keep the hazards from growing beyond safe limits. Because it is
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neither technically nor economically feasible to clean up space, action must
be taken to prevent the creation of new debris. Furthermore, they declare
that any action can be successful only if it is implemented through interna-
tional cooperation. Victor J. Slabinski, of the Intelsat organization, presents a
paper called "Intelsat Satellite Disposal: Orbit Raising Considerations,"
which supports the position taken in the U.S. CCIR position paper of April
15, 1992, as well as the draft recommendation written by Loftus and submit-
ted at CCIR 4 on May 29, 1992.
lbid; "First European Space Debris Conference," Spaceflight,Vol. 35, June
1993, p. 185; Victor J. Slabinski, Intelsat Spacecraft Disposal: Orbit Raising
Considerations," presented at the First European Conference on Space Debris,
Darmstadt, Germany, April 5-7, 1993.
The U.S. Congress inserts language into the FY 1994 NASA Authorization BiU
calling for U.S. government action on orbital debris. Specifically, section 309
mandates that "[t]he Office of Science and Technology Policy, in coordination
with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, and other agencies as appropriate, shall
submit a plan to Congress within one year after the date of enactment of this
Act for the control of orbital debris." Section 309 also calls for the plan to
include "launch vehicle and spacecraft design standards and operational
procedures to minimize the creation of new debris" and "a schedule for the
incorporation of the standards into all United States civil, military, and
commercial space activities." FinaUy, it states that the plan "shall include a
schedule for the development of an international agreement on the control of
orbital debris."
FY 1994 NASA Authorization Bill, August 4, 1993version, p. 25
Zhang Wen Xiang and Liao Shao Ying of the Chinese Launch Vehicle System
Design and Research Institute announce that the upper stage of the Long
March 4 rocket is being redesigned to make it less likely to explode in orbit.
z. w. xiang and L. S. Ying, "Analyzing the Causeof LM-4(A)'s Upper
Stage's Disintegration and the Countermeasure," presented at the International
Space Conference of Pacific Basin Societies, Shanghai, China, June 6-9, 1993.
A special meeting on orbital debris is held at the U.N. The subject of orbital
debris is introduced onto the agenda of the Science and Technical Committee
of the U.N. COPUOS.
On the STS-57 mission, the Space Shuttle Endeavour orbits Earth for nearly
10 days. It carries in the forward half of its payload bay the first Spacehab
module, a commercial space facility. Endeavour retrieves the Eureca satel-
lite, which carries the TiCCE, a British-built device for collecting orbital
debris particles. The MCC delays a planned maneuver by 45 min to avoid a
space object predicted to pass near the orbiter's 2-km-by-5-km-by-2-km
maneuver box. Endeavour's orbit is lowered after Eureca retrieval in accor-
dance with Flight Design Standard Ground Rule 4.2.4.2.
Interview,David S. F. Pot-treewithMichaelF. CollinsandJ. Steven
Stich, August 17, 1993.
94
95
Index
A
A Comparison of Spacecraft Penetration Hazards Due to
Meteoroids and Manmade Earth-Orbiting Objects
(report) (1976) 22
"A Position Paper on Orbital Debris" (1992) 86
A-1 (Asterix) (satellite) 7
Able Star (upper stage) 4
Abrahamson, James 51
Ad Hoc Committee on Potential Threat to U.S. Satellites by
Space Debris 43
Ad Hoc Expert Group of the Committee for Safety, Reliability,
and Quality 84, 86
Ad Hoc Working Group on Space Debris and Geostationary
Crowding 32
Adams, Douglas S. 81
Advanced Programs Office (NASA HQ) 30
Advanced Technology, Office of (Department of State) 58
Aeronautical and Space Technology, Office of (NASA HQ) 77
Aeronautics, Exploration, and Technology, Office of
(NASA HQ) 78
Aerospace Control Squadron, First 4
Aerospace Daily (newspaper) 88
Agrisoletta 87
Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) ix, 51
Air Force Space Command (AFSPACECOM) vii, 90
Air Force Space Technology Center (Phillips Laboratory) 67
Alaska 47
albedo 53, 54, 80, 89
Aldrich, Arnold D. 78
Aldrin, Edwin 10
alert box 49, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 76, 77
Alexandrov, Alexander 43, 44
Alighieri, Dante 87
AUer, Robert 54, 58
"Altitude Adjustment Strategy" (see Flight Design Standard
Ground Rule 4.2.4.2.)
aluminum 16, 17, 20, 45, 50, 70, 71, 79, 81, 82, 88, 89, 91, 92
particles from solid rocket motors 3, 31, 34, 41,42, 79
Alvarez, Joe 17
America (Apollo CSM) 15
American Institute of Astronautics and Aeronautics (AIAA) ix,
27, 33, 55, 65, 73
AIAA/NASA/DoD Orbital Debris Conference 65, 88
"Position Paper on Orbital Debris" (1981) 33, 35
Space Programs and Technologies Conference 69
Space Transportation Technical Committee 55
Technical Committee on Space Systems 33, 35
"Analysis of Orbital Debris Collision Probabilities for Space
Station" (paper) (1986) 51
Anders, William 10
Anderson, Charles E., Jr. 65
Anderson, Jeff 56
anomalous event 30
anomalous gamma ray 33, 53
anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) ix, 1, 5, 9, 11, 14, 22, 24, 26, 33,
39, 43, 47, 48, 51, 55, 57
Anz-Meador, Phillip 61,76, 92
Apollo 9, 17, 18, 21, 31,45
Apollo 7 9
Apollo 8 10
Apollo 11 10
Apollo 17 15
Command and Service Module (CSM) 9, 15, 31
Lunar Module (LM) 15, 36
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) ix, 11, 20
Arecibo 58
Argentina
and Salyut 7 reentry 72
Ariane 28, 38, 59, 75
Ariane 1 31, 52
Ariane 4 75
Ariane 5 73
Ariane V 1 31
Ariane VI6 52, 53, 54, 71
Arianespace 73
Armstrong, Neil 7, 10
Arnold Engineering Development Center (AEDC) (U.S. Air
Force) ix, 47, 79
Artificial Space Debris (book) (1987) 53
ARSAT (Art Satellite) ix, 87
ASAT (see anti-satellite weapon)
asteroid 17, 20
Atkov, Oleg 37
Atlantis (Space Shuttle) 63, 77, 83
Atlas E (launch vehicle) 56
atmospheric drag 1, 74
Augmented Target Docking Adapter (ATDA)
(spacecraft) ix, 7, 8
Australia
and Skylab reentry 26, 28
and Cosmos 434 reentry 36
Avdeyev, Sergei 88
B
Badhwar, Gautam 60, 61
Baker, Howard 62
Baker-Nunn Schmidt Camera 4
Ball Aerospace 78
Electro-Optics/Cryogenics Division 77
Banner (see Znamya)
Battelle Institute 25, 39, 57
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories 54
Belyayev, Pavel 6
Besette, D.E. 12
Bess, T. Dale 17, 19, 20, 22
Biosoletta 87
Black Arrow (launch vehicle) 12
Boeing Corporation 77
Borman, Frank 10
box score v
Branscombe, Darrell 54
96
PAGE I__ANK NOT F_MED
Britain 45
Brooks, David 17, 19, 22, 28
Brown, William B. 26
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 25
Buenos Aires 72
BUMPER computer program 85
Buran (spacecraft) 61, 72
C
Cameo (Chemically Active Material Into Orbit) ix, 35
Canada 92
and Cosmos 954 reentry 25, 33
Carlone, Ralph 83
Carlucci, Frank 39
Carr, Gerald 18
CCD Debris Telescope (CDT) ix, 63, 73
CCIR (see International Radio Consultative Committee)
Celestis Space Services 87
Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES) ix, 43, 73, 82
Cernan, Eugene 15
Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory 42
Challenger (Apollo spacecraft) 15
Challenger (Space Shuttle) viii, 34, 42, 45, 47, 49, 59, 64
Cherniatiev, B. V. 86
Cherniyevski, J. 86
China, Peoples' Republic of 10, 61, 75, 82, 89, 92, 93
China 1 (satellite) 10, 61
Chinese Academy of Science 75
Chinese Academy of Space Technology 75
Chinese Launch Vehicle System Design and Research
Institute 94
Chobotov, Vladimir 51
Christiansen, Eric L. vii, 69, 84, 88
Clanton, Uel 31
Clinton, William 93
Cold War 61
Collins, Michael 8, 10
"Collision Avoidance in Space" (article) (1980) 40
"Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a
Debris Belt" (article) (1978) 26
"Collision Probabilities of Future Manned Missions with
Objects in Earth Orbit" (1970) 10
collisional cascading (see also runaway debris generation,
Kessler Syndrome) 1, 66
"Collisional Cascading: The Limits of Population Growth in
Low Earth Orbit" (paper) (1990) 66
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1992) 87
Columbia (Apollo spacecraft) 10
Columbia (Space Shuttle) 34, 39, 64, 81, 82, 84
Columbus (ESA space station module) 71, 79, 88
Comedia Divina (novel) 87
Command and Service Module (CSM) ix, 9, 18, 31
Commercial Space Launch Act 44, 57
Commercial Space Transportation, Office of (OCST)
(DOT) 57
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) ix, 80, 93
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(COPUOS) ix, 8, 12, 58, 94
Communications Research Laboratory (CRL) ix, 79
Computation of Misses Between Orbits (COMBO) ix, 49
Comsat 39
Congressional Research Service (CRS) ix, 72
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects 11, 12, 15, 25, 59
Cooper, Gordon 5
Cooperation Meeting on Orbital Debris 71
Coordination Meeting on Orbital Debris, NASA/ESA/Japan,
Eighth 88
Cosmos satellites 26
Cosmos 50 (reconnaissance satellite) 6
Cosmos 198 (RORSAT) 9
Cosmos 248 (ASAT target) 9
Cosmos 249 (ASAT) 9
Cosmos 252 (ASAT) 9
Cosmos 373 (ASAT target) 11
Cosmos 374 (ASAT) 11
Cosmos 375 (ASAT) 11
Cosmos 382 (lunar lander test vehicle) 36
Cosmos 394 (ASAT target) 11
Cosmos 397 (ASAT) 11
Cosmos 398 (lunar lander test vehicle) 36
Cosmos 434 (lunar lander test vehicle) 36
Cosmos 459 (ASAT target) 14
Cosmos 462 (ASAT) 14
Cosmos 844 (reconnaissance satellite) 22
Cosmos 886 (ASAT) 22
Cosmos 954 (RORSAT) 6, 25, 26, 33
Cosmos 955 (military satellite) 76
Cosmos 970 (ASAT) 24
Cosmos 1171 (ASAT target) 33
Cosmos 1174 (ASAT) 33
Cosmos 1176 (RORSAT) 33
Cosmos 1267 (Space station module used with
Salyut 6) 24
Cosmos 1275 (Tsikada-class navigation satellite) 35, 36,
53, 80
Cosmos 1375 (ASAT target) 39
Cosmos 1379 (ASAT) 39
Cosmos 1402 (RORSAT) 42
Cosmos 1405 (ocean surveillance satellite) 45
Cosmos 1508 (minor military satellite) 88
Cosmos 1686 (space station module/manned spacecraft
test vehicle) 47, 72
Cosmos 1900 (RORSAT) 58, 59
COSPAR
XXV 45
XXVI 50
XXVIII 66
COSPAS/SARSAT (satellite system) ix, 18
Cour-Palais, Burton G. 17, 18, 23, 26, 28, 31, 40, 41, 65, 69
Crawley, Edward 71
Crews, Jeanne Lee vii, 37, 69, 88
Culbertson, Philip 28
Culp, Robert 54
Cunningham, Walter 9
Curator, Office of the 88
Current and Potential Technology to Protect Air Force Space
Missions from Current and Future Debris (report) 55
Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences 87
Czechoslovakia 24, 45, 86
97
DDalton, R. E. 7
David, Leonard 40
"Death with Dignity" (program proposal) 32
Debris Environment Characterization Radar (DECR) ix, 54, 57,
58, 63
Debris Collision Warning Sensors flight experiment 77
Delta (launch vehicle) 10, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 34, 35, 38, 73, 75
breakups 34, 38
Program Office 25, 34
second stage 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 29, 34, 35, 36, 37, 51,
53, 54, 59, 73
upper stage (see second stage)
Delta 180test 51, 54
Delta Aquarid meteor shower 43
Department of Commerce 55
Department of Defense (DoD) ix, 39, 41,42, 44, 47, 48, 53, 56,
58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 67, 77, 94
Department of Energy (DOE) ix, 30
Department of State 31, 33, 58, 59, 63, g0, 94
Department of Transportation (DOT) ix, 31, 44, 57, 63
Deutsche Agentur fOr Raumfahrtangelegenheit
(DARA) ix, 71, 79
Diamant (launch vehicle) 7
Diego Garcia 56
dipole 4, 6, 20
Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) ix, 22, 27, 71, 80
Discovery (Space Shuttle) 59, 62, 64, 76, 89
Djinis, William 63, 64
DMSP F3 (military weather satellite) 46
Dobrovolski, Georgi 12
Donahoo, Michael E. 10
Duck, Donald 40
Dudley Observatory 18
Dzhanibekov, Vladimir 46, 72
E
Eagle (Lunar Module) 10
Early Bird satellite (see Inteisat 1)
Earth-orbiting dust cloud 17
Edelstein, Karen 81
Edgecombe, Donald 25
Eglin Air Force Base 52
Eisele, Dorm 9
Ekran satellites
Ekran 1 22
E.kran 2 27, 80
Endeavour (Space Shuttle) 80, 83, 94
Energia (see also NPO Energia)
Design Bureau 76
Scientific Production Association 86
Environmental Aspects of Activities in Outer Space
Workshop 58
Environmental Effects Office (EEO) (JSC) 18, 87
work on Shuttle environmental effects 21
Solar Power Satellite studies 21, 87
ERS-1 (see European Remote Sensing 1) 75
Eureca (European Retrievable Carrier) ix, 83, 94
Europe 60, 61, 65, 79, 82, 93
European Aerospace Conference, Fourth 73
European Conference on Space Debris, First 93
European Remote Sensing 1 (ERS-1) (satellite) ix, 75
European Space Agency (ESA) ix, 31, 39, 43, 44, 45, 52, 54,
55, 59, 60, 67, 71, 72, 75, 84, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93
ESA Council 60
ESA-Russia Workshop on objects in GEO 84
European Space Operations Center (ESOC) ix, 71, 72, 84
European Space Technology Center (ESTEC) ix, 79
EVA (see extravehicular activity)
Evans, John V. 46
Evans, Ronald 15
EVOLVE computer model 76
Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Office (NASA HQ) 25,
29, 34
Experimental Telescope System (ETS) ix, 41, 42, 44. 45
Explorer satellites
Explorer 3 17
Explorer 16 17
Explorer 23 17
Explorer 46 15, 33, 34
extravehicular activity (EVA) ix, 6, 9, 44, 69, 80, 85, 88
F
F-15 fighter plane, ASAT launched by 47, 57
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) ix, 44, 80
Fengyun 1-2 69, 75
FGAN radar 80, 89
Fine Guidance Sensors 51
Fletcher, James 52, 54
Flight Design Standard Ground Rule 4.2.4.2. 84, 94
Flight Dynamics Officer (FDO) ix, 49
Flight Rule 2-77 84, 85
Flight Rule 4-3 ("Orbit Conjunctions and Conflicts") 49, 60
Flight Rule 4-61 49, 60
Flury, Walter 86
FPS-79 radar 52
FPS-85 radar 52
France 7, 50, 55, 82, 89, 92
Friendship 7 (Mercury capsule) 5
Friesen, Larry Jay 80
Frosch, Robert A. 26
FY 1994 NASA Authorization Bill 94
G
GT-8 (see Gemini 8)
Gabbard diagram 12, 13
Gabbard, John R. 11, 25
Gagarin, Yuri 4
Galileo (Jupiter probe) 63
Gamma Ray Spectrometer (GRS) 33
Gaposchkin, Michael 92
Gemini GT-8 Orbital Collision Hazard Evaluation (1966) 7
Gemini (spacecraft) 7, 17
Gemini 3 7
Gemini 8 7
Gemini 10 8
General Dynamics 63
geodesy 20
98
GEtS(GeodynamicsExperimentalOceanSatellite)satellitesGEtS2 44
GEtS3 26
Germany45,58,61,64,78,86,89,93
Get-AwaySpecial(GAS)ix,89
Gibson,Edward18
Gibson,Gary17,19,22
Ginga(Astro-3)(satellite)53GLAVCOSMOS64
GLONASS86
Glenn,John5
GMS(satellite)(seeHimawari1)
GoddardSpaceFlightCenter(GSFC)v,x,20,25,32,
34,35,39
GOES(seeNOAAsatellites)
Goldin,Daniel83
Goldstoneradar3,92
Gorizont17(satellite)90
Gorshkov,LeonidA.76,77
GovernmentAccountingOffice(GAO)ix,34,64,65,72,81
graveyard(seealsostorageorbit)32,74,75,81
Griffith,Andy40
Grissom,Virgil7
Ground-basedEl ctro-OpticalSpaceSurveillance(GEODSS)x,41,45,51,54,56
GroundBasedRadarExperimental(GBR-X)ix,66,78
Gubarev,Alexei24
H
H-1 (launch vehicle) 37, 75
"harmful interference" (see "potentially harmful interference")
Harris, C. Donald 77
Harvard Observatory 17
HAX (see Haystack Auxiliary radar)
Haystack radar 3, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 73, 79, 89, 90, 92
Haystack Auxiliary radar x, 63, 65, 66, 79
Hazard Analysis of Commercial Space Transportation
(report) 57
Hemenway, C.L. 18
Henize, Karl G. vii, 45, 47, 50, 53, 54, 63, 73
Hermes (manned spacecraft) 61, 79
Hernandez, D. E. 66
Heusmann, Helmut 71, 88
Himawari 1 (weather satellite) 24
Homegoing (novel) 40
Horn, Jennifer 69
Hosenball, S. Neil 15, 58, 59
Hubble Space Telescope (HST) x, 42, 50, 51
Humes, Donald 17, 33, 34, 41
hypergolic propellants 37, 38, 86
Hypervelocity Impact Test Facility (HIT-F) vii, x 69, 89, 92
Idaho 46
"Implications of Artificial Satellite Population Growth for Long
Range Naval Planning" (1963) 5
India 33, 48, 82, 93
Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) x, 41,42, 51, 63
Infrared Astronomy Satellite (IRAS) (see also IRAS Space
Research Groningen) x, 41, 66
infrared telescope 44, 48, 53, 89
Inman, Thomas W. 51, 52
Instittit ftir Raumflugtechnik und Reaktortechnik (IfRR) x, 54
Institute for Astronomy (INASAN) x, 19, 37
Institute for Space Research (IK1) x, 76, 79
Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science (ISAS) x, 10,
63, 77
Intelsat
Intelsat 1 7
Intelsat 3-F1 10
Intelsat 6 65, 80
Intelsat Organization 7, 80, 94
"Intelsat Satellite Disposal: Orbit Raising Considerations"
(1993) (paper) 94
Interagency Group (IG) (Space) x, 56, 61, 65, 67
Report (see Report on Orbital Debris)
Intercosmos 14 (science satellite) 39
International Academy of Astronautics (1AA) x, 84
International Astronomical Union (IAU) x, 48
International Atomic Energy Agency 59
International Journal of lmpact Engineering 88
International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) ix, 74,
81, 94
International Space Year 61, 82
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) x, 74, 80, 81
International Workshop on the Salyut 7/Cosmos 1686
Reentry 72
IRAS Space Research Groningen 41
Israel 54
ITOS-F (satellite) (see NOAA 3)
Investigation of Delta Second Stage On-Orbit Explosions
(report) (1982) 37
,J
Jacobs, Daniel 63, 64, 74, 75
Japan 10, 61, 63, 65, 74, 78, 79, 82, 86, 88, 89, 92, 93
Japan Society for Aeronautical and Space Sciences (JSASS) x,
68, 77, 79, 80, 92
Japanese Experiment Module (JEM) x, 69, 71, 88
Jehn, R. 88
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) x, 39, 54, 56, 58
Johnson, Lyndon B. 8
Johnson, Nicholas v, vii, 51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 86
Johnson Space Center (JSC) (see also Manned Spacecraft
Center) v, vii, viii, x, 18, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,
34, 37, 39, 40, 41, 90, 92 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 57,
60, 61, 63, 65, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 79, 80, 81, 84,
85, 88, 89
Joint Orbital Debris Working Group Meeting, (U.S.-Russia) 82,
86
Joint Workshop on Space Debris and Its Policy Implications 62
Journal of Geophysical Research (JGR) xx, 26, 28, 40
"Junk in Space" (article) (1982) 40
K
Kaman Sciences Corporation vii,77,78,84,86,87,89,90,92
Ke_,Justin 88
Kessler, Donald J. vii, 17,21,23,25,26,27,28,31,32,34,40,
41,47,51,52,54,56,58,61,62,64,65,66,71,74,75,80,84
99
KesslerSyndrome(s ealsocollisionalcascading,runaway
debrisgeneration)1
Kessler-Andersonorbitaldebrismodel(1991SSFdebris
environmentmodel)56,65,69,71,74,75,90
Kevlar77,92
KiernanReentryMeasurementsSite67
Kinard,William17
King-Hele,Desmond4,20
Kizim,Leonid37
Klingon40
Klinkrad, H. 88
Komarov, Vladimir 9
KOSMOS organization 76, 86
Kovolos, George 46
Kraft, Christopher 21, 23, 27, 28, 29. 87
Kristall (Mir module) 50
Kunsberg, Philip 53, 58, 59
Kvant (Mir module) 50
Kvant-2 (Mir module) 50
Kwajalein Atoll 51, 66, 67
Kyoto University 79
L
Landry, Preston 22, 40
Landsat satellites 19
Landsat 1 19, 53
Landsat 2 21
Landsat 3 34, 53
Langley Research Center (LaRC) x, 17, 19, 20, 22, 33, 41
Lambda 4S-5 (launch vehicle) 10
LDEF x, 3, 19, 45, 64, 72, 73, 82, 88, 92
LDEF II 88
LDEF Post-Retrieval Symposium, First 73
LDEF Post-Retrieval Symposium, Second 82
LDEF Space Environmental Effects Newsletter 73
Lenoir, William 66
Lenzar orbital debris telescope 47, 50, 53
Leonov, Alexei 6
Levin, George 74, 75
Liability Convention (see Convention on International Liability
for Damage Caused by Space Objects)
Liao, Shao Ying 94
light-gas gun 41, 74
Lockheed 39, 47, 57, 78, 80, 81, 82,
Loftus, Joseph P., Jr. v, 23, 25, 28, 29, 31, 42, 51, 52, 55, 61,
62, 63, 64, 73, 74, 75, 80, 94
Long Duration Exposure Facility (see LDEF)
Long March 1 (launch vehicle) 10
Long March 4 (launch vehicle) 38, 69, 75, 94
Lovell, James 10
Luch/SDRN satellites 48
lunar base 21
lunar cabin 36
Lunetta 87
LOst, Reimar 52, 60
Lyakhov, Vladimir 43
I¢1
Magellan (Venus probe) 63
Mahon, Joseph 34, 58
100
Maley, Paul D. vii, 46
Management and Budget, Office of 56
Management Council, NASA 29
Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) (see also Johnson Space
Center) x, 8, 10, 17, 18
maneuver box 49, 59, 60, 63, 76, 77, 78, 94
Mars 11, 21, 83
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) x, 12, 17, 39, 41, 48, 51,
56, 69, 90
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 71
Lincoln Laboratory (MIT-LL) x, 41, 42, 44, 46, 73, 79, 92
Maui 56
Max Planck Instit0t 39
McCarter, James 12, 14, 51
McDonald Observatory 50
McDonnell Aircraft Company 21
McDonnell Douglas Space Systems Company x, 34, 35, 37, 83
McKnight, Darren v, 36, 53, 57, 86
McGohick, J. E. 14
Memorandum of Agreement, NASA-NORAD/ADCOM 36, 66,
76
Memorandum of Understanding, NASA-USSPACECOM 45
Mercury (spacecraft) 5, 17
Mesh Double Bumper Shield (MDB) x, 69, 70, 88, 89, 92
meteoroid (micrometeorite, micrometeoroid) 15, 17, 18, 19, 21,
22, 27, 31, 33, 37, 43, 46, 50, 69, 71, 79, 81, 82, 88, 92
de_ctor 15, 17, 34, 80
Michaud, Michael A. 58, 59
Midas satellites
Midas 4 4
Midas 6 6
Midcourse Space Experiment (MSX) satellite 92, 93
Middle and Upper (MU) atmosphere radar (Kyoto
University) x, 79
"Minimization and Mitigation of Orbital Debris"
(USSPACECOM regulation 57-2) 73
Mir (space station) 1,48, 50, 76, 77, 89, 92
description of orbital debris protection 64, 77
window impact (1988) 57
Mir 1 (space station) (see Mir)
Mir 2 (space station) 62, 93
Mission Control Center (MCC) x, 43, 49, 59, 60, 77, 94
Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) 49, 84
Mission to Planet Earth 76
Mitre Corporation vii, 78
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 74
Moon 10, 11, 46, 83
Multi-Shock Shield (MSS) x, 69, 70, 91, 92
"Must Space Missions be Beneficial?" (paper) 87
Iq
NASA-ESA Working Group 59
National Aerospace Laboratory (Japan) 79
National Directive on Space Policy 56, 57, 58
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 25,
44
National Science Foundation (NSF) 39
National Security Council 56, 61
National Space Council 67
National Space Development Agency (NASDA) x, 37, 69, 71,
74, 79, 88, 93
NationalSpaceSymposium,Fifth62,68
NavalResearchLaboratory5,77,83
NAVSPASUR(NavalSpaceSurveillanceSystem)x,4,20
Neal,Valerie81
NECCorporation80
Nelson,George45
Newell,Homer14
Nextel69,92
Nimbussatellites
Nimbus6 72
Nimbus7 35
NOAA(NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration)x,
25,44
NOAAsatellites
NOAA1 18
NOAA3 18
NOAA4 20,36
NOAA5 22
NOAA8 18
NOAA1218
NOAA1318
NORAD(NorthAmericanAerospaceD fenseCommand) v, x,
1, 3, 4,7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 21, 22, 23, 25, 31, 34, 36, 39, 40, 43,
44, 45, 49
North Carolina State University (NCSU) x, 67, 73, 76, 89
NPO Energia (see also Energia) 64, 92
nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) x, 83
nuclear reactor 9, 25, 30, 33, 42, 53, 58, 59, 64, 65, 76
O
O'Brien, John E. 64, 65
Offeq- 1 (satellite) 54
OMS kits (see Orbital Maneuvering System kits)
optical sensor (see telescope)
Orbit Flight Techniques Panel 84
Orbital Debris Committee (NASA Headquarters) 56
Orbital Debris Coordination Meeting (NASA-ESA) (see also
Space Debris Coordination Meeting) 72
Orbital Debris Data Analysis Facility 73
Orbital Debris Program Manager (NASA Headquarters) 63, 74
"Orbital Debris Environment for Space Station" (JSC 20001)
(report) 46
Orbital Debris Impact Laboratory 37, 41, 69
Orbital Debris Monitor (newsletter) 57
Orbital Debris Radar Calibration Spheres (ODERACS) x, 67,
76, 82, 84, 89
Orbital Debris Study Group (China) 75
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) kits 30
Orbital Workshop (see Skylab)
Orbiting Debris: A Space Environmental Problem (report)
63, 68
Oscar 8 (satellite) 34
Oscar 22 (satellite) 79
Osumi (satellite) I0
"Outer Space Activities versus Outer Space" (paper) (1979) 28
Outer Space Treaty (see Treaty on Principles Governing the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space)
oxidizer 37, 38, 87
P
P-78 test (see Solwind)
PAGEOS (Passive Geodetic Earth-Orbiting Satellite) xi, 20
paint 1, 3, 18, 42, 50, 82
Patseyev, Victor 12
Pegasus satellites 17
Perek, Lubos 24, 28, 29, 87, 88
Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System (PARCS)
xi, 22, 23, 27, 45, 59
Peterkin, Ernest W. 5
"Physics, Uses and Regulation of the Geostationary Orbit, or, ex
facto sequitur lex" (paper) (1977) 24
Pion subsatellites 80, 87
Pion 5 83, 84, 88
Pion 6 83, 84, 88
Pioneer 10 (Jupiter probe) 40
Pogo (comic strip) 40
Pogue, William 18
Pohl, Frederik 40
Popov, Leonid 24
post-Cold War world 61
"potentially harmful interference" 15, 40, 87
Potter, Andrew E. vii, 21, 41,47, 51, 53, 54, 55, 58, 63, 64, 67,
74, 75, 76, 87
Powersoletta 87
Poynting-Robertson Effect 74
"Predicting the Probability that Earth-Orbiting Spacecraft
will Collide with Man-made Objects in Space" (paper)
(1974) 19
Preservation of Near-Earth Space for Future Generations
(symposium) 60, 82
Professor Hermit 40
Progress (spacecraft) 24, 28, 47, 72
Progress M-15 (see also Znamya) 92
Project Moonwatch vii, 4
Project West Ford 4, 5, 6, 20, 27
Prospero (satellite) 12
Proton Block DM (fourth stage) 38, 86, 90
auxiliary motor 38, 86, 90
ullage motor (see auxiliary motor)
o/n
QUICKSAT 56
Radar-equipped Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (RORSAT) xi,
9, 25, 33, 42, 53, 58, 59
radioactive material (radioactives, radioactive debris) 6, 25, 30,
33, 59, 64
radioisotope thermal generator (RTG) xi, 30
Raney, William 88
Rast, Richard 46
Rattlesnake Mountain Observatory 54, 63, 73
Raytheon 78
Reagan, Ronald 44, 56, 58
Remek, Vladimir 24
Report on Orbital Debris 61, 67, 68
Resolution on the Agency's Policy vis-a-vis the Space Debris
Issue (ESA) 60
Resurs F-16 (satellite) (see also Pion subsatellites) 83, 84. 88
Rex, Dietrich 54, 60, 64
Rockwell vii, 84
101
Rohini1B(satellite) 33
Royal Greenwich Observatory 89
Rule of Good Seamanship 29
runaway debris generation (see also Kessler Syndrome,
Collisional Cascading) 1, 21
Russia 1, 61, 62, 82, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93
Russian Academy of Sciences 79
Center for Program Studies 86
Russian Defense Ministry 79
Russian Federation (see Russia)
Russian Space Agency (RKA) xi, 79. 83, 93
Ryumin, Valeri 24
S
S 149 Particle Collection experiment 18
Safety Office (NASA Headquarters) 12
Salvage 1 (television program) 40
Salyut space stations 17
Salyut 1 12, 24, 80
Salyut 2 17
Salyut 6 24, 37
Salyut 7 37, 43, 44, 46, 47, 72
Sato, Naoki 88
Savinykh, Viktor 46
Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM) xi, 18, 31, 81, 82
Science Planning Corporation 67
Science and Technical Committee (U.N. COPUOS) 94
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) (U.S. Air Force) 43, 50, 55
Schevardnadze, Edvard 59
Schirra, Walter 9
Schmitt, Harrison 15
Schultz, Richard 31
Scott, David 8
Scout (launch vehicle) 6, 47
Seiradakis, John 46
Shaw, Morton 12
Shefter, Jim 40
Shuttle (see Space Shuttle, STS)
silver 62
Sira 89
Skylab (space station) 10, 12, 14, 17, 18, 22, 25, 26, 28
Skylab 1 18
Skylab 3 18
Skylab 4 18, 31
Skynet 1-B (satellite) 10
SL-6 (launch vehicle) 5
Slabinski, Victor J. 94
SLV-3 (launch vehicle) 33
Smith, Harlan 50
Smith, Marcia S. 72
Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory (SAO) xi, 4
SNAP (Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power) systems
SNAP 9 6
SNAP 10-A 30
Snapshot (see SNAP 10-A)
solar activity 5, 27, 31, 48, 60
Solar Max 33, 45, 50, 53, 56, 59, 71
solar maximum 25, 27, 31,48, 60
Solar Maximum Mission satellite (see Solar Max)
Solar Power Satellite (SPS) xi, 21, 23, 27, 28, 87
Solar Power Satellite: Concept Evaluation (report) (1977) 23
102
solar sail 92
soletta 92
Solovyev, Vladimir 37
Solovyov, Anatoli 89
Solwind 47, 48, 50, 51, 57
"Some Characteristics of the Artificial Earth Satellite Popula-
tion" (memorandum) (1963) 5
Southwest Research Institute (SRI) xi, 65
Soviet 5, 6, 11, 14, 22, 25, 27, 28, 33, 36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 46, 58,
59, 72, 76, 77, 80, 90
Soviet Academy of Science 19
Soviet Union 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 17, 20, 22, 24, 25, 33,
36, 37, 39, 48, 50, 59, 61, 65, 71
Soyuz 1, 61, 72
Soyuz 1 9,
Soyuz 2 9
Soyuz 11 12
Soyuz 35 24
Soyuz T xi
Soyuz T-9 43
Soyuz T-10B 37
Soyuz T- 13 46
Soyuz TM xi, 48
Soyuz TM-15 89
Space and Technology Policy, Office of 94
space cleanup 23, 27, 94
Space Debris (report) (1988) 60, 68
Space Debris Advisory Group (ESA) 60
Space Debris Coordination Committee 93
Space Debris Coordination Meeting (NASA-ESA) (see also
Orbital Debris Coordination Meeting) 55, 71, 79
Space Debris Coordination and Technical Analysis Group
(ESA) 60
Space Debris Forum 80
Space Debris Study Group (JSASS) 68, 79, 92
Space Debris Working Group (ESA) 54, 60
Space Debris Workshop 91 77
Space Debris: A Growing Problem (report) 72
Space Debris Minimization and Mitigation Handbook 67
Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) 61
Space Flight, Office of 54, 58, 75
"Space Junk: It's Time to Invent Orbited Baggies" (article)
(1978) 40
Space Program Space Debris: Potential Threat to Space Station
and Shuttle (report) 64, 65
Space Science Board (National Academy of Sciences) 4
Space Shuttle 1, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 36, 39, 42, 47, 49, 59, 60,
62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 72, 73, 76, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 89, 94
cargo hay (see payload bay)
Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) ix, 82, 84
payload bay 45, 77, 82, 84, 85, 89
payload bay doors 83, 85
Program Office 54
radiators 82, 83, 84, 85
Thermal Protection System 62, 82
windows 34, 42, 43, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85
Space Station (see also Salyut, Skylab, Mir, Mir 2) 10, 11, 12,
14, 21, 28, 41, 44, 47, 48, 52, 76, 78, 80, 81, 83, 88, 92, 93
Control Board 74, 75
Freedom (SSF) xi, 48, 51, 55, 58, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 69,
71, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80, 81, 83, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93
Critical Design Review (CDR) 58, 63, 81, 83
ProgramOffice71
Option Alpha 93
Space Station: Delays in Dealing with Space Debris May
Reduce Safety and Increases Costs (1992) 81
Space Surveillance Network (SSN) xi, 78
Space Telescope Science Institute 50
Space Transportation Operations, Office of 30, 34
Space Transportation Systems, Office of 28
space tug 30
Spacehab 94
Spacelab 2 viii, 47
spacesuits 88, 92
spacewalk (see extravehicular activity)
SPOT I (satellite) 52
Sputnik satellites
Sputnik 1 l, 4
Sputnik 3 17
Sputnik 29 5
stable plane 75
stainless steel 82
Stanford University 63
Stanley, John F. vii, 47, 51, 67, 73, 76, 89
Stansbery, Eugene E. vii, 51, 73, 87
Star Trek V: The Final Frontier (movie) 40
State Department (see Department of State)
Statement of Regret 33
storage orbit (see also graveyard) 25, 42, 59
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 2 (SALT 2) xi, 28
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) xi, 47, 55, 61
Organization (SDIO) xi, 45, 51
Structures Working Group 48
STS (Space Transportation System) (see also Space Shuttle) xi
STS-I 34, 36, 49
STS-4 39
STS-6 42
STS-7 42
STS-26 49, 59
STS-27 60
STS-29 62
STS-30 63
STS-32 64
STS-33 64
STS-35 81
STS 41-C 45
STS-44 77
STS-45 82
STS-46 83
STS-48 64, 76
STS-49 80
STS-50 82
STS 5 I-F viii, 47
STS 51-L 49
STS-53 89
STS-57 49, 83, 94
STS-60 89
Stuffed Whipple shield 91, 92
Su, Shin-Yi 47
SubcommiUee on Micrometeor and Debris Protection (Space
Station Advisory Council) 71
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space (U.S.
Senate) 26
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications (U.S. House
of Representatives) 51, 53, 54, 58
Suddeth, David H. 32
Sun-synchronous orbit 18, 24, 37, 52, 56, 75
Symphonie (satellite) 43
Symposium on Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion, Tenth 90
Syncom 3 (satellite) 6
Syromiatnikov, Vladimir S. 92
"Systematic Discontinuities in the Location of Satellite
Explosion Fragments" (1971) 11
T
Tabor, Jill 83
Taylor, Reuben 40
Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) xi, 69, 71
Technical Planning Office (JSC) 23
Technische Universit_it Braunschweig (TUBS) xi, 54, 63, 65,
71, 72, 79, 86
Technogenic Space Debris: Problems and Directions in
Research (conference) 79-80
Technology Assessment, Office of xi, 62, 63, 68, 72
Teledyne Brown Engineering 51, 53, 54, 57, 58, 63
telescope viii, 3, 23, 44, 50, 66, 67, 78, 79, 80, 89
Telstar 1 (satellite) 6
Tethered Remover Satellite (TERESA) xi, 79
The Growing Challenge: A Short Course on Dealing with
Orbital Debris 65
"The Growing Peril of Space Debris" (article) (1982) 40
"The Explosion of Satellite 10704 and Other Delta Second Stage
Breakups" (1981) 34
"The Solar Power Satellite Concept - The Past Decade and the
Next Decade" (paper) (1979) 27
Thilges, J. N. 7
Tilton, E. Lee, IN vii, 56
Timeband Capture Cell Experiment (TiCCE), xi, 83, 94
Titan 3 (launch vehicle) 65
Titan 3C (launch vehicle) 7
titanium 18, 42, 82
Toda, Susuma 79
Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS) xi, 35
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) xi, 42, 48, 51, 59, 62
Transit satellites (see also Oscar 22) 78
Transit 4-A 4
Transit 5BN3 6
Transportation Systems Center 57
transtage 7, 42
Treaty on Principles Governing the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space 8, 9, 59, 87
Article VI 15
Article VII 15
Article IX 15, 87
TRW 7
Tsikada-class navigation satellite (see Cosmos 1275)
Tullos, Randy 65
IJ
uncatalogued debris population 2, 3, 27, 45, 47, 51, 52, 54, 67
uncontrolled reentry 11, 14, 25, 46, 59, 72
Unispace 89
United Kingdom (U.K.) (Britain) 12, 45, 80
United Nations (U.N.) 8, 11, 12, 15, 24, 58, 59, 65, 94
United States Space Foundation (USSF) xi, 62, 68
103
UniversityofChicago 60, 79, 82
University of Kent 83
University of Texas 50
Unknown Satellite Track Experiment 22
Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) 76
Upper Stage Breakup Conference 54
uranium 25, 59
Urnsat (satellite) 87
U.S. Air Force 4, 6, 43, 47, 48, 50, 55, 56, 57, 66, 67, 69, 73,
79, 83
Academy 36, 53
Space Division 31
Space Test Program 83
U.S. Naval Observatory 53
U.S. Army 63
U.S.-Soviet Orbital Debris Working Group 64, 67, 76-77, 82
USSPACECOM (United States Space Command) v, xi, 1, 3, 6,
7, 45, 46, 47, 49, 59, 63, 65, 66, 71, 73, 76, 79, 92
V/W
van Hoften, James 45
Vanguard 1 (satellite) 1
Vedder, John 83
Vega (Halley's Comet probe) 80
venting 43, 59
Viking (satellite) 52
Vilas, Faith 48, 50
Volkov, Vladislav 12
Voskhod 2 6
Vostok (spacecraft) 5, 6, 83
Vostok 1 4
Walyus, Diane 83
Weinberger, Caspar 47
West Ford Needles 4
West Germany (see Germany)
Wiesner, Jerome B. 5
Williams, Walter C. 32
Winlder, Jerry 53
Whipple, Fred vii, 4, 16, 17, 47
Whipple Bumper 15, 16, 17, 22, 45, 69, 70, 88, 91,92
World Space Congress 86
X/Y/Z
XonTech Corporation 67, 78, 90
Yardley, John F. 29
Young, John 7, 8
Zhang, Wen Xiang 94
zinc 81
Znamya 92
ZniMash (Central Institute for the Ministry of General Machine
Building) 64
Zolensky, Michael E. vii, 88
Zook, Herbert A. vii, 17, 31
104
105
Form Approved
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMBNo.OZO4-Olaa
Public reloocting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect Of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA
222024302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (07040188), Washingtofl, DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) I 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVEREDDecember 1993 Reference Publ ication
I
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
Orbital Debris and Near-Earth Environmental Management:
A Chronology
6. AUTHOR(S)
David S. F. Portree
Joseph P. Loftus
7. PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES)
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Houston, TX 77058
9. SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCYNAME(S)ANDADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546-001
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
S-747
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
NASA-RP-1320
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unclassified/Unlimlted Publicly Available from
NASA Center for Aerospace Information
800 Elkridge Landing Road
Linthicum Heights, MD 21090 Subject Category 88
301-621-0390
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200words)
This chronology covers the 32-year history of orbital debris and near-Earth
environmental concerns. It tracks near-Earth environmental hazard creation, research,
observation, experimentation, management, mitigation, protection, and policy-making,
with emphasis on the orbital debris problem. Included are the Project West Ford
experiments; Soviet ASAT tests and U.S. Delta upper stage explosions; the Ariane V16
explosion, U.N. treaties pertinent to near-Earth environmental problems; the PARCS
tests; space nuclear power issues, the SPS/orbital debris link; Space Shuttle and space
station orbital debris issues; the Solwind ASAT test; milestones in theory and modeling;
the Cosmos 954, Salyut 7, and Skylab reentries; the orbital debris/meteoroid research
link; detection system development; orbital debris shielding development; popular
culture and orbital debris; Solar Max results; LDEF results; orbital debris issues
peculiar to geosynchronous orbit, including reboost policies and the stable plane;
seminal papers, reports, and studies; the increasing effects of space activities on
astronomy; and growing international awareness of the near-Earth environment.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Space Debris, Environmental Effects, Reentry Effects, Collision
Rates, Debris, Orbit Decay, Histories, Bibliographies
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF REPORT
Unclassified
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified
15. NUMBER OF PAGES
116
16. PRICE CODE
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UL
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-gg)
prescriioedbyANSlStd. 23g-18 P_I_ P!SE BLANK NOT FICMP_?
298-102
